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This dissertation is comprised of three distinct essays that generally examine the impact of foreign
aid on political and economic governance in recipient countries. The first essay of the dissertation
develops a game-theoretic model that predicts that Chinese development assistance has a negative
effect on recipient country compliance with Western aid conditionality. Using project-level data
from 42 Sub-Saharan African countries, I find strong empirical evidence that increased Chinese aid
within a recipient country decreases the likelihood of compliance with conditions specified in World
Bank project agreements. The second essay of the dissertation examines the effect of foreign aid
on the incidence of political budget cycles in expenditures and taxation in developing countries.
I theorize that aid increases the likelihood of political budget cycles by increasing the value of
holding office, obscuring fiscal transparency, and creating a soft budget constraint that discourages
fiscal discipline. Using panel data for 70+ developing democracies from 1990-2012, the empirical
analysis finds that political budget cycles in expenditures are statistically and substantively larger
as foreign aid within a country increases. Contrary to my hypothesis, the analysis reveals no
significant relationship between aid and tax revenue prior to elections. The third essay of the
dissertation investigates the effect of foreign aid projects on institutional trust using geolocated
data on aid projects and Afrobarometer survey results from Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. Drawing
from institutional theories of trust, I theorize that foreign aid projects harm institutional trust by
lowering citizens’ evaluations of government performance and administrative competence. Using
a spatial difference-in-difference strategy, the empirical results find that active aid projects are
associated with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and local government council. The
results also indicate that completed aid projects are associated with declines in institutional trust,
although the effect size constitutes a statistically and substantively smaller change compared to
active projects.
iii
To my grandmother, Sylvia Black.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My profound thanks to my advisor, Layna Mosley, who was supportive of me and my research
throughout my graduate career. In addition, I would like to express my immense gratitude to
committee members, Lucy Martin, Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Erik Wibbels, and Brigitte Seim.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
ON COMPLIANCE WITH WESTERN AID CONDITIONALITY . . . . . . . 5
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Determinants of Compliance with Conditionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chinese Aid and Compliance with Conditionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
CHAPTER 3: FOREIGN AID AND PRE-ELECTORAL FISCAL MANIPULA-
TION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Aid and Political Budget Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Illustrative Case: Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
vi
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN AID AND TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS . 59
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Aid and Trust in Political Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 . . . . . . . . 84
Incorporating Chinese Aid into the Aid-for-Policy Model Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Data sources and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 . . . . . . . . 100
Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Fixed Effects Estimation Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
System-GMM Estimation Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4 . . . . . . . . 116
Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Location of Afrobarometer Respondents and Aid Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
vii
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Conditional logit estimations (average semi-elasticities) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Instrumental variable estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Fiscal outcomes by ODA/GDP grouping and election year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Foreign aid and political budget cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 Foreign aid projects and institutional trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Foreign aid projects and government performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3 Foreign aid projects and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.2 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.3 Government compliance summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.4 Top 10 recipients of Chinese development assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.5 Conditional logit estimation results (change in log odds coefficients) . . . . . . . . . 95
A.6 Conditional logit specifications with additional economic controls . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.7 Conditional logit specifications with additional political and project controls . . . . . 97
A.8 Instrumental variable analysis robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.9 Heterogenous treatment effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B.2 Countries included in sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B.3 Alternative measures of foreign aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.4 Additional controls for Expenditures/GDP model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.5 Additional controls for Tax/GDP model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.6 Addressing outlier concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B.7 Alternative election year adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B.8 Alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.9 System-GMM estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
B.10 System-GMM robustness checks- Alternative specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
B.11 System-GMM robustness Checks- Alternative measures of foreign aid . . . . . . . . . 110
B.12 System-GMM robustness checks- Additional controls for Expenditures/GDP model . 111
viii
B.13 System-GMM robustness checks- additional controls for Tax/GDP model . . . . . . 112
B.14 System-GMM robustness checks- Addressing outlier concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B.15 System-GMM robustness checks- Alternative election year adjustments . . . . . . . . 114
B.16 System-GMM robustness checks- Alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
C.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
C.2 Trust in political institutions by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
C.3 Foreign aid projects and institutional trust (region-round fixed effects) . . . . . . . . 118
C.4 Foreign aid projects and institutional trust by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C.5 Foreign aid projects and institutional trust (alternative empirical strategy) . . . . . 120
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Predicted probability of compliance as the proportion of Chinese OF to GDP increases 23
2.2 Heterogenous treatment effects across institutional and economic environments . . . . 29
3.1 Political budget cycles in Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Marginal effects of ODA/GDP on Expenditures/GDP and Tax Revenue/GDP in elec-
tion and non-election years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Marginal effect of Elections on Expenditures/GDP by level of ODA/GDP . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Marginal effect of Elections on Tax Revenue/GDP by level of ODA/GDP . . . . . . . 51
3.5 Marginal effect of ODA/GDP on Expenditures/GDP controlling for alternative expla-
nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Marginal effect of ODA/GDP on Tax Revenue/GDP controlling for alternative expla-
nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 Conceptual model of the relationship between aid projects and political trust . . . . . 64
4.2 Difference in Active and Inactive coefficients with 95% CIs across cutoff distances . . . 75
4.3 Difference in Completed and Inactive coefficients with 95% CIs across cutoff distances 75
A.1 Single shot game matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.2 Chinese Official Finance to Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.3 Government Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa (% projects rated moderately satis-
factory and above) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
C.1 Nigeria Afrobarometer clusters and aid project locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
C.2 Senegal Afrobarometer clusters and aid project locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
C.3 Uganda Afrobarometer clusters and aid project locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DPF Development Policy Finance
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
IFI International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
NGO Non-governmental organization
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Cooperation and Development
OF Official Finance
OOF Other Official Flows




Two decades after becoming a buzzword on the development agenda, governance remains a top
priority for the international donor community (Gisselquist and Resnick 2014). Good governance is
essential to ensure that foreign aid supports long-term capacity development and poverty alleviation
in recipient countries. Governance refers to the institutions and processes by which authority in
a country is exercised. Governance encompasses “the process by which governments are selected,
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic
and social interactions among them” (Kaufman et al. 2011). Governance has a range of different
components including accountability, political stability, government capacity, control of corruption,
sound economic policies, and rule of law.
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that examine how foreign aid impacts political and
economic governance in developing countries. The dissertation aims to explore new research paths
in the field of the political economy of aid and important questions that have yet to be sufficiently
addressed in the literature. The three essays in this dissertation examine the impact of Chinese
development assistance on recipient country compliance with Western aid conditionality (Chapter
2), the effect of foreign aid on pre-electoral fiscal manipulation of expenditures and taxation in
developing democracies (Chapter 3), and the impact of foreign aid projects on citizens’ trust in
political institutions and actors (Chapter 4). The dissertation aims to contribute generally to the
literature on aid effectiveness and governance in recipient countries. Individually, the essays also
aim to contribute to research on emerging donors, political budget cycles, and institutional trust.
The first essay of the dissertation, “Undermining Conditionality? The Effect of Chinese De-
velopment Assistance on Compliance with World Bank Aid Agreements” examines how the rise of
China as an international donor impacts recipient country compliance with traditional Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) donor conditionality. Aid conditionality has been a standard tool
used by donors to improve governance in recipient countries. Aid conditionality is the attachment
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of policy conditions to the disbursement of aid. Conditionality is intended to induce policy reform
and deter the misappropriation of aid by threatening to withdraw future transfers if the recipient
country fails to comply with the conditions of the aid agreement. Donors commonly condition aid
on institutional reform, fiscal transparency, and economic policy to limit rent-seeking and improve
the effectiveness of foreign aid. The recent emergence of China as a prominent donor has introduced
competitive pressures into the international development finance system that have implications for
compliance with conditionality and the effectiveness of aid from traditional donors.
In Chapter 2, I theorize that Chinese development assistance, which does not utilize condi-
tionality, weakens the incentives of recipient countries to comply with the conditions attached to
aid from traditional donors. I argue that Chinese aid reduces compliance incentives by providing
an alternative source of development assistance that does not require policy reform and marginally
displaces the importance of future aid transfers from traditional donors. I formalize the theoretical
argument by incorporating unconditional aid from China into the existing aid-for-policy framework
commonly used to model aid conditionality. In an infinitely-repeated and simultaneous aid-for-
policy game, the model predicts that Chinese development assistance limits the conditions under
which recipient countries are willing to comply with conditionality. The empirical analysis focuses
on the impact of Chinese aid on recipient country compliance with World Bank conditionality in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Using data on government compliance with World Bank project agreements
for 42 African countries from 2000-2014, I find strong and robust evidence that increased Chinese
development assistance within a recipient country is associated with decreased compliance with
World Bank conditionality. To address concerns about the potential endogeneity of Chinese devel-
opment assistance to recipient compliance, I also employ an instrumental variable strategy that uses
Chinese steel production and cross-sectional variation in a country’s tendency to receive Chinese aid
to instrument for Chinese development assistance. The findings of the essay suggest that China’s
emergence as a significant donor may deter recipient policy reform in the areas of macroeconomic
policy, transparency, and governance aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of traditional aid.
The second essay of the dissertation, “Enabling PBCs? Foreign Aid and Pre-Electoral Fiscal
Manipulation in Developing Countries”, shifts its focus to economic governance and examines the
effect of foreign aid on political budget cycles in expenditures and taxation in developing countries.
Economic governance encompasses the processes by which public resources are effectively managed
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and sound policies are implemented. In this essay, I examine the effect of aid on economic gover-
nance in recipient countries prior to elections. Elections are an important source of fiscal volatility
in developing countries that can potentially have harmful effects on long-term economic stability
(Collier and Chauvet 2010; Fatas and Mihov 2013). Prior to elections, incumbent politicians have
powerful incentives to manipulate fiscal policy in order to affect voter behavior. The basic intuition
of political budget cycles is that incumbents will increase public spending and/or decrease taxation
before elections in order to improve their chances of reelection.
In Chapter 3, I argue that foreign aid is a fungible source of revenue that incentivizes incum-
bents to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral purposes. Specifically, I theorize that aid increases
the likelihood of political budget cycles by increasing the value of holding office, obscuring fiscal
transparency, and creating a soft budget constraint that discourages fiscal discipline. I hypothe-
size that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation of expenditures and taxation is more likely to occur as
foreign aid within a country increases. Using panel data for over 70 developing democracies from
1990-2012, the empirical analysis finds that political budget cycles in expenditures are statistically
and substantively larger as foreign aid within a country increases. Contrary to my hypothesis,
the analysis reveals no significant relationship between aid and tax revenue before elections. The
primary results hold for a host of robustness checks that address concerns related to alternative ex-
planations of political budget cycles, potential sources of omitted variable bias, estimation strategy,
and outliers in the data. The findings of the essay suggest that the structure of public finance in
developing countries may impact incumbents’ choice of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation strategy.
The third essay of the dissertation, “Foreign Aid and Trust in Political Institutions”, exam-
ines how foreign aid projects impact citizens’ trust in political institutions and actors. Trust in
political institutions is a central element of good governance and political stability-it enhances
government legitimacy and encourages citizens to comply with rules and regulations (Levi, Sacks,
and Tyler 2009). The ability of governments and the international community to reduce poverty,
ensure security, and promote human rights depends on people’s trust in their government (Cheema
2010). However, building trust is a difficult task in developing countries, where governments of-
ten lack the capacity to provide basic public goods and social services to all of their citizens. In
many Sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries, donors and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) are the predominant providers of primary health care, basic education, sanitation, and
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infrastructure (Batley and McLoughlin 2010; Moran 2006).
In Chapter 4, I theorize that foreign aid projects harm institutional trust by lowering citizens’
evaluations of government performance and administrative competence. When citizens observe
that public goods and services are being provided by external actors, they may reevaluate their
beliefs about their government’s ability to manage the economy, address poverty, and deliver pub-
lic goods and social services. Additionally, aid projects can incentivize rent-seeking behavior and
have an adverse effect on citizens’ perceptions of political corruption. To analyze the impact of aid
on trust, this essay utilizes geolocated survey data on citizens’ trust in political institutions from
Afrobarometer Rounds 2-5 (2003-2012) and data on the location of foreign aid projects from Aid-
Data’s Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS) datasets for Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.
Using a spatial difference-in-difference strategy, the empirical results find that active aid projects
are associated with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and local government council. The
results also indicate that completed aid projects are associated with declines in institutional trust,
although the effect size constitutes a statistically and substantively smaller change compared to
active projects.
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON
COMPLIANCE WITH WESTERN AID CONDITIONALITY
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effect of Chinese development assistance on recipient country compliance
with aid conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that the presence of a significant non-
traditional donor, which does not utilize conditionality, weakens the material incentives of recipient
countries to comply with conditions attached to foreign aid from traditional donors. I formalize the
theoretical argument by incorporating unconditional aid from China into the existing aid-for-policy
framework commonly used to model aid conditionality. In an infinitely-repeated and simultaneous
aid-for-policy game, the model predicts that Chinese development assistance limits the conditions
under which recipient countries are willing to comply with conditionality. I test the theoretical
predictions using project-level data on government compliance with World Bank project agreements
for a sample of 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000-2014. The empirical analysis finds
strong support for the hypothesis that Chinese development assistance decreases the likelihood of
recipient country compliance with conditions in World Bank project agreements. The results are
robust to a number of alternative specifications, measures of Chinese development assistance, and
an instrumental variable approach.
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Introduction
Non-traditional donors, including China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emi-
rates, are quickly becoming a significant force in the international development finance landscape.
In 2015, development assistance from non-traditional donors accounted for 15 percent of global
official development assistance (ODA) (OECD 2018).1 Non-traditional donors operate outside of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Donor Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) and do not adhere to the norms and practices pertaining to the delivery of foreign
aid established by traditional donors.2 China is by far the most prominent non-traditional donor
and has emerged as one of the most important sources of finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. From
2000-2014, Chinese development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have totaled over
$120 billion (2014 USD), rivaling the World Bank and United States (Dreher et al. 2017).3 China’s
approach to development assistance fundamentally differs from that of traditional donors and is
guided by the principles of mutual benefit and non-interference (Dreher et al. 2017; State Coun-
cil 2011). In stark contrast with the practice of traditional DAC donors, China does not attach
conditions to its aid and does not interfere in the domestic politics of recipient countries.
The rapid rise of China as a prominent donor has introduced competitive pressures into the
international development finance system and ignited a debate among scholars and development
practitioners about the implications for the effectiveness of Western aid in promoting development
(Bräutigam 2011; Greenhill et al. 2016; Swedlund 2017; Welle-Strand and Kjøllesdal 2010; Woods
2008). Recent studies provide some initial evidence that Chinese development assistance adversely
affects political, economic, and environmental reforms in recipient countries (Benyishay et al. 2016;
Brazys. et al 2017; Brazys and Vadlamannati 2018; Li 2017). However, the nascent literature on
1The OECD estimate of non-DAC share of total ODA includes reported flows for 20 non-DAC reporting countries
and estimates for the top ten non-reporting non-DAC countries.
2DAC is an international forum created to discuss and promote cooperation on issues surrounding development
assistance practices in developing countries. The forum is comprised of the 30 Western donor countries with the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and regional
development banks participating as observers.
3Throughout this article, the terms “development assistance” and “aid” are used interchangeably when referring to
Chinese development finance. Chinese development assistance does not generally conform to the DAC definition
of official development assistance. A significant portion of Chinese development assistance does not meet the
strict definition of ODA used by DAC members and comes in the form of Other Official Flows (OOF) or cannot
be distinguished between ODA and OOF. This article defines Chinese development assistance using the broader
definition of official finance which captures both ODA and OOF.
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Chinese development assistance has not yet sufficiently examined the causal mechanisms through
which Chinese aid deters policy reform. One notable exception is research by Hernandez (2017),
which examines the effect of Chinese development assistance on the bargaining power of Western
donors in aid negotiations. Hernandez (2017) finds that competition from Chinese aid reduces the
number of policy concessions that donors request in exchange for aid. This paper proposes an
additional causal mechanism through which Chinese aid deters policy reform in recipient countries:
reduced compliance with aid conditionality.
Aid conditionality is the attachment of policy conditions to the disbursement of aid. DAC
donors commonly condition aid on institutional reform, fiscal transparency, and economic policy
in order to limit rent-seeking and improve the effectiveness of foreign aid. I theorize that Chinese
development assistance, which does not utilize conditionality, weakens the incentives of recipient
countries to comply with the conditions attached to aid from traditional donors. I argue that
unconditional Chinese aid is a less costly form of development finance that encourages recipient
countries to resist policy reform pressures from traditional donors. By marginally decreasing the
importance of future aid flows from traditional donors, the availability of aid from China weakens
the impact of punishment by traditional donors on recipient countries’ fiscal position. I formalize
the theoretical argument by incorporating unconditional aid from China into the aid-for-policy
framework commonly used to model aid conditionality (Bermeo 2016; Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2007, 2009). The model is used in an infinitely-repeated simultaneous game to analyze
the impact of Chinese development assistance on recipient-donor cooperation under a grim trigger
strategy. The model predicts that Chinese development assistance limits the conditions, specifically
the recipient’s discount rate and acceptable policy reform cost, under which the recipient country
is willing to comply with the policy reform requested by the traditional donor.
To test the empirical implications of the model, I examine the effect of Chinese development
assistance on recipient compliance with World Bank project agreements in Sub-Saharan Africa. To
my knowledge, the World Bank is the only multilateral or bilateral donor that publicly reports eval-
uations of compliance with aid agreements. The focus on Sub-Saharan Africa reflects the intuition
that the effect of Chinese aid on compliance should be empirically observable in the region where
competition between traditional donors and China is most intense, aid conditionality is widely em-
ployed, and the political costs of policy reform are high. Using project-level data on government
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compliance with World Bank agreements for a sample of 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from
2000-2014, the empirical analysis finds strong and robust evidence that increased Chinese devel-
opment assistance within a recipient country is associated with decreased compliance with World
Bank conditionality. For an otherwise typical project and recipient country, a one percent increase
in Chinese official finance as a percent of GDP over a project’s duration decreases the likelihood
of recipient compliance with the project agreement by 14 percent. The findings are robust to al-
ternative measures of Chinese development assistance and potential sources of omitted variable
bias. To address concerns about the potential endogeneity of Chinese development assistance to
recipient compliance, I also employ an instrumental variable strategy that uses Chinese steel pro-
duction and cross-sectional variation in a country’s tendency to receive Chinese aid to instrument
for Chinese development assistance (Dreher et al. 2017). An extension of the primary analysis
explores heterogeneous treatment effects and finds that the negative effect of Chinese development
assistance on compliance with World Bank conditions is most pronounced in environments with
autocratic regimes and high natural resource rents. The findings of the extension have meaningful
implications for the success of governance and transparency reforms in these environments aimed
at enhancing the effectiveness of aid.
This paper contributes to the literature on compliance with aid conditionality by demonstrating
that donor competition is an additional determinant of recipient country compliance. To the best of
my knowledge, this study is the first to directly examine the effect of aid from non-traditional donors
on compliance with conditionality. This paper also contributes to the quickly growing literature
on the effect of Chinese development assistance on political, social and environmental reforms in
recipient countries by identifying a causal mechanism, reduced compliance with conditionality, that
links Chinese development assistance with policy outcomes.
The next section summarizes the extant literature on compliance with aid conditionality. Sec-
tion 2 presents the theoretical argument, an overview of the formal model, and two illustrative
cases. Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the data, empirical strategy, and results. The final section
highlights the importance of the findings and discusses avenues for future research.
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Determinants of Compliance with Conditionality
Aid conditionality has been a standard tool used by international financial institutions (IFI) and
DAC donors to improve aid effectiveness and prevent the misappropriation of resources. Condition-
ality aims to solve principal-agent and credible commitment problems in donor-recipient relations.
The basic idea behind conditionality is that donors provide aid to recipient countries as an incentive
for the recipients to adopt policies or to restrict the way aid is spent (Collier et al. 1997). The
threat of withdrawal of future aid is expected to induce recipient compliance with conditionality. In
the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF and World Bank conditioned the disbursement of aid on structural
adjustment policies including fiscal austerity, privatization, trade openness, and capital account
liberalization. In the 1990 and 2000s, major bilateral DAC donors began to utilize political condi-
tionality to promote democratization, the rule of law, and human rights protection. Since the early
2000s, major multilateral donors have shifted away from structural adjustment policies and now
commonly condition aid on sector-specific policy reforms, governance and transparency reforms,
project reporting and auditing requirements, and progress towards development goals.
Despite the extensive use of conditionality by donors, recipient country compliance with con-
ditionality has been relatively poor (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Easterly 2005; Ivanova et al. 2001).
One explanation of poor recipient compliance is weak enforcement of conditionality by donors
(Kilby 2009; Swedlund 2017; Vreeland 2006). Weak enforcement is most often attributed to the
strategic interests of donors including military alliances, voting in the United Nations, and strong
economic ties (Dreher et al. 2009; Kilby 2009; Stone 2004). Agency and moral hazard problems
in donor-recipient relations, which stem from donor agencies’ desire to maximize their aid budgets
(Martens et al. 2002; Svensson 2006) and concerns of organizational performance and reputation
(Swedlund 2017), are additional explanations of weak enforcement by donors.
Poor compliance with conditionality has also been attributed to domestic political factors and
structural impediments in recipient countries such as regime type (Joyce 2006; Montinola 2010) and
powerful interest groups and veto players (Drazen 2002; Ianova et al. 2001; Mayer and Mourmouras
2002). Variation in recipient country compliance can also be explained by examining the effect of
conditionality on revenue sources in recipient countries. Girod and Tobin (2016) theorize that the
presence of large foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks is associated with increased compliance
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with conditionality due to the expectation that compliance will maintain or increase future revenue
from FDI. In contrast, the authors argue that dependence on natural resource rents is associated
with decreased compliance due to the negative impact of policy reforms on the revenue source. I
contend that development assistance from non-traditional donors is an additional revenue source
that explains variation in compliance behavior. Specifically, I argue that Chinese aid reduces
recipients’ compliance incentives by providing an alternative source of development assistance that
does not require policy reform and marginally displaces the importance of future aid transfers from
traditional donors.
Chinese Aid and Compliance with Conditionality
Following decades of limited engagement, China revitalized its development assistance program
to Africa in 2000 following the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and quickly
established itself as one of the largest bilateral donors to the continent by the end of the decade.
From 2000-2014, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 35 percent of global Chinese official finance
commitments or some $120 billion (2014 USD) in official finance (Dreher et al. 2017). Over
this period, Chinese official finance to Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have exceeded bilateral
commitments from the United States (Dreher et al. 2017, OECD 2018).4 The composition of
Chinese development assistance differs dramatically from the composition of aid from DAC donors:
only 39 percent of Chinese flows to Sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2014 can be classified as official
development assistance.5 37 percent of Chinese development assistance does not qualify as ODA
and instead comes in the form of Other Official Flows (OOF), a less concessional form of official
finance that does not meet the DAC requirements for ODA (Strange et al. 2017).6 The remaining
24 percent of Chinese development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be classified as ODA
4United States commitments of official finance to Sub-Saharan Africa totaled $106 billion (2016USD) from 2000-2014
(OECD 2018). Despite being the same relative size, China and the United States have very different development
finance portfolios. The United States’ portfolio is almost entirely comprised of ODA (over 90 percent).
5Official development assistance is defined by the DAC as flows of official financing that are administered to promote
the economic development and welfare of developing countries that are concessional in character with a grant element
of at least 25 percent (OECD 2002).
6Other Official Finance lacks a significant grant element or an explicit development purpose. Examples of other
official flows include loans with a development intent without a grant element, loans with a grant element lower
than 25 percent, and grants with a representational purpose (Strange et al. 2017, 10). Other official flows can also
include commercial loans and export financing (Strange et al. 2017, 10).
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or OOF due to insufficient information.
Several unique characteristics further differentiate Chinese development assistance from aid
from traditional donors. Chinese aid is characterized by the principles of mutual respect of
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and efficiency
(State Council 2011, 2014).7 First, China adheres to the principle non-interference and has stated
that it “never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in recipient countries’ internal affairs” (State
Council 2011). Chinese development assistance does not utilize conditionality and has few or no
strings attached. The only notable political condition that China places on development assistance
is support for the One-China Policy, which prohibits recognition of Taiwan.8 China’s principle of
non-interference fundamentally differs from the use of conditionality on macroeconomic policies,
governance, political and legal reform, and human rights protection by traditional donors. The
absence of political and governance conditionality makes Chinese aid attractive to leaders who fear
that reform might undermine their political survival by impacting domestic support, increasing po-
litical competition, or decreasing access to rents. Second, China approaches development assistance
under a principle of equality and mutual benefit and offers an alternative development model that
differs from the Washington Consensus. Chinese aid prioritizes infrastructure, energy generation
and supply, industrial and mining activities, and communications and is highly tied to Chinese
contractors (Bräutigam 2009; Dreher et al. 2018). Third, Chinese development assistance is char-
acterized as being more efficient and quicker to materialize than aid from DAC donors. China is
able to negotiate, disburse funds, and complete projects quickly due to bilateral negotiation, pro-
curement requirements that are highly tied to Chinese contractors, and less stringent requirements
for environmental and social impact studies.
Due to its characteristics, Chinese development assistance has become an attractive alternative
to aid from traditional donors and introduced competitive pressures into the international aid
system (Greenhill et al. 2016; Kilama 2016). Chinese development assistance represents an outside
option that reduces recipient country dependence on traditional donors and weakens the bargaining
7China’s approach to aid was first outlined in “Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other
Countries” (1964) and reiterated in the 2011 and 2014 White Papers on Foreign Aid issued by the State Council of
the People’s Republic of China (State Council 2011, 2014).
8Swaziland is currently the only remaining African nation to recognize Taiwan.
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power of DAC donors in aid negotiations with recipient countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2016). Empirical evidence from Hernandez (2017) finds that the World Bank imposes significantly
fewer conditions on aid recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa that also receive Chinese aid. In addition
to altering the bargaining power of traditional donors during the negotiation of aid deals, Chinese
development assistance has the potential to undermine recipient compliance with aid conditionality.
I theorize that conditionality is less effective in a competitive international aid environment with
multiple donor types. Specifically, I consider competition between bilateral and multilateral DAC
donors, who utilize aid conditionality, and China, who does not adhere to DAC norms and practices.
I argue that Chinese development assistance, which does not contain conditionality, alters the
material incentives of recipient countries and limits the conditions under which recipients are willing
to comply with conditionality attached to traditional aid. By marginally decreasing the importance
of future aid transfers from traditional donors, the availability of aid from China weakens the impact
of punishment by traditional donors on recipient countries’ fiscal position. I predict that increased
Chinese development assistance within a country will be associated with decreased compliance with
conditionality. In recipient countries where the cost of compliance is sufficiently high, I predict
that the availability of Chinese aid allows recipient governments to completely disengage with DAC
donors.
I formalize the theoretical argument on the effect of Chinese development assistance on condi-
tionality using the aid-for-policy model framework, which examines aid transfers from a potential
donor to a recipient country in exchange for policy reform (Bermeo 2016; Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2007, 2009; Svensson 2000).9 The framework describes a simultaneous stage game between a
donor and a recipient government. The donor decides between the actions of disbursing aid to the
recipient country and withholding aid. The donor’s decision to provide aid is based on the relative
utility of policy reform in the recipient country compared to the loss of revenue from disbursing
aid. The recipient decides between the actions of implementing policy reform and no reform. The
recipient’s compliance decision is based on the relative utility from aid compared to the cost of
policy reform. The central assumption of the model is that Chinese aid does not impose a policy
9See supporting information on the formal model in Appendix A.
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reform cost on the recipient country.10
In an infinitely-repeated and simultaneous aid-for-policy game, the model is used to analyze
the effect of unconditional aid from China on the conditions under which cooperation between
the recipient and the traditional donor is sustainable under a grim trigger strategy. In a grim
trigger strategy, the traditional donor and recipient begin the game by cooperating and continue to
cooperate as long as the other has cooperated in their previous action. The cooperative equilibrium
in the game is such that the traditional donor disburses aid to the recipient country, and the recipient
government implements the policy reforms requested by the donor. I derive observable implications
from the comparative statics of the cooperative equilibrium. The model predicts that Chinese aid
decreases the range of the recipient’s discount factor in which a cooperative equilibrium strategy
under a grim trigger strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium. The discount factor determines
the present value of future aid flows to the recipient government. By decreasing the range of
the recipient’s discount factor, the presence of Chinese aid limits the conditions under which the
recipient is expected to comply with the policy reform requested by the traditional donor. The
model framework can also provide insight on the effect of Chinese development assistance on the
maximum policy reform cost the recipient country is willing to accept in exchange for aid from
traditional donors. The model predicts that as the amount of Chinese aid the recipient receives
increases, the maximum reform cost the recipient is willing to pay for aid from the traditional donor
decreases. From the theoretical argument and formal model, I derive the following hypothesis:
H1: Increased Chinese development assistance within a recipient country decreases the likelihood of
compliance with conditionality attached to aid from traditional donors.
Illustrative Cases
Uganda and Zimbabwe offer two illustrative cases of the theoretical argument. Uganda has tradi-
tionally been one of the largest recipients of foreign aid from DAC donors. Despite having a long-
standing relationship, Uganda has maintained a contentious relationship with traditional donors
10In practice, Chinese aid reflects its guiding principle of non-interference and is not explicitly conditioned on policy
reform. Outside of the One-China policy, Chinese aid is devoid of political or governance conditionality. Survey
evidence from Custer et al. (2015) confirms that Chinese development officials have been reluctant to dispense
policy advice with its development assistance (Bräutigam 2015). Less than ten percent of the 6,750 policymakers
and development practitioners surveyed in Custer et al. (2015) were capable of responding to questions about
policy advice from Chinese development officials (Bräutigam 2015).
13
in recent years. In 2012, numerous European donors suspended foreign aid in response to a major
corruption scandal involving the office of the Prime Minister. In 2014, the passage of the legislation
outlawing homosexuality also led to widespread condemnation by traditional donors. Norway and
Denmark withheld disbursements of aid, and the United Kingdom redirected aid away from the
government to non-governmental organizations. In response to the backlash by donors, a Ugandan
government spokesperson stated that “the West can keep their aid... we shall develop without
it”(The Telegraph 2014). In light of this increased tension with traditional donors, Uganda looked
to China for development assistance and secured $10 billion in semi-concessional loans to fund
infrastructure projects (Financial Times 2014). When asked if development assistance from China
was preferable to assistance from the World Bank, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni replied, “I
was a bit embarrassed when I was talking to the World Bank. They talked about a lot of things like
structural adjustment, but they don’t understand the basics. How can you have structural adjust-
ment without electricity?... The Chinese understand the basics”(Financial Times 2014). In 2018,
when asked about the importance of Uganda’s growing relationship with China, Museveni replied,
“They [the Chinese] do it without conditionalities, without interfering in our politics”(New Vision
2018). Despite public criticisms of their interference in domestic politics, Uganda remains deeply
engaged with traditional donors. However, Uganda’s compliance with World Bank conditional-
ity has declined substantially. From 2000-2009, government compliance with World Bank project
agreements averaged 91 percent across 37 evaluated projects (IEG 2017). In contrast, government
compliance from 2010-2016 averaged just 51 percent for 19 evaluated projects (IEG 2017).
A second illustrative case from Zimbabwe demonstrates that the availability of an alternative
aid source without conditionality can allow recipients to disengage with traditional donors when
the cost of implementing policy reform is high. In 2000, the adoption of a land reform policy by the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriot Front (ZANU-PF) government drew intense criticism
from the international community. The United States and European Union imposed sanctions on
Zimbabwe for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law (Chun 2014, 9). Additionally,
Zimbabwe was prohibited from obtaining assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank (Chun 2014). In response, the ZANU-PF government turned to China for
finance in 2003. Since that time, Chinese development assistance has been a major source of
revenue and totaled over $6 billion (2014 USD) in commitments from 2000 to 2014 (Dreher et
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al. 2017). The availability of Chinese aid allowed the ZANU-PF to pivot away from traditional
donors and avoid pressure from aid conditionality. Facing an economic crisis in 2015, Zimbabwe,
resumed negotiations with the IMF for the first time in over a decade. In the negotiations, the
IMF immediately requested structural reforms focused on fiscal discipline as well as reforms on
governance, human rights, and property rights (IMF 2017).
Data
To test the theoretical implications of the model, a project-level dataset is constructed for 42 African
countries for the 2000-2014 period. The dataset is constructed around data from the World Bank’s
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Project Performance Ratings and AidData’s China Official
Finance datasets.
Dependent Variable: World Bank Project Compliance
The empirical analysis focuses on compliance with conditions in World Bank project agreements
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank is the largest and most influential multilateral donor and
is representative of the development goals of the major DAC donors. The Independent Evalua-
tion Group, a semi-autonomous branch of the World Bank, conducts performance evaluations of
all projects funded by the World Bank and reports the results in the IEG Project Performance
Ratings dataset. For the study period 2000-2014, the IEG dataset covers 1,112 projects across
49 Sub-Saharan African countries. The dataset contains assessments of government performance,
which have been used to measure recipient government compliance with conditions in World Bank
project agreements in previous research (Girod and Tobin 2016; Smets et al. 2012). Government
performance is defined as “the extent to which the borrower ensured quality of preparation and
implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of devel-
opment outcomes”(IEG 2015). The assessment considers “government ownership and commitment
to achieving objectives, adequacy of stakeholder involvement, timely resolution of implementation
issues, adequacy of M&E (Monitoring and Evaluation) arrangements, and relationship with donors”
(Smets et al. 2012, 34).
Government performance is reported on a 6-point scale (highly unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory,
moderately unsatisfactory, moderately satisfactory, satisfactory, or highly satisfactory) for the 2006-
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2014 time period and on a 4-point scale (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly
unsatisfactory) from 1997-2006. Due to the inconsistent measurement over the study period, the
government performance rating is used to create a binary measure of government compliance.11
Government compliance is coded as 1 if the project is rated as moderately satisfactory, satisfac-
tory, or highly satisfactory and 0 otherwise.12 66 percent of projects evaluated during the study
period received a government performance rating of moderately satisfactory or above. A detailed
breakdown of project compliance by country is provided in the appendix.
To further justify the measure of compliance, I will briefly summarize the conditions attached
to two typical projects in the natural resources and agriculture sectors to highlight the types
of conditions included in World Bank project agreements and demonstrate that conditionality is
routinely employed outside of the economic policy and governance sectors. The first illustrative
example is drawn from a 2010 natural resource sector project agreement in Ghana (IEG 2013). The
project agreement included conditions for improvements in revenue collection and transparency for
the mining and forestry sectors (IEG 2013). The second example is from a 2013 agriculture sector
project in Nigeria. The project agreement required a reduction in agricultural subsidies, further
privatization, and new regulations in the agriculture sector (IEG 2016).
One potential concern with the use of the IEG government performance measure is that the
number and type of conditions attached to World Bank projects may vary substantially by country
(Girod and Tobin 2016). To address this concern, Girod and Tobin (2016) analyzed the content of
a random sample of 100 project agreements and found no evidence of bias in the number or type
of conditions attached to World Bank projects across countries. Instead, Girod and Tobin found
that the conditions attached to projects primarily reflected the needs of the project sector (221).
Concerns over variation in the number or type of conditions across countries or sectors are further
addressed in the empirical analysis of this study by the inclusion of country fixed effects and project
sector dummy variables.
A second related concern with the IEG measure of government performance is that the World
11The use of binary measure is consistent with extant research that utilizes IEG outcome ratings (Denizer et al. 2015;
Dreher et al. 2013; Kilby 2015; Girod and Tobin 2016).
12A subset of projects in the dataset receive ratings from Implementation Completion Reports as well as more in-depth
Project Performance Assessment Reports (IEG 2015). If projects were evaluated multiple times for government
performance, I selected the most recent evaluation rating.
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Bank has altered its use of conditionality over time in response to competition from non-traditional
donors (Hernandez 2017).13 Fewer conditions attached to World Bank projects should lower the
cost of compliance for recipients and have a positive effect on government compliance. Therefore, a
competitive reduction in the number of conditions by the World Bank should have a positive bias
on the estimated effect of the Chinese development assistance on government compliance, which is
hypothesized to be negative.
Independent Variable: Chinese Development Assistance
Data on Chinese development finance commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa from 2000-2014 is col-
lected from AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset (Dreher et al. 2017). The Chinese
AidData dataset is based on AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) method-
ology (Strange et al. 2017). The TUFF methodology is a data collection technique that utilizes
information from secondary sources including news reports in multiple languages, Chinese ministry
documents, national aid and debt information management systems, and research undertaken by
scholars and NGOs (Strange et al. 2017). The AidData dataset covers 2,390 projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa but does not have full coverage of project amounts. For Sub-Saharan Africa, 40%
of the Chinese projects in the dataset are missing project amount values. Technical assistance
and scholarship projects account for a sizable portion of missing project amount values and are
typically small in scale (Dreher et al. 2017). In contrast, the dataset has 95 percent coverage of
project amount data for loans, which are the largest flows. Due to the patterns in the coverage
of project amount data, the missing data should not present a significant problem for researchers
interested in the aggregate effects of Chinese development assistance (Dreher et al. 2017, 10). De-
spite its shortcomings, AidData’s China Development Finance dataset is the most comprehensive
and transparent source of information on Chinese development assistance available and has been
used by scholars to examine the economic and political effects of Chinese aid (Dreher et al. 2017,
2018; Brazys et al. 2017; Brazys and Vadlamannati 2018; Hernandez 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam
2018).
Data on Chinese development assistance is categorized by AidData into three types of official
13Data on the number of conditions attached to World Bank projects is only available for the limited subset of
Development Finance Policy projects.
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finance: ODA-like flows, OOF-like flows, and Vague Official Finance. ODA-like flows meet the
definition for ODA specified by the OECD DAC (Strange et al. 2017). As previously noted, OOF
is defined as other official financing that does not meet the DAC definition of ODA, because it
lacks a significant grant element or an explicit development purpose. Vague Official Finance is
defined as any flow that constitutes official financing but for which there is not enough information
to confidently classify as ODA or OOF (Strange et al. 2017). Due to the classification challenges, I
employ the broader measure of Chinese official finance commitments, which is the sum of ODA-like,
OOF-like, and Vague Official Finance flows.14 Chinese official finance is measured as a percent of
GDP in order to measure its importance as a source of finance to the recipient government. Chinese
official finance per capita and Chinese share of total official finance are also used as alternative
measures of Chinese development assistance. In order to test the effect of Chinese official finance
on compliance over the duration of an aid project, the five-year average of Chinese official finance
as a percent of GDP prior to the completion of the World Bank project is used as the primary
explanatory variable. A five-year average aligns with the average World Bank project duration of
5.25 years for the sample during the study period.15 A summary table of the top 10 recipients of
Chinese development assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa is reported in the appendix.
Control Variables
Control variables for alternative sources of revenue, economic conditions, institutional quality, and
project characteristics are included in the analysis to account for determinants of compliance with
project agreements identified in previous research. All country-level control variables are measured
as five-year averages prior to project completion. Variables for DAC ODA, natural resource rents,
foreign direct investment, and debt burden are included to control for alternative sources of revenue
that may affect compliance. Data on official development assistance disbursements by OECD DAC
countries and multilateral organizations is collected from the OECD International Development
Statistics database and measured as a percent of recipient country GDP. Data on natural resource
rents as a percent of GDP is collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
14Chinese official finance commitments exclude projects that are not recommended for research purposes. Projects
not recommended for research include: pledged, umbrella, suspended, and canceled projects (Strange et al. 2017).
15The use of an alternative three-year average prior to project completion does not change the results.
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database, and data on FDI stock as a percent of GDP is collected from the UNCTADstat database.
Natural resource rents and FDI stocks have been found to influence compliance through recipients’
revenue maximization considerations (Girod and Tobin 2016). Data on debt stock as a percent of
Gross National Income (GNI) is collected from the WDI database. Debt stock is a measure of a
country’s ability to access credit from private sources.16 Sub-Saharan African countries with high
levels of debt are less able to access private credit and, therefore, more likely to comply with aid
conditionality in order to secure access to concessional finance in the future.
Economic and institutional controls are included for GDP per capita, executive corruption, and
the incidence of conflict. Data on GDP per capita data is collected from the WDI database. GDP
per capita is a measure of state capacity and is expected to have a positive effect on compliance.
Data on corruption is drawn from the executive corruption index in the Varieties of Democracy
(VDEM) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017). Executive corruption is defined as the frequency in
which members of the executive: 1) grant favors in exchange for bribes and 2) steal, embezzle, or
misappropriate state resources for personal use. Executive corruption is expected to have a strong
negative effect on compliance with conditionality. Conditionality in high corruption environments
often contains governance and transparency reforms aimed at reducing rent-seeking behavior. A
control variable for the incidence and intensity of conflict is also included from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCPD) Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset (Pettersson and Wallensteen
2014). The conflict variable measures the average intensity level of conflict over the five-year period
prior to project exit.17
Previous research has found that project-level factors account for a significant portion of vari-
ation in project outcomes (Denizer et al. 2013). Project-level control variables are included for
project duration, project cost, project sector, and the number of projects evaluated in the current
year. Project duration is the number of years from project approval to completion. Project cost
is measured as the log of project cost. A control variable for the number of evaluated projects
in current country-year is included to control for recipients’ overall level of engagement with the
16External debt service/GNI is utilized in robustness checks to address concerns over multicollinearity with Chinese
and DAC development assistance.
17In each country-year, minor armed conflicts (<25 battle deaths) are coded as 1 and wars (>1000 battle deaths) are
coded as 2.
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World Bank and the total cost of policy reform across projects. Project sector dummy variables
are included for governance, economic policy, energy and extractive, environment and natural re-
sources, agriculture, and other sectors. Other sectors include health, education, transportation,
and poverty reduction sectors. Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Appendix A.
Empirical Strategy
The empirical model aims to test the hypothesis that increased Chinese development assistance
within a recipient country over the duration of a World Bank project decreases the likelihood of
recipient compliance with the conditions specified in the project agreement. The baseline empirical
model is of the following form:
Complianceijt = βCHOF/GDPijt + γXijt + αj + φt + εijt (1)
where Complianceijt denotes the dichotomous indicator of recipient compliance for project i in
country j in period t. CHOF/GDPijt is the primary explanatory variable of interest and refers to
the five-year average of Chinese official finance as a percent of GDP prior to project completion.
Xijt denotes a matrix of country and project control variables. Country controls are measured as
averages over the five-year period prior to project completion, and project controls are measured
at project completion. αj refers to a country fixed effect, φt refers to a year fixed effect, and εijt is
the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all estimations to account for
within-country correlations including serial autocorrelation in the data.
The model is estimated with a conditional (fixed effects) logit estimator to control for any un-
observed, time-invariant confounding variables. Conditional logit regression estimates the within-
group relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. In contrast to
the fixed effects estimator, the conditional logit estimator controls for country effects by eliminat-
ing aj from the estimating equation by conditioning on the “minimum sufficient statistic” for aj
(Chamberlain 1980). Hausman and likelihood ratio tests confirm that the conditional logit model is
a more appropriate choice than random effects or pooled logit models.18 The use of the conditional
18Hausman tests are conducted to evaluate a conditional logit model against a pooled logit model. The Hausman
test rejects the null hypothesis that unobserved individual level effects are uncorrelated with the other covariates.
The likelihood ratio test indicates that the random effects logit model is statistically different from the pooled
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logit model is also aligned with the aid-for-policy model framework, which focuses on the effect of
within-country variation in Chinese development assistance on compliance.
Results
The empirical results consistently support the hypothesis that increased Chinese development as-
sistance within a country is associated with a decline in recipient compliance with World Bank
project agreements. Table 2.1 presents the primary conditional logit estimations of equation (1)
using several different measures of Chinese development assistance. For ease of interpretation, co-
efficients are reported as average semi-elasticities.19 Regression results that report the coefficients
as the change in log odds are also provided in Appendix Table A.5.
Model 1 utilizes the primary dependent variable, Chinese Official Finance/GDP. Chinese Of-
ficial Finance/GDP is estimated to have a negative and statistically significant effect on the prob-
ability that a recipient country complies with World Bank aid project agreements. Recall that
the average probability of compliance in the sample is 66 percent. A one percent increase in the
average level of Chinese Official Finance/GDP over the five-year period prior to project completion
is associated with a 14.3 percent decrease in the probability of satisfactory government compliance
with the conditions attached to a World Bank project.
To further give a sense of the magnitude of effect size, Figure 2.1 presents the predicted
probability of compliance with an aid agreement as the proportion of Chinese Official Finance/GDP
increases within a country. The figure includes a histogram that indicates the distribution of the
five-year average of Chinese Official Finance/GDP in the sample. For reference, the five-year
average of Chinese Official Finance/GDP has a mean of 0.9 percent and a standard deviation
of 0.8 percent within countries. For an average project in a recipient country that receives the
mean level of Chinese Official Finance/GDP over the project’s duration, the predicted probability
of satisfactory government compliance with the project agreement is 69 percent. For the same
project and recipient, a one standard deviation increase in Chinese Official Finance/GDP lowers
logit model. The Hausman test evaluating between conditional and random effects logit model rejects the null
hypothesis that the coefficients from the models are not systematically different but reports a non-positive definite
VCE matrix.
19Average semi-elasticities were calculated using the aextlogit Stata module (Santos Silva 2016).
21
Table 2.1: Conditional logit estimations (average semi-elasticities)
Dependent variable:
Government Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Chinese Official Finance per capita (log) -0.180**
(0.071)
Chinese Share of Total OF -0.019***
(0.005)
DAC ODA/GDP 0.012 0.018 0.017 -0.000
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
NR Rents/GDP 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
FDI Stock/GDP -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Debt/GNI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDPPC (log) 0.653 0.438 0.508 0.369
(0.643) (0.584) (0.534) (0.522)
Executive Corruption -2.584** -2.531*** -2.273** -2.557***
(1.008) (0.951) (0.964) (0.904)
Conflict -0.178 -0.200 -0.110 -0.138
(0.273) (0.278) (0.242) (0.283)
Project Duration -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.051***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Project Amount (log) -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011
(0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032)
Evaluation Count -0.061** -0.061** -0.065*** -0.063**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
Energy & Natural Resources Sector -0.311** -0.331** -0.317*** -0.327**
(0.125) (0.131) (0.097) (0.127)
Governance Sector -0.380*** -0.381*** -0.367*** -0.384***
(0.131) (0.134) (0.114) (0.131)
Economic Policy Sector -0.175* -0.169 -0.172* -0.189*
(0.103) (0.104) (0.088) (0.105)
Agriculture Sector -0.168 -0.167 -0.168 -0.177
(0.118) (0.118) (0.114) (0.120)
Observations 736 736 736 736
Countries 35 35 35 35
Note: Coefficients are reported as average semi-elasticities and correspond with the percentage change in compli-
ance associated with a one unit change in the explanatory variables. All specifications include year fixed effects.
Country controls are 5-year lagged averages. Project controls are measured at exit year. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
the predicted probability of compliance to 61 percent. The predicted probability of compliance
further decreases to 52 percent if the level of Chinese Official Finance/GDP is increased above
the mean by two standard deviations. In contrast, for the same project in a recipient country
that receives no Chinese official finance, the predicted probability of satisfactory compliance is 77
percent.
Turning to the control variables, Executive Corruption, Project Duration, and Evaluation
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Figure 2.1: Predicted probability of compliance as the proportion of Chinese OF to GDP increases
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions shown in Model 1 of Table 2.1. Margins are estimated using
simulation from an unconditional logit estimation with country dummy variables. The dotted lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Count are estimated to have a negative effect on recipient compliance with World Bank conditions.
Executive Corruption ranges from 0 to 1 with a sample average of 0.60 and within-country stan-
dard deviation of 0.05. Higher values of the corruption index correspond with greater executive
corruption. Based on Model 1, a one standard deviation increase in Executive Corruption within
a country over the five-year period prior to project completion is associated with a 12.9 percent
decrease in the probability of satisfactory compliance. Longer projects are also associated with
decreased compliance: a one year increase in project duration is associated with a 4.9 percent
decrease in the probability of satisfactory compliance. Similarly, an increase in the number of
projects evaluated in a given year is associated with decreased compliance. Consistent with previ-
ous research, project sectors are an important source of variation in project outcomes. Relative to
poverty reduction sectors, Economic Policy, Governance, and Energy & Natural Resources project
sectors are associated with lower recipient compliance.
Models 2-4 of Table 2.1 introduce alternative measures of Chinese development assistance.
Model 2 disaggregates Chinese Official Finance/GDP into Chinese ODA/GDP and Chinese OOF/GDP.20
The coefficient estimates for Chinese ODA/GDP and Chinese OOF/GDP are both negative and
statistically significant. Although the estimated effect size of Chinese OOF/GDP is larger, the two
20The results are not substantively changed if the two measures are included in separate regressions. The correlation
between the two measures is sufficiently low to warrant inclusion in the same regression.
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coefficient estimates are not statistically different. Model 3 utilizes Chinese Official Finance per
capita (log) as the measure of Chinese development assistance. The coefficient on Chinese Official
Finance per capita is also estimated to be negative and statistically significant. Lastly, Model
4 utilizes a third alternative measure, Chinese Share of Total Official Finance. This measure is
calculated by dividing Chinese Official Finance by the sum of Chinese and DAC Official Finance.
The five-year average of Chinese Share of Total OF has a mean of 10.1 percent and a standard
deviation of 8.0 percent within countries. Based on Model 4, a one percent increase in the share of
Chinese Official Finance over the five-year period prior to project completion is associated with a
1.9 percent decrease in the probability of satisfactory government compliance with the conditions
attached to a World Bank project.
Robustness Checks
A number of robustness checks are performed to address concerns of omitted variable bias in the
model specification. First, I introduce additional economic controls that may impact the allocation
of Chinese aid and compliance with conditionality including population, GDP growth, trade open-
ness, and economic crisis (Denizer et al. 2013; Girod Tobin 2016; Kilby 2015).21 Second, to address
concerns that the findings may be driven by Chinese investment or trade flows, I also control for
bilateral Chinese exports and FDI inflows to recipient countries (WITS 2017; UNCTAD 2014).22
Third, I consider additional political and strategic controls for political regime (Mashall et al. 2018),
political constraints (Henisz 2000), voting alignment with the United States in the United Nations
(Voeten et al. 2009), and temporary UNSC membership (Dreher et al. 2013). I also control for
whether a project was financed a development policy finance (DPF) loan or an investment loan.
To receive DPF projects, recipients are required to maintain an adequate macroeconomic policy
framework, make satisfactory progress in their overall reform program, and complete of a set of
critical policy and institutional actions (World Bank 2015). Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 report
the results from alternative specifications that introduce the additional economic and political vari-
21Economic crisis is measured as the proportion of the five-year period prior to project completion that a country
experienced an economic recession.
22The inclusion of Chinese FDI inflows to recipient countries limits the study period to 2008-2012. Data on bilateral
Chinese FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa is only available for 2004-2012 (UNCTAD 2014).
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ables into the baseline specification. The primary results do not substantively change across the
specifications and increase confidence in the primary empirical findings.
Instrumental Variable Analysis
To address concerns that Chinese development assistance may be endogenously determined in the
model, I employ an instrumental variable analysis to supplement the primary analysis. Although
Chinese aid may influence recipient government willingness to comply with aid project agreements,
it could also be that compliance with aid conditionality influences the allocation of Chinese aid. To
address this concern, I use a two-stage least squares instrumental variable estimator with country
fixed effects. Following Dreher et al. (2017), I instrument for Chinese development assistance using
the interaction of logged and lagged Chinese steel production and the probability of a recipient
country receiving Chinese aid over the study period, iv = [ 115
∑15
1 pi ∗ ln(Chinesesteel)t−1].23
Specifically, I use the five-year average of the interaction to instrument for the five-year average
of Chinese official finance as a percent of GDP and Chinese official finance per capita. Data on
Chinese steel production is collected from the World Steel Association’s 2017 Statistical Yearbook.
As part of its industrial strategy, China has maintained a surplus in steel production (Zheng et al.
2009). A portion of China’s steel surplus is used as inputs for its development projects, particularly
in the transport, industry, mining, and construction sectors (Dreher et al. 2017, 4).
The instrumental variable strategy examines the “differential effect of Chinese steel production
on the amount of aid to countries with a high (compared to a low) probability of receiving Chinese
aid”(Dreher et al. 2017, 13). The identifying assumption is that compliance with World Bank
project agreements in recipient countries with differing probabilities of receiving Chinese aid will
not be affected differently by changes in Chinese steel production other than through the impact
of Chinese aid (Dreher et al. 2017, 5). The inclusion of country fixed effects controls for the effect
of the probability of receiving aid on compliance. For the analysis to be valid, the excluded instru-
ment must only affect compliance with aid agreements through an impact on Chinese development
assistance. To address concerns that the differential effects of the Chinese steel production on
compliance could be a result of growth, investment, or trade, I control for GDP growth, FDI stock,
23The instrument utilized in Dreher et al. (2017) builds off Nunn and Qian (2014), which utilizes an instrument for
food aid based on lagged United States wheat production and the probability of receiving food aid.
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trade openness, and bilateral Chinese exports interacted with the probability of receiving Chinese
aid in robustness checks (Dreher et al. 2017, 14).24




Chinese Official Finance/GDP -0.238**
(0.120)
Chinese Official Finance per capita (log) -0.253**
(0.123)
DAC ODA/GDP -0.013 -0.005
(0.014) (0.010)
NR Rents/GDP -0.002 0.005
(0.008) (0.005)




GDPPC (log) 1.012* 0.572
(0.600) (0.384)




Project Duration -0.029*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.008)
Project Amount (log) 0.003 -0.004
(0.016) (0.017)
Evaluation Count -0.043*** -0.049***
(0.015) (0.016)
First Stage




Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 8.65*** 10.09***
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 32.18 56.26
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 10.36 23.52
Note: The table reports results from two-stage least squares estimation. All
specifications include country fixed effects and linear time trend. Project sector
controls are included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 2.2 presents the estimates from a two-stage linear probability model (LPM) with country
fixed effects.25 The two-stage LPM estimations include standard errors clustered at the country-
level and a linear time trend in place of year fixed effects.26 Instrumenting for Chinese official
24FDI stock is included in the primary specifications. The inclusion of a control for Chinese bilateral FDI inflows
from UNCTAD limits the analysis to the study period to 2008-2012 and results in weak identification.
25A two-stage LPM was selected to avoid any concerns of extending two-stage least squares estimation to nonlinear
models (Angrist and Pischke 2008). The results are robust to the use of a two-stage instrumental variable probit
model with county fixed effects and a linear time trend.
26The inclusion of year fixed effects results in weak identification. Specifications that include year fixed effects fail
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finance, the coefficients for Chinese Official Finance/GDP and Chinese Official Finance per capita
are both estimated to be negative and statistically significant in Models 5 and 6 respectively. Mir-
roring the conditional logit estimations, the controls for corruption, project duration, and number
of evaluated projects are estimated to be negative and statistically significant in both specifications.
The primary results of the instrumental variable analysis are robust to specifications that include
GDP growth, FDI stock, trade openness, and bilateral Chinese exports as well their interaction
with the probability of receiving Chinese development assistance (Dreher et al. 2017, 14).27
Tests for underidentification and weak identification are reported at the bottom of Table 2.2.
First, the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange-Multiplier tests of underidentification suggest that the instru-
ment is relevant. In both IV specifications, the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange-Multiplier test rejects
the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. Second, both specifications pass the “rule
of thumb” test for weak identification of a first stage regression F-statistic greater than 10 (Staiger
and Stock 1997).28 To further address concerns of weak identification, I conduct Anderson-Rubin
Wald and Stock-Wright LM S tests for weak-instrument robust inference, which are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and clustering at the country level (Anderson and Rubin 1949; Stock and Wright
2000). For both IV estimations, the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM S test statis-
tics reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the endogenous regression is equal to zero at
a 95 percent confidence level.
Extensions
This section considers potential heterogeneous treatment effects of Chinese development assistance
on compliance with conditionality. The effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance
with aid conditionality is unlikely to be constant across institutional and economic environments.
Drawing on the aid-for-policy model framework, the adverse effect of Chinese aid on compliance
is expected to be most observable in environments where the cost of policy reform is high. Under
the Anderson-Rubin Wald and Stock- Wright LM S tests for weak-instrument robust inference.
27Alternate IV specifications are reported in Appendix Table A.8. Estimations that include controls for Chinese
bilateral exports are included in the replication files.
28For the case of a single endogenous regressor, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic is the robust first-stage F
statistic (Baum et al. 2007). The Kleibergen-Paap statistic generalizes the Cragg-Donald statistic to the case of
non-independently and identically distributed errors.
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what conditions do recipient leaders face high policy reform costs and are most likely to seek
Chinese development assistance in order to avoid the implementation of policy reform? I theorize
that Chinese foreign aid is most likely to undermine recipient compliance in environments with
autocratic political regimes and high natural resource rents. In these environments, policy reforms
requested by traditional donors impose significant costs on the recipient leaders by limiting their
access to political rents and decreasing the likelihood of political survival.
First, one might expect the effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance to vary
across political institutions. DAC donors commonly utilize political and legal conditionality as
an instrument to promote democratization and limit political repression. In countries with poor
institutional quality, governance conditionality is also routinely employed by DAC donors to limit
rent-seeking behavior. The absence of political and governance conditionality makes Chinese aid an
attractive option to leaders who fear that institutional reform will affect their chances of political
survival. As a result, I argue that leaders in countries with autocratic political institutions are
less willing to implement the policy reforms requested by traditional donors and more likely to
turn to Chinese development assistance as an alternative source of funding. To test for heteroge-
neous treatment effects across political regimes, I interact the Polity2 index with Chinese Official
Finance/GDP. Figure 2.2(a) presents the simulated average marginal effects of Chinese OF/GDP
on compliance across the Polity2 index. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table A.9
The figure shows that the effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance with condition-
ality is negative and statistically significant in autocratic and anocratic environments that have a
Polity2 score less than 6. In contrast, Chinese development assistance is not estimated to have a
statically significant effect on the likelihood of compliance in democratic environments.
Second, dependence on natural resource rents may also condition the impact of Chinese devel-
opment assistance on compliance with Western aid conditionality. Compliance with transparency
and public finance reforms reduce leaders’ access to rents and are therefore very costly to leaders in
resource-rich countries. Public finance reforms require leaders to give up control over how natural
resource revenue is spent domestically and often requires that governments allocate the revenue
towards social expenditures (Girod and Tobin 2016). In contrast, leaders in resource-rich countries
would prefer to spend the rents on patronage and regime security (Girod and Tobin 2016, 218). I
argue that access to Chinese development assistance discourages recipient governments from un-
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Figure 2.2: Heterogenous treatment effects across institutional and economic environments
(a) Political Regime (b) Natural Resource Dependence
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions presented in Appendix Table A.9. Margins are estimated using
simulations from unconditional logit estimations with country dummy variables. The dotted lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
dertaking policy reforms that would reduce their control over natural resource rents. To test for
heterogeneous treatment effects, I interact Natural Resource Rents/GDP with Chinese OF/GDP
and report the marginal effects in Figure 2.2(b). For reference, the sample average of Natural
Resource Rents/GDP is 12.8 percent. The results find that the effect of Chinese OF/GDP on com-
pliance is negative and statistically significant in environments where Natural Resource Rents/GDP
are greater than or equal to 7 percent. In summary, the results from the analysis of heterogeneous
treatment effects find that Chinese development assistance has a negative and significant effect on
compliance in environments with autocratic and anocratic political regime and access to natural
resource rents.
Conclusion
The rise of China as a prominent donor in Sub-Saharan Africa has raised concerns about whether
Chinese development assistance undermines the effectiveness of aid conditionality used by tradi-
tional donors. The theory developed in this paper predicts that recipient countries are less likely
to comply with aid agreements with traditional DAC donors when they have access to Chinese
development assistance. Using data on recipient compliance with World Bank project agreements
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the empirical analysis in this study finds robust evidence that increased
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Chinese development assistance within a recipient country is associated with decreased compliance
with World Bank conditionality. For an otherwise typical project and country, a one percentage
point increase in Chinese official finance as a proportion of GDP over the five-year period prior to
project completion decreases the likelihood of recipient compliance with the project agreement by
14 percent. The primary results of the study are again confirmed when I instrument for Chinese
official finance using the interaction of Chinese steel production and the probability of a recipient
receiving Chinese aid and continue to find a negative and significant relationship between Chinese
official finance and compliance.
This study contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of Chinese development assis-
tance on the effectiveness of aid from traditional donors. Recent empirical evidence suggests that
competition from China constrains the ability of traditional donors to extract policy concessions
from aid recipients (Hernandez 2017). The findings of this study suggest that Chinese development
assistance also has an adverse effect on compliance with aid conditionality. Aid recipients in Sub-
Saharan Africa appear to be strategically reacting to the presence of Chinese aid by reducing their
compliance with DAC conditionality. Examining heterogeneous treatment effects, the study finds
that the negative effect of Chinese aid on compliance is most pronounced in environments with
autocratic regimes and access to natural resource rents. The findings have important implications
for the implementation of governance and transparency reforms in such environments aimed at
enhancing the effectiveness of aid. Future research might investigate if the findings of this study
translate to conditionality attached to IMF lending and aid from prominent DAC donors. Future
research might also test the generalizability of the findings to other non-traditional donors.
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CHAPTER 3: FOREIGN AID AND PRE-ELECTORAL FISCAL
MANIPULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the effect of foreign aid on the incidence of political budget cycles (PBCs) in
expenditures and taxation in developing countries. I argue that foreign aid is a fungible source of
revenue that incentivizes incumbents to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral purposes. Specifically,
I theorize that aid increases the likelihood of political budget cycles by increasing the value of
holding office, obscuring fiscal transparency, and creating a soft budget constraint that discourages
fiscal discipline. Using panel data for over 70 developing democracies from 1990-2012, the empirical
analysis finds that political budget cycles in expenditures are statistically and substantively larger
as foreign aid within a country increases. Contrary to my hypothesis, the analysis reveals no
significant relationship between aid and tax revenue prior to elections. The primary results hold
for a host of robustness checks that address concerns related to alternative explanations of political
budget cycles, potential sources of omitted variable bias, estimation strategy, and outliers in the
data. The findings of the study suggest that the structure of public finance in developing countries
may impact incumbents’ choice of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation strategy.
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Introduction
National elections are an important source of fiscal volatility in developing countries that can
potentially have harmful effects on long-term economic stability (Collier and Chauvet 2010; Fatas
and Mihov 2013). Prior to elections, incumbent politicians have powerful incentives to manipulate
fiscal policy in order to affect voter behavior. The basic intuition of political budget cycles (PBCs)
is that incumbents will increase public spending and/or decrease taxation before elections in order
to improve their chances of reelection. Empirical studies have documented politically-driven cycles
in expenditures, taxation, and overall budget balance in developing countries but have only found
modest evidence of such cycles in developed countries (Alesina et al. 1997; Brender and Drazen
2005; Drazen 2000; Ebeke and Ölçer 2013; Prichard 2018; Schuknecht 2000; Shi and Svensson 2006).
What explains the prevalence of political budget cycles in developing democracies? To answer this
question, scholars have examined the institutional conditions under which incumbent politicians
have the motivation and ability to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral purposes. Prominent studies
in the literature find that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is more likely in countries with young
democratic institutions (Brender and Drazen 2005; Hanusch and Keefer 2014), high corruption (Shi
and Svensson 2006), limited fiscal transparency (Alt and Lassen 2006), and low media freedom (Shi
and Svensson 2006; Veiga, et al. 2017). This study identifies an additional mechanism that can
explain why political budget cycles most commonly occur in developing democracies: access to
foreign aid.
Building on the literatures on political budget cycles and the political economy of aid, I argue
that aid is a fungible resource that provides both a motive and an opportunity for incumbents
to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. First, foreign aid provides access to political rents
(Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016; Busse and Göening 2009; Braütigam and Knack 2004; Djankov
et al. 2008; Svensson 2000a). Higher political rents increase the value of holding office and make
incumbents more likely to manipulative fiscal policy for electoral purposes (Shi and Svensson 2006).
Second, foreign aid obscures voters’ information about the government’s total budget and quality
of incumbent politicians (de Renzio and Angemi 2011; Klomp and de Haan 2016). Foreign aid
also limits citizens’ willingness to monitor the government and weakens demands for budget trans-
parency (Martin 2016; Paler 2014). Low fiscal transparency compels candidates to use political
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budget cycles to demonstrate their competency to voters and minimizes the risk that voters will
punish them for deficit spending (Alt and Lassen 2006). Third, foreign aid can provide a soft
budget constraint that encourages incumbents to utilize pre-electoral fiscal expansion (Braütigam
and Knack 2004; Chiripanhura and Nino-Zarazua 2015; Janus 2009). The soft budget constraint
creates an expectation that future deficits will be met by foreign aid and undermines fiscal disci-
pline, particularly during election years (Braütigam and Knack 2004). Incumbents are more likely
to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation if they believe they can finance future deficits with aid
flows instead of increased taxation. Lastly, foreign aid may also impact the ability of incumbents
to finance political budget cycles. Empirical evidence finds that recipient countries closely aligned
with major donors receive more aid during election years (Faye and Niehaus 2012; Dreher and
Vaubel 2004). Based on these mechanisms, I hypothesize that foreign aid will be associated with
increased expenditures and decreased tax revenue in election years.
Two mechanisms have the ability to mitigate the theorized effect on foreign aid on pre-electoral
manipulation: donor control and aid conditionality (Bermeo 2011, 2016; Dietrich 2013; Milner et
al. 2016). In order to reduce rent-seeking opportunities, donors may strategically select different
types of aid and delivery channels in response to the governance environment in recipient countries
(Dietrich 2013). Additionally, aid conditionality, which is the attachment of policy conditions to the
disbursement of aid, is designed to limit fungibility and address moral hazard problems. However,
budget support still represents a sizable proportion of total official development assistance, and the
enforcement of conditionality is weak due to institutional incentives within aid agencies and the
strategic interests of donors (Dreher et al. 2009; Kilby 2009; Stone 2004; Swedlund 2017). The
extent to which aid incentivizes incumbents to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation depends
on the level of donor control and aid conditionality. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that
political budget cycles are more likely to occur in countries that receive more fungible types of aid
(i.e. budget support) and are strategically aligned with major donors.
To test the effect of foreign aid on government expenditures and tax revenue prior to elections,
I estimate a dynamic panel model using data on elections and fiscal behavior for 70+ low- and
middle-income democracies from 1990-2012. The empirical analysis finds that foreign aid has a
significant and substantial positive impact on government expenditures prior to elections. Holding
all other covariates at their sample means, a one standard deviation increase (12.1 percent) in
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ODA as a percent GDP from the sample mean (7.8 percent) is associated on average with a 1.03
percentage point increase in expenditures as a percent of GDP in non-election years and a 2.03
percentage point increase in election years. Turning to taxation, the analysis reveals no significant
relationship between aid and tax revenue prior to elections. Together, the results suggest that
incumbents in high-aid environments are more likely to utilize an electoral strategy of increased
expenditures than decreased tax collection. The primary results are robust to both fixed-effects and
system-GMM estimators, the introduction of a host of potential omitted variables, the exclusion of
outliers from the sample, and alternative classifications of election year. Additionally, the findings
remain unaltered in magnitude or significance when I control for prominent alternative explanations
from the PBC literature pertaining to experience with democratic institutions, fiscal transparency,
and media freedom.
This study primarily contributes to the literature on political budget cycles and proposes an
additional explanation for the occurrence of political budget cycles in developing countries. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively examine the impact of aid
on political cycles in expenditures and taxation. Previous research on aid and political budget
cycles examines the effect of aid on fiscal deficits and growth in Sub-Saharan African countries
(Chiripanhura and Nino-Zarazua 2015; Mosley and Chiripanhura 2016). This study also contributes
to the literature on the electoral effects of aid, which finds that aid increases the likelihood that
incumbent governments remain in power via the provision of public goods, clientelistic private
transfers, and undeserved credit claiming (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Briggs 2015; Cruz
and Schneider 2017; Jablonski 2014; Kono and Montinola 2009; Morrison 2007, 2009). The study
provides an additional mechanism, enabling political cycles in expenditures, through which foreign
aid can help incumbents gain electoral support. Increased spending prior to elections may be used
to provide public goods and services, temporary civil service employment, subsidies to targeted
voters, or clientelist transfers (Briggs 2012; Harding 2015; Pierskalla and Sacks 2018).
The next section presents the theoretical argument on the effect of foreign aid on the inci-
dence of political budget cycles in developing countries. Section 3 demonstrates the theoretical
mechanisms using an illustrative case from Ghana. Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the data, empirical
strategy, and results. The final section concludes and discusses avenues for future research.
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Aid and Political Budget Cycles
The incidence of political budget cycles depends on the incentives of incumbent politicians to ma-
nipulate fiscal policy for electoral purposes and their ability to fund the cycles. Early theoretical
models of political budget cycles attribute pre-electoral fiscal manipulation to information asym-
metries between incumbents and voters (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990). In these models,
voters generally prefer politicians who deliver greater material wellbeing but have imperfect in-
formation about incumbents’ abilities and the fiscal environment. Through elections, voters try
to select the most competent politicians, defined as ones that can provide higher levels of public
goods for a given budget constraint. Due to imperfect information, incumbents have incentives to
increase spending or decrease taxation in order to demonstrate competence to voters and improve
their chances of reelection.
Later models of political budget cycles move away from adverse selection problems and fo-
cus exclusively on moral hazard (Shi and Svensson 2006; Alt Lassen 2006). In these models, all
politicians, independent of their competence levels, face the same incentives prior to the election
(Shi and Svensson 2006, 1368). As a result, all incumbents have an incentive to exploit imperfect
information about the budget and implement political budget cycles. This line of moral hazard
models attributes variation in the size of political budget cycles to characteristics of the institutional
environment. Shi and Svensson (2006) find that the size of political budget cycles is conditional
on the incumbents’ access to political rents, proxied by corruption. The authors argue that weak
institutional environments increase access to political rents and incentivize incumbents to engage
in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation in order to secure access to future rents. Shi and Svensson also
attribute political budget cycles to the proportion of informed voters in the electorate and find that
the size of political budget cycles decreases as media access increases. Similarly, Alt and Lassen
(2006) find that fiscal transparency conditions the occurrence of political budget cycles. The au-
thors document a persistent pattern of political budget cycles in low transparency environments
and no evidence of cycles high transparency environments. Alt and Lassen argue that fiscal trans-
parency allows voters to observe the causes and consequences of a government’s fiscal policy, either
directly or through the media (Alt and Lassen 2006, 531). As a result, transparency makes it more
difficult for incumbents to gain electoral support by fiscal expansion because voters can more easily
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discern manipulation and relate it to the presence of elections.
Drawing from these prominent explanations of political budget cycles, my theoretical argu-
ment focuses on how foreign aid impacts incumbents’ incentives to engage in pre-electoral fiscal
manipulation. Building on the literature on foreign aid and governance, I view aid as a fungible
resource that can have adverse effects on corruption and citizens’ demands for political accountabil-
ity. I theorize that foreign aid incentivizes incumbents to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
through three primary mechanisms: 1) increasing access to rents and the value of holding office; 2)
obscuring fiscal transparency and weakening demands for budget transparency; and 3) creating a
soft budget constraint that discourages fiscal discipline. The extent to which foreign aid incentivizes
incumbents to pursue pre-electoral fiscal expansion depends on the level of donor control over aid
resources and enforcement of aid conditionality. The occurrence of budget cycles also depends on
whether the government is able to fund these cycles. Drawing on empirical research on political
aid cycles, I contend that foreign aid is an additional form of revenue that can finance increased
expenditures or decreased taxation during election years.
First, foreign aid may incentivize political budget cycles by increasing political rents and the
value of holding office. A number of studies find that aid enables government actors to engage in
rent-seeking behavior and undermines governance in recipient countries (Asongu and Nwachukwu
2016; Busse and Göening 2009; Braütigam and Knack 2004; Easterly 2006; Djankov et al. 2008;
Moyo 2009; Svensson 2000a).29 Similar to natural resource rents, this literature views aid as a
fungible resource that can be captured by political elites. Aid fungibility refers to the diversion
of aid away from its intended use (Morrissey 2015). At the aggregate level, aid is fungible when
one additional dollar of aid increases total government expenditure by less than one dollar after
accounting for administrative costs (Morrissey 2015).30 Due to fungibility, access to foreign aid
increases the level of the political rents that can be extracted by politicians. Higher political rents
increase the value of holding political office and make incumbents more likely to manipulate fiscal
policy for electoral purposes in order to gain access to future rents. Higher political rents also
29Notable exceptions include Altincekic and Bearce (2014), Jones and Tarp (2016), and Tavares (2003).
30Feyzioglu et al. (1998), Pack and Pack (1993), Ouattara (2006), and Lloyd et al. (2009) provide evidence that some
degree of aid fungibility exists. Aid fungibility can also result in the reallocation of sectoral spending, reduction of
domestic revenue, reduction of external borrowing, and/or misappropriation for clientelistic purposes.
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increase the prize of the electoral contest and the likelihood that incumbents will be challenged
(Klomp and de Haan 2016). Existing research suggests that incumbent governments are most
likely to use political budget cycles in competitive elections (Block et al. 2003; Prichard 2018;
Vergne 2009).
Second, aid can incentivize incumbents to use political budget cycles by obscuring fiscal trans-
parency. Fiscal transparency impacts voters’ ability to monitor the government’s spending and
revenue decisions and accurately assess the quality of incumbent politicians. Low budget trans-
parency provides incentives for opportunistic politicians to pursue expansionary fiscal policy prior
to elections in order to demonstrate competency. In contrast, high budget transparency makes it
more difficult for incumbents to gain voters’ support by fiscal expansion since voters can easily dis-
cern manipulation and relate it to the presence of elections (Alt and Lassen 2006). Despite donors’
recent efforts to strengthen budget transparency in developing countries led by the International
Budget Partnership (IBP), empirical evidence finds a negative correlation between aid dependency
and budget transparency (de Renzio and Angemi 2011). By obscuring fiscal transparency, I argue
that foreign aid decreases citizens’ ability to observe the total budget and incumbent quality. When
sources of unearned income comprise a significant portion of government finance, incumbents have
incentives to hide unearned income from the public eye in order to maximize rent-seeking oppor-
tunities. Additionally, foreign aid may also limit citizens’ willingness to monitor the government
and demands for budget transparency. There is a longstanding argument that citizens will more
readily demand accountability from governments for taxes than for non-tax revenue from aid or
oil (Beblawi 1987; de la Cuesta et al. 2018a, 2018b; Martin 2016; Paler 2013; Ross 2001, 2004).31
Thus, in high-aid environments with low fiscal transparency, voters are more uncertain about the
total budget and incumbent quality. As a result, incumbents are more likely to pursue expansionary
fiscal policies prior to elections in order to demonstrate competency.
Third, foreign aid can create a soft budget constraint that encourages incumbents to utilize
31Paler (2013) presents experimental evidence from Indonesia which finds that taxation creates stronger incentives
for citizens to monitor the budget and government than windfall revenue. Using laboratory experiments from
Uganda, Martin (2016) finds that taxation increases citizens’ willingness to punish leaders compared to non-earned
income. However, recent experimental evidence by de la Cuesta et al. (2018a, 2018b) from Ghana and Uganda
calls this traditional taxation-accountability argument into question. The taxation-accountability argument may
be conditioned by the type of tax (de la Cuesta et al. 2018a) or citizens’ feelings of ownership over collectively
owned resources (de la Cuesta et al. 2018b).
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pre-electoral fiscal expansion (Svensson 2000b; Braütigam and Knack 2004; Janus 2009). A soft
budget constraint refers to the expectation of a bailout by an entity in the case of financial distress
(Janus 2009). Research on subnational political budget cycles finds that political budget cycles can
result from fiscal institutions that create soft budget constraints. Baskaran et al. (2015) find that
high dependence on central government transfers compared to locally-generated revenue exacer-
bates political budget cycles. The authors argue that dependence on central government transfers
encourages local politicians to pursue fiscal expansion in election years and seek a bailout from
the central government in the future. I contend that this same dynamic applies to donor-recipient
relations. Moral hazard problems have been long documented in the provision of foreign aid and
lending by international financial institutions (IFIs) (Braütigam and Knack 2004; Dreher 2004).
Braütigam and Knack (2004) argue that access to foreign resources convinces aid-recipients that
budgets are flexible, discourages fiscal discipline, and creates the expectation that future deficits
will be funded by foreign aid. If incumbents believe that the costs of fiscal manipulation will be
shifted outside of the state to foreign donors in the future, they are more likely to pursue expansion-
ary fiscal policies before elections. Soft budget constraint expectations may also decrease voters’
willingness to punish political budget cycles if they also believe the cost of the fiscal manipulation
will be met by future aid instead of increased taxation.
In addition to increasing incumbent politicians’ incentives to utilize fiscal manipulation as an
electoral strategy, foreign aid also enhances the ability of incumbents to finance political budget
cycles. Political budget cycles can be financed in two ways: increased borrowing from capital
markets and increased revenues from non-tax revenues including foreign aid and natural resource
rents. Recent research by Klomp and de Haan (2016) finds evidence of political cycles in natural
resource rents that are used to finance increased expenditures and decreased taxation prior to
elections. Foreign aid is an additional source of non-tax revenue that can directly finance political
budget cycles. Existing empirical research provides evidence of political cycles in the allocation of
aid. Dreher and Vaubel (2004) find that new IMF credits are larger prior to elections in recipient
countries. Examining bilateral aid flows, Faye and Niehaus (2012) find that donors give significantly
more aid to strategically-aligned countries that are facing competitive elections. Similarly, Kersting
and Kilby (2015) find that the speed of World Bank disbursements accelerates prior to elections
in recipient countries that are geopolitically aligned with the United States. Increased aid from
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strategic donors can directly finance increased expenditures and/or decreased tax collection prior
to elections. The strategic behavior of donors also contributes to moral hazard problems and soft
budget constraint expectations.
To this point, I have focused on the mechanisms through which aid increases incumbent politi-
cians’ incentives and ability to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. However, it is crucial to
also consider the interests and actions of donors that may constrain such opportunistic behavior
and characteristics that differentiate aid from other forms of non-tax revenue (Collier 2006; Bermeo
2016). Donor control of aid resources is one mechanism through which donors can address the ad-
verse effects of aid on governance and constrain incumbents’ incentives to engage in pre-electoral
fiscal manipulation (Bermeo 2016; Dietrich 2013; Milner et al. 2016). To limit fungibility and
rent-seeking behavior, donors can target aid to specific populations or sectors (Winters 2014), alter
the type of aid (Bermeo 2016; Swedlund 2018), and channel aid through non-state actors (Diet-
rich 2013). Over the past 30 years, donors have disbursed different types of aid, including budget
support, project aid, and results-based aid, in an effort to address credible commitment problems
in donor-recipient relations (Swedlund 2018). Similarly, donors have utilized alternative aid de-
livery channels to minimize capture by incumbent politicians (Dietrich 2013). Dietrich finds that
donors strategically decide how much aid to give directly to governments and how much to bypass
to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based on corruption levels and institutional capacity.
However, donors still actively engage with recipient governments and routinely give discretion to
recipient governments in the allocation of aid (Jablonski 2014). Although there is substantial vari-
ation by recipient and donor, the government-to-government channel continues to be the largest
delivery channel and accounted for over 65 percent of total ODA from 2006-2017 (OECD CRS
2018). Furthermore, budget support and contributions to pooled programs, commonly considered
to be more fungible types of aid, have comprised an average of 18 percent of total ODA excluding
administrative costs since 2006 (OECD CRS 2018).
Aid conditionality is a second mechanism through which donors can constrain incumbents’ use
of political budget cycles. Aid conditionality is the attachment of policy conditions to the disburse-
ment of aid. Conditionality is intended to induce policy reform and deter the misappropriation of
aid by threatening to withdraw future transfers if the recipient country fails to comply with the
conditions of the aid agreement. Donors commonly condition aid on institutional reform and fiscal
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transparency to limit rent-seeking and improve the effectiveness of foreign aid. The IMF and World
Bank also routinely condition assistance on fiscal and monetary indicators that constrain incum-
bent governments’ incentives to pursue electorally-driven fiscal manipulation (Hyde and O’Mahony
2010). The effective enforcement of conditionality can address soft budget constraints and encour-
age fiscal discipline. Despite the extensive use of conditionality by OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) donors and IFIs, recipient country compliance with conditionality has been poor
(Dollar and Svensson 2000; Ivanova et al. 2001; Easterly 2005). Poor compliance with aid condi-
tionality has been most attributed to weak enforcement by donors. Donors have been unable to
credibly commit to the enforcement of aid conditionality due to the strategic interests of major
donors and institutional incentives within aid agencies to continue disbursing aid (Dreher et al.
2009; Kilby 2009; Stone 2004; Swedlund 2017).
Based on this discussion, the extent to which foreign aid incentivizes incumbent politicians to
pursue pre-electoral fiscal expansion through the theorized rent-seeking, transparency, and moral
hazard mechanisms depends on the level of donor control over aid resources and enforcement of
aid conditionality. Despite donors’ efforts, empirical evidence suggests that donors still provide
more fungible types of aid to recipient countries and the enforcement of aid conditionality has been
poor. As a result, I predict that foreign aid incentivizes incumbents to pursue political budget
cycles in expenditures and taxation in order to gain electoral support. Thus, the following testable
hypotheses are generated:
H1:Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation of expenditures is more likely as foreign aid within a country
increases.
H2: Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation of taxation is more likely as foreign aid within a country
increases.
Illustrative Case: Ghana
To demonstrate the validity of the theoretical mechanisms through which aid incentivizes political
budget cycles, I now turn to an illustrative case from Ghana. Ghana is widely considered one of
Africa’s success stories due to its significant strides towards development and democratic consoli-
dation (Cheesman 2015; Whitfield 2009). Since the resumption of democracy in 1992, Ghana has
established a two-party system with tightly contested elections between the National Democratic
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Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Over this period, power has transferred three
times between the two parties. The incidence of political budget cycles in Ghana has been well-
documented by scholars, development practitioners, and media outlets (Block 2002; Mosley and
Chiripanhura 2016; Tarawalie et al. 2012). Figure 3.1 reports Ghana’s historical fiscal balance.
Budget crises have coincided with the four-year election cycle. Large fiscal deficits in 1992, 1996,
2008, 2012, and 2016 were especially destabilizing to the Ghanaian economy. Ghana’s election-
year deficits have primarily been driven by increased expenditures in health, education and social
protection sectors as well as increased civil service expenditures (Abdulai and Hulme 2015; Block
2002; Mosley and Chiripanhura 2016).
Figure 3.1: Political budget cycles in Ghana
Since 1992, Ghana has received consistent support from donors with official development assis-
tance averaging 8 percent of GDP. In the 1980s and 1990s, Ghana primarily received support from
the IMF and World Bank under structural adjustment programs. In 2001, Ghana received debt
relief as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Soon after, a Multi-Donor
Budget Support (MDBS) framework was established in 2003.32 From 2005-2015, MDBS donors
provided $3.4 billion in General Budget Support (GBS) and $1 billion in sectoral assistance (MDBS
Joint Evaluation 2017). Since 2005, budget support and other sectoral assistance have comprised
30 percent of total aid to Ghana (OECD CRS 2018). Additionally, Ghana has received nearly $1
32The MDBS program included 11 development partners: the African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, the
European Union, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the World
Bank.
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billion in concessional lending from the IMF since 2015. The use of aid for electoral purposes has
been documented in the regional allocation of budget support expenditures and the provision of
electricity (Abdulai and Hulme 2015; Briggs 2012). The use of aid for electoral purpose can also
be observed in survey data on citizens’ attitudes towards elections and voting. In 2015, 76% of
Ghanaians felt that politicians should not be punished for directing development projects toward
areas that support them (Cheeseman et al. 2016)
How has Ghana’s continued access to foreign aid contributed to the incidence of political
budget cycles? Following my theoretical argument, foreign aid provides incentives for Ghana’s
political parties to pursue political budget cycles due to its adverse effects on corruption and fiscal
transparency. Despite its progress towards democratic consolidation, corruption and fiscal trans-
parency remain central challenges to Ghana’s economic and institutional development. According
to Transparency International (TI), Ghana ranked 78 out of 180 countries on the 2018 Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) with a score of 41 out of 100 (TI 2018). According to MDBS donors,
public sector accountability has not significantly improved since 2003 and is undermined by strong
political interference (MDBS Joint Evaluation 2017). One notable source of corruption in Ghana
is public procurement, where donors have recognized the strong resilience of political patronage
systems (MDBS Joint Evaluation 2017). Due to its relative fungibility, budget support to Ghana
has contributed to rent-seeking opportunities in the procurement of public goods and services. One
crucial tool for addressing corruption is fiscal transparency. However, fiscal transparency reform
in Ghana over the last two decades has largely been disappointing despite the recent introduction
of institutional mechanisms and technologies (Adamtey 2017; Betley et al. 2011). In 2008, Ghana
scored 50 out of a possible 100 on the International Budget Partnership’s (IBP) Open Budget Index
(OBI) with a small improvement to 54 in 2010 (Adamtey 2017).33 However, Ghana’s OBI score
slipped back to 50 in 2012, an election year, and remained roughly the same through 2017 (Adamtey
2017). According to the IBP, an OBI score of 60 is considered to represent the level at which coun-
tries are publishing sufficient information to allow public discussions on the budget to occur. Ghana
has also scored low on legislature and audit institution oversight and public participation in the
budget process. Why has Ghana showed limited improvement in budget transparency? Significant
33The OBI is a comparative measure calculated from a set of questions that assesses the level to which governments
around the world make publicly available timely and comprehensive budget information.
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non-tax revenues from aid and more recently oil have allowed government administrations to limit
fiscal transparency by minimizing the government’s dependence on taxation. Although interna-
tional donors, notably the IMF, have put significant effort into improving budget transparency,
the efforts have not yet been able to drastically improve fiscal transparency and thwart Ghana’s
election year deficits.
The case of Ghana also illustrates the soft budget constraint mechanism. Recipient countries
are more likely to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral purposes if they expect to fund election-year
deficits with foreign aid in the future. Access to grants and concessional finance has allowed Ghana
to avoid dramatically increasing taxes during post-election fiscal crunches. To demonstrate the
moral hazard mechanism, I focus on the 2012 and 2016 Ghanaian elections. In the 2012 election,
the fiscal deficit increased by 4 percentage points to 11 percent of GDP. The increase in the deficit
was largely due to civil service wage and off-budget expenditures. Following a fiscal adjustment after
the election year, the MDBS partnership broke down, with several participating donors suspending
disbursements in 2013 and 2014 in response to a deteriorating macroeconomic situation. At this
time, Ghana approached the IMF and agreed to an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) under the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) in 2015. Under the agreement, the IMF agreed
to provide Ghana with $918 million in financial assistance over three years. The ECF aimed to
ensure fiscal stability, reduce budget overrun, and restore macroeconomic stability. Under the IMF
deal, the 2016 fiscal deficit target was 5.25 percent of GDP (Mpoke Bigg 2017). However, the 2016
deficit came in around 7 percent in the 2016 election year. According to the IMF, initial adjustment
efforts were reversed by the 2016 election-related policy slippages resulting in a repeat of Ghana’s
political budget cycle. Despite the fiscal indiscipline, the ECF agreement, initially planned to end
in 2018, was extended until April 2019. Today, there is a growing concern that Ghana could return
to the IMF for financial support if the government fails to control its expenditure during the 2020
elections. The final IMF Review of the ECF Arrangement conducted in 2019 includes concerns
that Ghana’s continued weak revenue collection and spending pressures from the run up to the
2020 election could escalate and undermine adjustment (IMF 2019). Specifically, the review states
that, “Political pressures to spend more and tax less are evident. Ghana has de facto entered into
a pre-election campaign”(IMF 2019, 13).
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Data
To test the effect on aid on political budget cycles, I construct a dataset on elections and fiscal
behavior for 70+ low- and middle-income democracies over the 1990-2012 period. Political budget
cycles assume the presence of electoral democracies. When elections are not competitive and
incumbents’ political rents are not at risk, political budget cycles are not expected to occur. I
classify electoral democracies using the Polity2 index (Marhsall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017). Following
Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006), democracies are defined as countries that
receive a Polity2 score between 0 and 10. Countries that are classified as democracies for less than
5 years during the study period are excluded from the analysis. The list of countries included in
the sample is presented in Appendix B.
Data on public finance is collected at the general government level and captures government
spending and tax collection at all levels of government. Data for the first dependent variable,
Expenditures/GDP, is collected from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (IMF
2017). Compared to the IMF Government Finance Statistics database, the IMF World Economic
Outlook Database has superior coverage of expenditure data for the sample of developing countries.
Data for the second dependent variable, Tax/Revenue GDP, is collected from the Government
Revenue Dataset (GRD) from the International Center for Tax and Development (ICTD). The
ICTD GRD is the most comprehensive dataset on taxation suitable for cross-country research
(Prichard et al. 2016). Tax Revenue/GDP excludes social contributions and natural resource
revenue. Fiscal data coverage in both the IMF WEO and ICTD GRD is limited for the 1980s.
As a result, the study period begins in 1990 and captures the effect of aid on fiscal policy in the
Post-Cold War period.
The primary source of election data is the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy
(NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The NELDA dataset provides detailed information
on all election events from 1960-2012. I create a binary variable, Election, which is coded as 1
for years in which there is an election and 0 otherwise. I focus on government elections where
the leader of the country’s government is elected. These include executive elections in presidential
democracies and parliamentary elections in parliamentary democracies.34 In total, 191 executive
34Classification is based on NELDA20.
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elections were held in the sample of developing democracies. On average, each country held three
executive elections. To address potential bias from endogenous election timing, I exclude elections
that were held early or late relative to the fixed date established by the constitution or procedure
(Shi and Svensson 2006).35 I also construct an additional election dummy variable for competitive
multi-party elections. Existing research finds that incumbents are most likely to implement political
budget cycles in competitive, multi-party elections (Block et al. 2003; Prichard 2018; Vergne 2009).
Competitive Election is coded as 1 if the government wins 70 percent or less of all the seats in
government and 0 otherwise.36 Data on electoral competition is drawn from the Database on
Political Institutions (DPI) (Scartascini et al. 2017).
In empirical tests of political budget cycles, it is important to take into account the timing
of elections within a year. When elections are held early in the year, changes in expenditures and
taxation are mostly expected to occur in the previous year. Therefore, it is necessary to define
an effective election year and specify a cutoff point in which to look for fiscal effects in the year
prior when elections occur in the first k months of the calendar year, where k takes a value of 1
through 12 (Prichard 2018, 326). The extant literature suggests that political cycles in expenditures
cycles occur closer to elections than political cycles in tax revenue (Prichard 2018).37 Studies on
political budget cycles in expenditures have most commonly adjusted for elections in the first three
or six months of the year (Block 2002; Hanusch and Keefer 2014; Mironov and Zhuravskaya 2014;
Vergne 2009).38 Studies on political budget cycles in taxation commonly adjust for elections in the
first 6 months of the year (Ehrhart 2013; Prichard 2018). Following Prichard (2018), the primary
empirical results of this study look for fiscal effects in the year prior when elections occur in the
first five months of the calendar year. This cutoff point reflects a compromise between a three and
six-month cutoff and aims to best capture the effects of elections on both expenditures and tax
revenue. The primary results of the study are robust when using the calendar election year as well
as three, six, and nine-month cutoff points for the effective election year.
35Classification is based on NELDA6.
36Classified based on NELDA3, NELDA4, NELDA5, and DPI Margin of Majority.
37Prichard (2018) argues that PBCs in taxation occur earlier than PBCs in expenditures, because tax benefits are
often more difficult to target and are often constrained by the timing of tax payments (p. 436).
38Mironov and Zhuravskaya(2014) find that political cycles in public procurement contracts in Russia are concentrated
in the month prior to elections.
45
Data on foreign aid is collected from the OECD International Development Statistics (IDS)
database. Foreign aid is measured as official development assistance (ODA) disbursements as a
percent of GDP. The OECD data covers aid disbursements from OECD DAC countries, multilateral
donors, and some non-DAC countries.39 In robustness checks, data on aid type is used to create an
alternative measure of aid that excludes technical cooperation. I remove technical cooperation from
net ODA/GDP to address the concern that foreign aid may increase in election years to facilitate
elections (Faye and Niehaus 2012).
All estimations include a standard set of controls variables commonly used in the literature to
account for economic, demographic, and political determinants of fiscal behavior. I include economic
and demographic controls for real GDP per capita, GDP growth, trade openness, natural resources
rents as a percent of GDP, and age dependency ratio from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) database (Brender and Drazen 2005; Klomp and de Haan 2016; Shi and Svensson
2006). Additionally, political control variables for political constraints and conflict are included in
all baseline specifications (Streb et al. 2009). Data on the number of veto players in the political
system is drawn from the Political Constraint Index (Heinsz 2004). Data on the incidence and
intensity of conflict is collected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCPD) Monadic Conflict
Onset and Incidence Dataset (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2014).40 In robustness checks, additional
controls are introduced for age of democracy, fiscal transparency, media censorship, debt stocks,
inflation, partisanship, corruption, temporary UN Security Council membership, UNGA voting,
and participation in IMF arrangements. Descriptive statistics are presented in the appendix.
Empirical Strategy
To analyze the effect of aid on the incidence of political budget cycles, the following dynamic panel
data (DPD) model is estimated:
Fit = αFit−1 +β1Electionit+β2ODA/GDPit+β3ODA/GDPit∗Electionit+δ′xit+υi+φt+εit (1)
where Fit is the fiscal outcome in country i and year t, Electionit is a dummy variable for effective
39The OECD estimate of total ODA disbursements includes reported flows for 20 non-DAC reporting countries and
estimates for the top ten non-reporting non-DAC countries.
40In each country-year, minor armed conflicts (<25 battle deaths) are coded as 1 and wars (>1000 battle deaths) are
coded as 2.
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election year, ODA/GDPit is official development assistance as a percent of GDP, xit is a vector of
control variables, υi is a country fixed effect, φt is a year fixed effect, and εit is the error term. Fiscal
outcomes include total government expenditures and tax revenue as a percent of GDP. The lagged
dependent variable is included to account for the persistence of fiscal activities over time and any
potential equilibrium dynamics. Country fixed effects are included to control for any unobserved,
time-invariant confounding variables and analyze the effect of within-country variation in aid on
government spending and tax collection prior to elections. The model is estimated using the fixed
effects (FE) estimator in the primary results. In robustness checks, the model is also estimated
with the system generalized methods of moments (system-GMM) estimator to address concerns of
Nickell bias stemming from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in panels with small time
dimensions a large number of country units (Kiviet 1995; Nickell 1981).
Results
Before moving to results from my econometric model, I briefly demonstrate support for my hy-
potheses using descriptive statistics. Table 3.1 presents simple decompositions of average Expen-
diture/GDP and Tax Revenue/GDP in election and non-election years for high-aid and low-aid
sample groupings. Country-year observations are classified in the high-aid grouping if ODA/GDP
is greater than or equal to the sample mean of 7.8 percent of GDP and in the low-aid grouping if
ODA/GDP is below the mean. For the entire sample, government expenditures averaged 25 percent
of GDP. The decomposition in Table 3.1(a) shows that expenditures as a percent of GDP were on
average 0.7 percentage points higher in election years than non-election years for the entire sample.
Looking closer, we see that expenditures as a percent of GDP in the high-aid grouping are 1.0
percentage point higher in election years. In contrast, we observe that election-year expenditures
in the low-aid grouping are 0.09 percentage points smaller than non-election year expenditures.
Turing to taxation, tax revenue averaged 16 percent of GDP for the entire sample. The decomposi-
tion in Table 3.1(b) shows that tax revenue as a percent of GDP is on average 0.3 percentage points
lower during election years than non-election years for the entire sample. Election-year decreases
in tax revenue as a percent of GDP correspond with a 0.56 percentage point decrease in the high-
aid grouping and a 0.25 percentage point decrease in the low-aid grouping. The results from this
comparison of mean values across high- and low-aid groupings are consistent with my theoretical
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argument. I now turn to the regression analysis to further evaluate the size and significance of
these differences.
Table 3.1: Fiscal outcomes by ODA/GDP grouping and election year
(a) Expenditures/GDP
Election Non-election All
High aid 25.12 (n=62) 24.12 (n=319) 24.28 (n=381)
Low aid 25.26 (n=114) 25.37 (n=610) 25.35 (n=724)
All 25.21 (n=176) 24.94 (n=929) 24.99 (n=1105)
(b) Tax Revenue/GDP
Election Non-election All
High aid 12.97 (n=66) 13.53 (n=370) 13.44 (n=436)
Low aid 17.35 (n=123) 17.60 (n=665) 17.56 (n=788)
All 15.82 (n=189) 16.15 (n=1035) 16.10 (n=1224)
Note: High aid is defined as ODA/GDP >= 7.8%.
Table 3.2 reports the main results, employing the fixed-effect estimator. Overall, the results
find strong support for the hypothesis that political budget cycles in expenditures are more likely
to occur as foreign aid within a country increases. Foreign aid is estimated to have a positive
and significant effect on expenditures during non-election years and a substantively larger and
significant on expenditures in election years. Contrary to my hypothesis, the results reveal no
significant relationship between aid and tax revenue prior to elections. Moving from left to right,
Models 1-3 report results for political budget cycles in expenditures in all elections and competitive
elections. Similarly, Models 4-6 report results for political budget cycles in taxation in all elections
and competitive elections. Model 1 does not include an interaction term between Election and
ODA/GDP and represents the alternative hypothesis that developing countries engage in pre-
electoral fiscal manipulation unconditionally. Model 1 estimates that elections are associated with
a 0.57 percentage point increase in government spending as a percent of GDP. In this baseline
specification, ODA/GDP is estimated to have a positive effect on Expenditure/GDP in all years,
which is consistent with the extant literature (Remmer 2004; Morrissey 2012). To test H1, Model 2
introduces an interaction term between Election and ODA/GDP. The interaction term is estimated
to be positive and statistically significant. For ease of interpretation, Figure 3.2(a) graphically
displays the average marginal effects of ODA/GDP on Expenditures/GDP in non-election and
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Table 3.2: Foreign aid and political budget cycles
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.666*** 0.660*** 0.662***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.045)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.691*** 0.692*** 0.690***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Election5 0.571** 0.022 0.028 -0.281*
(0.231) (0.258) (0.123) (0.148)
ODA/GDP 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.092*** -0.022* -0.025* -0.023*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.079*** 0.044**
(0.024) (0.018)
Competitive Election5 -0.339 -0.375**
(0.333) (0.170)
Competitive Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.130*** 0.039*
(0.031) (0.022)
GDPPC (log) -0.358 -0.240 -0.370 0.000 0.011 0.016
(1.366) (1.435) (1.342) (0.587) (0.575) (0.588)
GDP Growth Rate -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Trade/GDP 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP 0.006 0.008 -0.000 0.034 0.034 0.033
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Age Dependency Ratio 0.042 0.048 0.039 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Political Constraints 0.809 1.081* 0.823 0.363 0.489 0.396
(0.591) (0.633) (0.601) (0.374) (0.366) (0.371)
Conflict 0.090 0.087 -0.041 -0.109 -0.112 -0.123
(0.347) (0.347) (0.345) (0.191) (0.187) (0.188)
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 1015 1015 1015 1155 1155 1155
Countries 73 73 73 71 71 71
Adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.64 0.64
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in each
regression but are not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
election years. Holding all other covariates at their sample means, a one percentage point increase
in ODA/GDP from the mean within a country is associated on average with a 0.09 percentage
point (β2) increase in Expenditures/GDP in non-election years and a 0.17 percentage point (β2 +
β3) increase in election years. Model 3 limits the election variable to competitive elections. Recall
that Competitive Election equals 1 if the government wins 70 percent or less of all the seats in
government and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term between Competitive Election
and ODA/GDP is larger but not statistically different from the coefficient on interaction term
between Election and ODA/GDP in Model 2. As displayed in Figure 3.2(b), a one percent increase
in ODA/GDP from the mean within a country is associated on average with a 0.22 percentage
point increase Expenditures/GDP in competitive election years.
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Figure 3.2: Marginal effects of ODA/GDP on Expenditures/GDP and Tax Revenue/GDP in
election and non-election years
(a) Expenditures/GDP (b) Tax Revenue/GDP
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions shown in Table 3.2. The bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
Figure 3.3: Marginal effect of Elections on Expenditures/GDP by level of ODA/GDP
(a) All Elections (b) Competitive elections
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions shown in Models 2 and 3 of Table 3.2. The dotted lines represent
90% confidence intervals.
Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) present the marginal effects of Election and Competitive Election
on Expenditures/GDP as ODA/GDP varies. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that political budget cy-
cles in expenditures are substantively and significantly larger as foreign aid within a country in-
creases. Compared to non-election years, a one standard deviation increase (12.1 percentage point)
in ODA/GDP from the mean (7.8 percent) is associated on average with an additional 1.0 per-
centage point increase in Expenditures/GDP in all election years and an additional 1.7 percentage
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point increase in competitive election years.
Models 4, 5, and 6 of Table 3.2 report the primary results for political budget cycles in taxation.
Model 4 does not find an unconditional effect of Election on Tax Revenue/GDP, which is consistent
with the literature that finds that political budget cycles in taxation only occur prior to competitive
elections (Prichard 2018). In the baseline specification, ODA/GDP is estimated to have a negative
and statistically significant effect on Tax Revenue/GDP. Model 5 introduces the interaction term
between Election and ODA/GDP. The interaction term is estimated to be positive and statistically
significant. Figure 3.2(b) graphically displays the average marginal effects of ODA/GDP on Tax
Revenue/GDP in non-election and election years. A one percent increase in ODA/GDP within a
country is associated on average with a 0.22 percentage point decrease in Tax Revenue/GDP in
non-election years and a 0.04 percentage point increase in election years. However, the average
marginal effect of ODA/GDP on Tax Revenue/GDP is not statistically different from zero during
election years.
Figure 3.4: Marginal effect of Elections on Tax Revenue/GDP by level of ODA/GDP
(a) All Elections (b) Competitive Elections
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions shown in Models 5 and 6 of Table 3.2. The dotted lines represent
90% confidence intervals.
Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b) present the marginal effects of Election and Competitive Election
on Tax Revenue/GDP as ODA/GDP varies. Relative to non-elections, a one standard deviation
increase in ODA/GDP from the mean is associated on average with a 0.50 percentage point increase
in Tax Revenue/GDP in all election years and a 0.49 percentage point increase in competitive
election years. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in ODA/GDP from the mean is
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associated on average with a 0.30 percentage point decrease in Tax Revenue/GDP in non-election
years. Focusing on Figure 4(b), Competitive Election is estimated to have a negative and significant
effect on Tax Revenue/GDP for levels of ODA/GDP below 5 percent. As ODA/GDP increases
above 5 percent, Competitive Election is no longer estimated to have a statistically significant
effect on Tax Revenue/GDP. These results suggest that political budget cycles in taxation occur
primarily in country-years with low levels of ODA/GDP.41
In summary, the primary results indicate that political budget cycles in expenditures are more
likely to occur in high-aid environments. In contrast, the results suggest that the incidence of
political budget cycles in taxation are confined to low-aid environments. Why might incumbents
in aid-recipient countries be more likely to pursue political budget cycles in expenditures than
taxation? Two potential factors may explain why incumbents in recipient countries are more likely
to use increased expenditures as an electoral strategy. First, aid-recipient countries often have
limited tax capacity and low compliance rates (Collier 2006). Due to the availability of non-tax
revenue, aid-recipient countries have weak incentives to invest in domestic institutions that support
tax administration. Additionally, low-income countries are often highly dependent on indirect
taxation, which is considered a less visible form of taxation (Ehrhart 2013). Relative to direct taxes,
citizens are often less aware of their indirect tax burden (Prichard 2018). As a result, political
budget cycles in taxation may be a less effective electoral strategy in aid-dependent countries.
Second, the development objectives of donors may also explain why incumbents in aid-recipient
countries are more likely to pursue political budget cycles in expenditures. In addition to strategic
considerations, OECD DAC donors and IFIs are concerned with maximizing poverty reduction
(Collier and Dollar 2002). Political expenditure cycles that increase the provision of public goods
and services are aligned with donors’ development and poverty reduction objectives (Chiripanhura
and Nino-Zarazua 2015; Mosley and Chiripanhura 2016). Donors’ concerns over deficits created by
opportunistic expenditures cycles may be overlooked if the cycles make significant progress towards
poverty reduction goals (Chiripanhura and Nino-Zarazua 2015; Mosley and Chiripanhura 2016).
In contrast, political budget cycles in taxation are more likely to be subject to donor scrutiny as
evidenced by the growing use of revenue conditionality by donors (Crivelli and Gupta 2016).
41The primary results for total tax revenue hold for political cycles in both direct and indirect tax revenue.
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Robustness Checks
A series of robustness checks confirm the validity of the primary results. First, I replicate the main
estimations using the system-GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel data (Arellano and
Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). In dynamic panel data models, the
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable can bias the fixed effects estimator.42 To address this
potential bias, the system-GMM estimation strategy uses first differences to transform the regressors
and remove the fixed country effect. The estimation strategy then instruments the differenced
variables that are not strictly exogenous with all their available lags in levels and differences. The
primary system-GMM estimations in this study treat the lagged dependent variable as endogenous.
Robustness checks also treat the independent and control variables for election year, ODA/GDP,
GDPPC, and GDP growth as endogenous or predetermined (Veiga et al. 2017). GMM estimators
also require decisions on how many instruments to use. To avoid over-fitting of the endogenous
variables, instruments are limited to 3 lags and collapsed (Roodman 2006). System-GMM results
are computed using the two-step method with orthogonal deviations and Windmeijer-corrected
standard errors.
The system-GMM results are reported in Appendix B and mirror the results estimated using
the fixed effects estimator in Table 3.2. The results do not detect any notable bias in the estimated
effects of ODA/GDP on Expenditures/GDP and Tax Revenue/GDP in all or competitive elections.
Across all estimations, the coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variables are between the
pooled OLS and FE estimates, which indicates that this estimator controls for any potential bias
induced by persistence in the dependent variable.43 The first-and second-order autocorrelations are
consistent with the validity of the GMM instruments. Across all specifications, first-order autocor-
relation in the first-differenced residuals is statistically significant and second-order autocorrelation
is statistically insignificant. Further robustness checks, also presented in the appendix, demonstrate
that the results are robust alternative specifications of the system-GMM model, which treat the
election variable, ODA/GDP, GDP per capita, and GDP growth as predetermined or endogenous.
Second, I consider alternative measures of foreign aid. One may be concerned that the findings
42The size of the bias is estimated to be − 1−α
T−1 , where T is the number of time units in the panel (Nickell 1981).
43Pooled OLS estimation results are reported in replication files.
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are driven by an increase in democracy assistance to support the facilitation of elections. To
address this concern, I create an alternative measure that removes technical cooperation from net
ODA/GDP to account for aid intended to support elections. I also create a measure of usable
foreign aid defined as net ODA/GDP minus technical cooperation and debt relief (Briggs 2015).
Usable aid is a more appropriate measure for the study of political budget cycles in expenditures
because it captures the portion of total aid that is capable of producing goods or services in recipient
countries (Briggs 2015). Debt relief is excluded because it does not represent a transfer of funds
equal to the reported amount (Briggs 2015, 208). When debt is forgiven, the recipient appears
to receive the full amount of relieved debt as ODA in a given year. In reality, the government
budget is relaxed by the difference in required repayments in that year. The results are reported in
the appendix. Across all specifications, the interaction terms between Election and the alternative
measures of ODA/GDP are positive and statistically significant supporting the primary results.
Third, I conduct additional robustness checks to address concerns of omitted variable bias. I
introduce additional economic controls for external debt stock as a percent of GNI and inflation.44
I also introduce additional political controls for government ideology, public corruption, temporary
UN Security Council membership, UN General Assembly voting ideal point, and the presence of
an IMF arrangement.45 Results for estimations including these additional controls are reported in
the appendix. For all alternative specifications of the expenditure model that include additional
control variables, ODA/GDP is estimated to have a statistically larger effect on Expenditures/GDP
in election years than in non-election years. The inclusion of additional controls in the taxation
model does not alter the findings from the primary analysis. Across all alternative specifications,
ODA/GDP is estimated to have a positive but statistically insignificant effect on Tax Revenue/GDP
in election years.
Fourth, I test the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of outlier countries and observations.
To address outlier concerns, I first exclude countries that have an average ODA/GDP level above
44Data on external debt stock/GNI and inflation is collected from the World Bank WDI database. External debt
stock /GNI is not included in the main estimations because increases in ODA/GDP, particularly in the form of
concessional loans, may be highly correlated with a country’s debt stock. Additionally, debt stock is an alternative
outcome measure for political budget cycles in government balance (Kaplan and Thomsson 2016).
45Data on government ideology is collected from the DPI. Data on public corruption in drawn from the VDEM
dataset. Data on UNSC membership is drawn from Dreher et al. (2009). Data on UNGA voting is drawn from
Voeten et al. (2009). Data on IMF arrangements is drawn from Dreher (2006).
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20 percent over the sample period. In a separate specification, I also exclude all country-year
observations in which ODA/GDP exceeds 20 percent. Results from this sensitivity analysis are
reported in the appendix and show that primary results for aid and political budget cycles in
expenditures and taxation are robust to the exclusion of potential outlier countries and observations
in the sample. The primary results are also robust to other sample sensitivity tests that restrict
the sample to low- and lower-middle income countries and Sub-Saharan African countries.46
Fifth, one may be concerned that the results may be driven by a particular definition of the
election year. In the primary results, I look for the fiscal effect of elections in the previous year if
the election occurs in the first five months of the calendar year. This adjustment decision aims to
capture the effects of elections on both expenditures and tax revenue and represents a compromise
between a three and six-month cutoff. In the appendix, I utilize alternative definitions of the election
year and report results using the calendar election year and adjustments for elections occurring in
the first three, six, and nine months of the year.47 The primary results are robust to changes in the
definition of the effective election year. The results suggest that the election-year effect of aid on
expenditures is largest with a three-month adjustment to the calendar election year. In contrast,
the effect of aid on taxation prior to elections is largest with a six month calendar year election
adjustment. The robustness check confirms that the use of a five-month adjustment to the calendar
election year in the primary analysis is appropriate.
Alternative Explanations
In this section, I consider several alternative explanations identified in the PBC literature that could
plausibly account for the observed effects of foreign aid on pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. For each
alternative explanation, I reestimate Models 2 and 5 from Table 3.2 with an alternative explanatory
variable interacted with Election as described below. The first country characteristic that could
potentially account for the observed effect of foreign aid is experience with democratic institutions.
Previous research finds that political budget cycles are significantly larger in new democracies
(Brender and Drazen 2005; Hanusch and Keefer 2014). All other things equal, democratic regimes
46Results presented in replication files.
47This robustness check mirrors a sensitivity check from Prichard (2018), which was the first to explore the sensitivity
of results to alternative definitions of election year at this level of detail.
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receive more aid, reflecting donor efforts to support the consolidation of new democracies (Alesina
and Dollar 2000). To control for experience with democratic institutions, I create a binary variable
for New Democracy, which is coded as 1 if the country has experienced 4 elections since 1980
and 0 otherwise.48 The second country characteristic that could account for the observed effect of
foreign aid is transparency. Alt and Lassen (2006) and Veiga et al. (2017) find that the incidence
of political budget cycles is conditional on low fiscal transparency and media freedom. I utilize
the HRV Transparency Index to control for fiscal transparency (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland
2014). To control for media freedom, I utilize a measure of government censorship effort of print
and broadcast media from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017).
Figure 3.5: Marginal effect of ODA/GDP on Expenditures/GDP controlling for alternative
explanations
(a) New Democracies (b) Fiscal Transparency (c) Media Freedom
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions presented in Appendix B. The dotted lines represent 90% confi-
dence intervals.
Figure 3.6: Marginal effect of ODA/GDP on Tax Revenue/GDP controlling for alternative
explanations
(a) New Democracies (b) Fiscal Transparency (c) Media Freedom
Note: Marginal effects are based on the regressions presented in Appendix B. The dotted lines represent 90% confi-
dence intervals.
48The results are also robust to the use of party age as a measure of experience with democratic institutions.
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For ease of interpretation, Figures 3.5 and 3.6 graph the average marginal effect of ODA/GDP
on Expenditures/GDP and Tax Revenue/GDP in election and non-election years when controlling
for each alternative explanation. The full regression results are presented in Appendix B. The
results do not find evidence that experience with democracy, fiscal transparency, or media freedom
have statistically significant effects on political budget cycles in expenditures or taxation after
controlling for the election-year effect of ODA/GDP. The inclusion of alternative explanations
in the primary expenditures model does not weaken the effects of ODA/GDP on pre-electoral
fiscal manipulation of expenditures. Across all alternative specifications presented in Figure 3.5,
ODA/GDP is estimated to have a statistically larger effect on Expenditures/GDP in election years
than in non-election years. The inclusion of controls for alternative explanations in the taxation
model does not alter the findings from the primary analysis. Across all alternative specifications
presented in Figure 3.6, ODA/GDP is estimated to have a positive but statistically insignificant
effect on Tax Revenue/GDP in election years.
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of foreign aid on the incidence of political budget cycles in expendi-
tures and taxation in developing countries. I argue that foreign aid is a fungible source of revenue
that incentivizes incumbents to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral purposes. Specifically, I the-
orize that aid increases the likelihood of political budget cycles by increasing the value of holding
office, obscuring fiscal transparency, and creating a soft budget constraint that discourages fiscal
discipline. Based on these mechanisms, I hypothesize that foreign aid will be associated with in-
creased expenditures and decreased tax revenue in election years. I also identify two mechanisms,
donor control and aid conditionality, that have the potential to mitigate the theorized effect of aid
on pre-electoral fiscal manipulation.
Using panel data for over 70 developing democracies from 1990-2012, the empirical analysis
finds that political budget cycles in expenditures are statistically and substantively larger as foreign
aid within a country increases. Contrary to my hypothesis, the analysis reveals no significant
relationship between aid and tax revenue prior to elections. The primary results hold for a host
of robustness checks that address concerns regarding alternative explanations of political budget
cycles, potential sources of omitted variable bias, estimation strategy, and outliers in the data.
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The findings of the study suggest that the structure of public finance in developing countries may
impact incumbents’ choice of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation strategy. Developing democracies
that receive significant amounts of foreign aid are more likely to manipulate government spending
than tax revenue for electoral purposes.
This study raises several potential avenues for future research. One avenue is to further explore
the effect of aid fungibility on the incidence and size of political budget cycles in expenditures using
disaggregated aid data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). More fungible types of
aid, such as budget support and aid channeled through public institutions, are more likely to be
used to finance political budget cycles in expenditures due to lower levels of donor control. A second
avenue is to examine the impact on aid on the composition of political expenditure cycles. Future
research might investigate the effect of aid on different types of expenditures during elections such as
capital vs. current expenditures or pro-poor expenditures in health, education, and infrastructure
(Drazen and Enslava 2009; Vergne 2009).
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CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN AID AND TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
ABSTRACT
Does foreign aid undermine citizens’ trust in political institutions and actors? Drawing on insti-
tutional theories of trust, I theorize that foreign aid projects harm institutional trust by lowering
citizens’ evaluations of government performance and administrative competence. When citizens
observe that public goods and services are being provided by external actors, they may reevaluate
their beliefs about their government’s ability to manage the economy, address poverty, and deliver
public goods and social services. Additionally, aid projects can incentivize rent-seeking behavior
and have an adverse effect on citizens’ perceptions of political corruption. To analyze the impact
of aid on trust, this study utilizes geolocated survey data on citizens’ trust in political institu-
tions from Afrobarometer Rounds 2-5 (2003-2012) and data on the location of foreign aid projects
from AidData’s Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS) datasets for Nigeria, Senegal, and
Uganda. Using a spatial difference-in-difference strategy, the empirical results find that active aid
projects are associated with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and local government
council. The results also indicate that completed aid projects are associated with declines in insti-
tutional trust, although the effect size constitutes a statistically and substantively smaller change
compared to active projects.
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Introduction
The ability of governments and the international community to reduce poverty, ensure security,
and promote human rights depends on people’s trust in their government (Cheema 2010). Trust
in political institutions is a central element of good governance and political stability-it enhances
government legitimacy and encourages citizens to comply with rules and regulations (Levi, Sacks,
and Tyler 2009). Institutional trust is formally defined as “the trust individuals have in their state-
wide legal-political institutions and actors” (Berg and Hjerm 2010, 391). According to institutional
theories of trust, trust in political institutions primarily depends on citizens’ assessments of the
quality of government performance and administrative competence (Hetherington 1998; Levi and
Sacks 2009; Mishler and Rose 2001). In order to foster trust, governments must have the ability to
mobilize economic resources and deliver basic public goods and services (Rondinelli and Cheema
2003). Furthermore, governments must also have the ability to control corruption and enforce laws
and regulations (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009).
Building trust is a difficult task in developing countries, where governments often lack the
capacity to provide basic public goods and social services to all of their citizens. In many Sub-
Saharan African and South Asian countries, donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
are the predominant providers of primary health care, basic education, sanitation, and infrastruc-
ture (Batley and McLoughlin 2010; Moran 2006). Scholars and development practitioners have
long theorized that the provision of public goods and services by non-state actors may have ad-
verse effects on citizens’ perceptions of their government (Bratton 1989; Batley and McLoughlin
2010; Fowler 1991; Whaites 1998). Following prominent research in the literature on comparative
political behavior, I approach trust as a performance-based evaluation of political institutions and
actors (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2015; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001). Building on
this framework, I hypothesize that foreign aid projects reduce citizens’ trust in political actors and
institutions by lowering citizens’ assessments of government performance and administrative com-
petence. Foreign aid projects reveal information to citizens about the capacity of their government.
When citizens observe that public goods and social services are being provided by external actors,
they may reevaluate their beliefs about their government’s ability to manage the economy, ad-
dress poverty, and deliver public goods and social services (Dietrich and Winter 2015; Sacks 2012).
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Additionally, aid projects can undermine institutional trust by increasing citizens’ perceptions of
corruption. Foreign aid is commonly viewed as a fungible resource that encourages rent-seeking
behavior. A large literature on aid and governance finds that aid increases corruption, undermines
good governance, and weakens political accountability (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016; Busse and
Göening 2009; Braütigam and Knack 2004; Martin 2016; Paler 2016). Based on this literature, I
predict that citizens living near aid projects will have higher perceptions of leader involvement in
corruption.
To analyze the effects of aid projects on institutional trust, I geographically match spatial
data on aid projects from Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda to over 20,000 respondents from four
Afrobarometer survey waves over the 2002-2013 period. The empirical analysis employs a spatial
difference-in-difference strategy, which examines variation in trust between citizens that live within
25km of an active aid project and citizens that live within 25km of a project that will start in the
near future (Knutsen et al. 2016; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018; Briggs 2018). The empirical results
find that active aid projects are associated with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and
local government council. The results also indicate that completed aid projects are associated with
declines in institutional trust, although the effect size constitutes a statistically and substantively
smaller change compared to active projects. The empirical analysis finds support for the proposed
government performance and corruption mechanisms. Compared to inactive projects, citizens liv-
ing near active aid projects have lower evaluations of government officials and their performance
managing the economy, narrowing the income gap, addressing educational needs, improving basic
health services, and providing sanitation services. Active aid projects are also found to be as-
sociated with increased perceptions of leader involvement in corruption and lower assessments of
government performance fighting corruption.
This study aims to complement a distinct but closely related series of studies that examine
the impact of aid on government legitimacy, conceptualized as willingness to obey authorities
including the tax department, police, and courts. Recent empirical studies in this literature find
minimal evidence that aid undermines government legitimacy and confidence in leaders (Baldwin
and Winters 2018; Dietrich and Winters 2015; Dietrich et al. 2018; Guiteras and Mobarak 2015;
Sacks 2012). The results of these studies suggest that the theorized negative effect of aid projects
on institutional trust may be mitigated by uncertainty over the source of development projects,
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citizens’ expectations about the relationship between their government and donors, donor control
over aid resources, and aid conditionality (Dietrich et al. 2018; Dolan 2019; Milner et al. 2016).
However, the empirical work on aid and legitimacy has several limitations that this study aims to
improve upon. The first shortcoming is that the use of tax-based measures of government legitimacy
may not be suitable for low-income countries, which have limited tax capacity and low levels of
direct taxation (Dolan 2019). This study aims to address this issue by focusing on institutional
trust, which is a central component of government legitimacy (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). The
second shortcoming is that existing studies in the literature often have a narrow focus. Most studies
utilize single country cases, largely from South Asia, and focus on aid projects in a single sector
from a single donor (Dietrich and Winters 2015; Dietrich et al. 2018; Guiteras and Mobarak 2015).
In reality, citizens in low-income countries often reside near aid projects across a range of sectors
that are funded or implemented by a host of different donors and NGOs. It is also plausible that
the impact of aid projects on citizens’ perceptions of government varies across geographic and
institutional settings. This study aims to expand on existing studies in this related literature by
examining the impact of aid projects from all sectors and a variety of donors on institutional trust
in multiple Sub-Saharan African countries.
This study contributes to the literatures on institutional trust and the political effects of foreign
aid. Given the billions of dollars in foreign assistance delivered to low-income countries each year,
understanding how that assistance affects citizens’ trust in government is of significant practical
importance due to its impact on state development. To my knowledge, this is the first study
to provide empirical evidence that aid projects lower trust in political institutions. The findings
have important implications for governance, political participation, and democratic consolidation
in low-income countries. The study also contributes to the practical question of how to best
deliver assistance to the world’s poorest countries and has implications for the use of branding and
cooperation between non-state actors and recipient governments. Lastly, the study contributes to
the literature on aid and incumbent support (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Briggs 2015;
Jablonski 2014; Kono and Montinola 2009; Morrison 2009). The findings of this study support
recent research by Briggs (2018), Blattman, Emeriau and Fiala (2018), and De Kadt and Lieberman
(2018) that finds evidence that aid projects can in some circumstances have a negative effect on
incumbent political support.
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Aid and Trust in Political Institutions
Theoretical Framework
Two main theoretical frameworks have been developed to analyze the determinants of institutional
trust.49 Cultural theories of institutional trust assume that trust is exogenous to political institu-
tions and rooted in cultural values, ethnicity, national identity, and interpersonal trust (Almond
and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Putnam 1993). In contrast, institutional theories hypothesize
that trust in institutions is rationally based on citizens’ evaluations of the design and performance
of government institutions and actors. As governments deliver economic growth, public services,
and security, citizens are more likely to trust the institutions seen to be improving their welfare.
Empirical research has found a great deal of support for institutional theories of trust (Catterberg
and Moreno 2006; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001). Satisfaction with the provision
of public goods and services has been found to be a central determinant of institutional trust in
developing countries (Epsinal et al. 2006; Godefroidt et al. 2017; Kampen et al. 2006; Mishler
and Rose 2001; Stoyan et al. 2016). Existing research has also identified a positive relationship
between citizens’ evaluations of the national economy and trust (Hutchison and Johnson 2017; Park
2017; Rose and Mishler 2011; Zmerli and Castillo 2015). A sizable body of work has examined the
effects of public-sector corruption on trust. Corruption has been widely found to have a corrosive
effect on citizens’ trust in government institutions and actors and is often found to be the strongest
macro-level determinant of political trust (Della Porta 2000; Cho and Kirwin 2007; Hakhverdian
and Mayne 2012; Seligson 2002).
How might foreign aid projects impact citizens’ trust in government? Building on institutional
theories of trust, I argue that aid projects undermine trust by lowering citizen evaluations of gov-
ernment performance and administrative competence. Foreign aid projects reveal information to
citizens about the capacity of their government. Information about the foreign funding of develop-
ment projects conveyed through aid branding may undermine citizens’ evaluations of government
performance managing the economy, addressing poverty, and delivering public goods and social
services. Additionally, aid projects provide rent-seeking opportunities to government officials and
can increase citizens’ experiences with and perceptions of corruption. Recent research on foreign
49For a comprehensive review of theoretical frameworks, see Mishler and Rose (2001).
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aid and governance has identified several factors that may limit the theorized negative effect of aid
projects on institutional trust. Potential mitigating factors include uncertainty over the source of
development projects, citizens’ expectations about the relationship between their government and
donors, donor control over resources, and aid conditionality (Dietrich et al. 2018; Dolan 2019; Mil-
ner et al. 2016). Figure 4.1 presents a conceptual model of the hypothesized relationship between
aid projects and political trust and potential mitigating factors.
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model of the relationship between aid projects and political trust
Government Performance
Performance has long been considered a central determinant of political trust (Van der Meer 2018).
As governments in developing countries deliver economic growth, jobs, schools, health care, and
other infrastructure, trust in political institutions is expected to grow. However, low-income coun-
tries often lack the capacity to provide basic public goods and services to all of their citizens. In
these cases, donors and non-governmental organizations are important actors that fund and/or im-
plement development projects across a range of sectors including health care, education, sanitation,
transportation, energy, and agriculture. In order to conduct public diplomacy and spread informa-
tion about their role in funding public goods and services, it is commonplace for donors to brand
their aid projects (Dietrich and Winters 2015; Dietrich et al. 2018). Development practitioners
have expressed concerns about the impact the branding of aid projects on citizens’ evaluations of
government performance, particularly in fragile environments (Moore 2018). Aid branding and
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the administration of development projects by non-governmental organizations allow citizens to
separate what was done by external actors from what was done by their government. Information
about the foreign funding of public goods allows citizens to attribute credit for the provision of
public goods to non-state actors and take away credit from their governments. Additionally, in-
formation about foreign funding of public goods may signal a lack of state capacity or willingness
to provide public goods and services (Brass 2016). I predict that exposure to aid projects lowers
citizens’ assessments of government performance managing the economy, addressing poverty, deliv-
ering health and education services, and building infrastructure. I also expect aid projects to have
a harmful effect on citizens’ evaluations of their government leaders. Based on extant literature on
institutional trust, I theorize that declines in citizens’ perceptions of government performance will
result in lower trust in political institutions.
The experience of W. Gyude Moore, a former public works minister in Liberia, captures
the potential negative effect of aid branding on citizens’ evaluations of government performance
providing infrastructure. In a recent editorial advocating for limited use of aid branding, W. Gyude
Moore states:
“Development partners brand aid so they can get credit for their good work, but local
governments want and need credit to maintain their legitimacy with their people... As
minister of public works in Liberia, I regularly encountered the negative impacts of
aid branding when I appeared on radio talk shows to provide updates on development
projects. Callers would consistently attempt to separate what was done by donor partners
from what was done by the government. It was not uncommon for callers to refuse to
give the government credit for securing the aid because the project was financed and
branded by USAID, the World Bank, or the African Development Bank. They would
argue that the government was merely incidental, that the partners would do the same
work regardless of who was in power (Moore 2018).”
The theorized negative effect of aid projects on citizens’ evaluations of government performance
is not a foregone conclusion. Research suggests that the impact of aid on citizens’ perceptions of
their government may be conditional on the effectiveness of branding and citizens’ expectations
of their government (Baldwin and Winters 2018; Dietrich et al. 2018; Dolan 2019). Attribution
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errors may occur if donors’ branding efforts do not effectively reveal information about the source
of funding. As a result, citizens may be unaware of the true source of the projects and attribute
development projects funded by donors to their local and/or national governments (Baldwin and
Winters 2018). Government leaders may take advantage of the information asymmetry about
the source of aid projects and strategically “claim credit” for goods and services that they did
not provide (Cruz and Schneider 2017; Guiteras and Mobarak 2016). Additionally, aid projects
may not have a harmful effect on citizens’ evaluations of performance if individuals do not expect
their governments to be self-sufficient (Dolan 2019). Aid projects may signal to citizens that their
government leaders played an active role in negotiating with donors and other national actors
(Dietrich et al. 2018, 10). If citizens believe government actors played a central role in attracting
external resources, aid projects will be associated with higher evaluations of government leaders
and performance in the sector of the development intervention (Dietrich et al. 2018).
Corruption
Foreign aid projects can also undermine trust in political institutions by increasing leaders’ rent-
seeking behavior and citizens’ perceptions of political corruption. Political corruption is defined as
the use of power by government officials for illegitimate private gain. When government officials
engage in corruption, they are abusing the entrusted power or betraying the public’s trust in their
integrity or fairness (You 2018). Corruption is expected to have a harmful on trust for citizens
who experience, observe, or hear about corruption. Corruption can also affect institutional trust
indirectly via its negative effects on economic growth (Mauro 1995; Meon and Sekkat 2005) and
development outcomes (Kaufmann et al. 1999). Empirically, control of corruption has been found
to be an important determinant of institutional trust across world regions (Catterberg and Moreno
2006; Chang and Chu 2006; Cho and Kirwin 2007; Della Porta 2000; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012;
Morris and Klesner 2010; Seligson 2002).
A large literature on foreign aid and governance finds that aid enables government actors to
engage in corruption and undermines governance in recipient countries (Asongu and Nwachukwu
2016; Busse and Göening 2009; Braütigam and Knack 2004; Easterly 2006; Djankov et al. 2008;
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Svensson 2000a).50 Similar to natural resource rents, this literature views aid as a fungible resource
that can be misappropriated by government officials for clientelistic purposes. Additionally, foreign
aid decreases recipient government dependence on domestic taxes to meet its financial needs (Mor-
rison 2009; Buena de Mesquita and Smith 2010). There is a longstanding argument that citizens
will more readily demand accountability from governments for taxes than for non-tax revenue from
oil or aid (Beblawi 1987; de la Cuesta et al. 2018; Ross 2004; Martin 2016; Paler 2013). As a result,
governments that are not dependent on tax revenues will face decreased pressure for good gover-
nance from their citizens. Based on rent-seeking and accountability mechanisms, I theorize that
aid projects decrease institutional trust by increasing citizens’ perceptions of political corruption.
The impact of aid on trust through the corruption mechanism may be mitigated by donor
control over resources and aid conditionality. Recent theories of donor control contend that the
effect of foreign aid on corruption may be limited due to donor efforts to address aid fungibility
(Bermeo 2016; Dietrich 2013; Milner et al. 2016). This literature argues that donors strategically
select different types of aid and delivery channels depending on the governance environment in
recipient countries (Dietrich 2013). Milner et al. (2016) compare Ugandan citizens’ beliefs about
foreign aid to domestic government projects to evaluate the competing “aid capture” and “donor
control” theories. Milner et al. find that Ugandan citizens show higher behavioral support for
foreign aid than government projects and view aid projects as less prone to political manipulation
and clientelism. The use of aid conditionality may also limit the harmful effects on aid on gover-
nance. Aid conditionality may signal that donors and non-state actors are able to exert a positive
influence on the government and put pressure on local and national leaders for better governance
and transparency (Milner et al. 2016). Despite the extensive use of conditionality by donors, com-
pliance with conditionality has been poor due to credible commitment problems in donor-recipient
relations (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Ivanova et al. 2001; Easterly 2005). Donors are often unable
to credibly commit to the enforcement of aid conditionality due to institutional incentives within
aid agencies as well as the strategic interests of donors (Dreher et al. 2009; Kilby 2009; Stone 2004;
Swedlund 2017).
50Notable exceptions include Altincekic and Bearce (2014), Jones and Tarp (2016), and Tavares (2003).
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Hypotheses
In summary, I hypothesize that aid projects have a negative effect on citizens’ trust in political
institutions and actors (H1). I theorize that the declines in public trust are driven by citizens’ eval-
uations of government performance and administrative competence. I hypothesize that aid projects
will have a negative effect on citizens’ evaluations of government performance (H2). Specifically,
I expect aid projects to have a negative effect on citizens’ evaluations of individual leaders and
evaluations of general government performance addressing poverty and delivering public goods and
services. In addition to affecting perceptions of government performance, I also hypothesize that
aid projects increase citizens’ perceptions of political corruption (H3).
Data
To examine the effect of foreign aid projects on trust, I combine individual survey data from Afro-
barometer with data on the location of aid projects from AidData’s geocoded Aid Information
Management System (AIMS) datasets. Afrobarometer surveys citizens’ views and attitudes on
democracy and governance on a repeated cycle. Afrobarometer aims to produce nationally repre-
sentative, stratified, random samples of individuals living in each surveyed country. Enumeration
areas are randomly selected within strata defined by region, and respondents are randomly selected
within enumeration areas. Clusters of survey respondents are geocoded at the enumeration area
(BenYishay et al. 2017). This study utilizes Afrobarometer survey data from Nigeria, Senegal,
and Uganda for Rounds 2-5 (2003-2014). These three countries are the only countries surveyed by
Afrobarometer for multiple rounds that have comprehensive geocoded Aid Information Manage-
ment System datasets.51 Although case selection is driven by data availability, the cases provide
an excellent opportunity to analyze the impact of aid projects on trust in a diverse sample of
Sub-Saharan African countries. The cases capture notable geographic, historical, and cultural vari-
ation and include an East African ex-British colony, a West African ex-British colony, and a West
African ex-French colony (Briggs 2018, 4). Importantly, the cases display variation in institutional
trust. Relative to the average Sub-Saharan African country, Uganda has a high level of trust in
political institutions. In contrast, Nigeria has one of the lowest levels of trust in state institutions
51Burundi and Sierra Leone have geocoded AIMS datasets but were only surveyed by Afrobarometer once late in the
study period.
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on the continent (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi 2016). Senegal has above average trust in executive
institutions but average levels of trust in legislative and local institutions. A detailed breakdown of
trust by country and political institution is reported in the appendix. Lastly, the cases also provide
variation in regime type and quality of governance. Uganda is an electoral autocracy while Nigeria
and Senegal have made notable progress towards democratic consolidation in the last two decades.
Turning to governance, Uganda and Nigeria have high levels of public corruption and rank among
the world’s worst in terms of citizens’ perceptions of corruption (Transparency International CPI
2018). In contrast, perceptions of corruption in Senegal are lower than the average Sub-Saharan
African country.
The primary dependent variables are measures of trust in the president, parliament, and local
government council from the Afrobarometer survey.52 The measures of trust in political institutions
are drawn from a set of survey questions that ask, “How much do you trust each of the following,
or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: President/Prime Minister, Parliament/National
Assembly, and Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly”. Response categories include “not
at all”, “just a little”, “somewhat”, “a lot”, and “don’t know”. Each survey response is coded
as an ordinal variable between 0 and 3.53 I also create an additive trust index based on trust in
the president, legislature, and local government councilors (Blair and Roessler 2018). The additive
index is coded as an ordinal variable from 0 to 9.
The independent variables capture Afrobarometer respondents’ proximity to active, inactive,
and completed aid projects using geocoded data on project locations from AidData’s AIMS datasets
for each country (AidData 2016a, 2016b, 2016c).54 Nigeria’s Development Assistance Database
(AIMS 1.3.1) covers over $6 billion in disbursements for 595 projects across 1,843 locations between
1988 and 2014. Projects in Nigeria are concentrated in the agriculture, health, and financial services
sectors. In terms of number of projects, the top donors captured in the Nigerian AIMS dataset
52Afrobarometer surveys with relevant trust questions were conducted in Nigeria in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2013.
Afrobarometer surveys with relevant trust questions were conducted in Senegal in 2002, 2005, and 2008. Because
Senegal’s Afrobarometer Round 5 survey was conducted in 2013, it is excluded from the analysis. Afrobarometer
surveys with relevant trust questions were conducted in Uganda in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2012.
53Respondents who answered “don’t know” are excluded from the analysis.
54Active projects are defined as projects that are ongoing during the Afrobarometer interview date. Inactive projects
are defined as projects that will start within two years of the interview date. Completed projects are defined as
projects that were completed prior to the interview date and for which the disbursement of funds has ended.
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are the World Bank, European Union, and United Kingdom. Senegal’s Aid Information Platform
(AIMS 1.5.1) tracks $3.3 billion in disbursements for 856 projects across 2,314 locations between
1992 and 2012. The top donors for Senegal are Canada, Belgium, and Japan, and projects are
concentrated in the transportation, health, and education sectors. Lastly, Uganda’s Aid Information
Platform (AIMS 1.4.1) covers more than $7.7 billion in disbursements for 565 geocoded projects
across 2,426 locations between 1978 and 2014. Projects in Uganda are concentrated in the health,
civil society, education, and water supply and sanitation sectors. The top donors for Uganda are
the United States, United Kingdom, and World Bank.
Despite being the most complete sources of geolocated data on foreign aid, the AIMS datasets
have two main limitations. First, the datasets do not have complete coverage for all donors. Donors
and development partner organizations voluntarily report detailed information on their projects
(Briggs 2018, 4). The AIMS datasets for Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda cover aid projects from 28,
79, and 56 donors respectively. The datasets capture projects from major Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) and multilateral donors. However, the datasets do not comprehensively capture
projects from local non-governmental organizations and non-DAC donors. Second, some projects
are crudely coded with a low level of precision (i.e. region or capital city). To address this concern,
I only include projects with a precision level of 3 and below, which captures projects coded at the
district level, locations within 25km of the project, and exact locations (Briggs 2018).55
Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of aid projects on institutional trust, I employ a spatial difference-in-difference
design, popularized by Knutsen et al. (2017), that utilizes spatial and temporal variation in the
location of aid projects. The strategy identifies respondents living in areas where a project was
active at the time of the survey and compares them with respondents living in areas where a project
is planned to start in the near future. The empirical strategy has previously been employed to study
the effect of aid on incumbent support (Briggs 2018) and the effect of Chinese aid on corruption
(Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018).
I examine whether each cluster of Afrobarometer respondents is located within a 25km radius of
55Robustness checks reported in the appendix also limit the dataset to projects coded with a precision of 2 and below
(Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018).
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an aid project.56 I code and create binary variables for four groups of respondents: 1) respondents
located within 25km of an active aid project (Active), 2) respondents located within 25km of
an inactive project that starts within two years of the survey date (Inactive), 3) respondents
located within 25km of a project that was completed prior to the survey date (Completed), and 4)
respondents more than 25km from current, completed, or future projects starting within two years
of the survey date (No Project). I then compare levels of trust in government among respondents
who live near active projects to those who live near projects that were inactive at the time of
the survey. This comparison removes any selection effect and aims to capture the causal effect
of project implementation on citizens’ trust in institutions. The identifying assumption is that,
conditional on covariates, citizens living near inactive projects starting in the near future serve
as valid counterfactuals for citizens living near active projects. The design focuses on inactive
projects that start within two years of the survey date in order to maximize the likelihood that the
difference-in-difference estimator is not capturing selection effects (Briggs 2018).57
Based on this discussion, the following model will be estimated:
Yivt = β1Activeijt + β2Inactiveijt + β3Completedijt + χ
′wijt + αj + φt + εijt (1)
where Yijt is level of political trust in individual i in country j in round t; Activeijt, Inactiveijt,
and Completedijt are aid project dummy variables; wijt is a vector of controls; αj is a country fixed
effect; φt is a round fixed effect; and εijt is the error term. Individual-level control variables are
included for age, education, and gender (Briggs 2018; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018). I also include
a binary control for urban enumeration areas to control for lower levels of institutional trust in
urban areas (Brinkeroff et al. 2017). Equation (1) is estimated with ordinary-least-squares (OLS)
due to the use of country and round fixed effects.58 All estimations use standard cross-national
Afrobarometer survey weights. To account for correlated errors, standard errors are clustered on
enumeration areas.
56Computations were done using geodetic distances in the “geonear” package in Stata 15.
57The primary results are robust to defining Inactive as respondents located within 25km of a project that starts any
time after the survey date and to the exclusion of completed projects (Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018).
58The primary results are robust to estimation using an ordered logistic regression model. However, the use of country
and region fixed effects in ordered logistic regression is subject to estimation bias.
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Results
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that aid projects are associated with lower levels of
citizen trust in political institutions and actors. Table 4.1 presents the main results, focusing on
trust in the President/Prime Minister (Model 2), Parliament/National Assembly (Model 3), and
Local Government Council (Model 4). The coefficient for Active captures the effect of living within
25km of an active aid project on trust relative to not living near active, planned, or completed aid
projects. Such a comparison likely underestimates the effect of aid projects on trust as it ignores the
endogenous relationship between trust and the location of aid projects. The coefficient for Inactive
captures the effect of living within 25km of aid projects that will start in the near future on trust
relative to not living near active, planned, or completed aid projects. The coefficient on Inactive
captures the selection effect and indicates that aid is more likely to be allocated to areas with higher
levels of trust in political institutions and actors. To correct for selection bias, I compare the effects
of projects that are active to those that are scheduled to start within two years of the survey date.
Based on the difference-in-difference estimates, I find that active projects have a negative effect on
citizens’ trust in the President, Parliament, and Local Government Council. Compared to living
near an inactive project, living near an active aid project is associated with a 0.44 decrease in
trust in the President, 0.39 decrease in trust in the Parliament, and 0.28 decrease in the Local
Government Council. The difference between Active and Inactive is statistically significant across
all specifications in Table 4.1. Additionally, the estimated effect sizes are substantial. The Active vs.
Inactive difference-in-difference estimates for the effect of aid projects on trust in the President and
Parliament both correspond with a 28 percent decrease from their respective mean trust values,
and the difference-in-difference estimate for trust in the Local Government Council corresponds
with an 18 percent decrease from its mean trust value.
Table 4.1 also presents difference-in-difference estimates between completed and inactive projects.
Caution should be noted for interpreting these estimates as causal. The spatial difference-in-
difference strategy assumes that citizens living near planned projects serve as valid counterfactuals
for those living near completed projects. If the timing of aid projects over the sample period is
driven by political, ethnic, or religious factors, then the difference-in-difference estimator is po-
tentially biased. Nonetheless, the comparison warrants examination as discerning the differential
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Table 4.1: Foreign aid projects and institutional trust
Dependent variable: Trust in Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust Index President/PM Parliament Local Council
Active -0.169* -0.045 -0.128*** -0.022
(0.093) (0.039) (0.031) (0.033)
Inactive 0.939*** 0.391*** 0.262*** 0.253***
(0.114) (0.047) (0.040) (0.045)
Completed 0.433*** 0.243*** -0.046 0.207***
(0.115) (0.049) (0.041) (0.041)
Age 0.004** 0.001* 0.001 0.002***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.105*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.044***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Female 0.073* 0.024 0.033** 0.012
(0.037) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Urban -0.451*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.193***
(0.070) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027)
Mean dependent variable 4.37 1.55 1.38 1.46
Observations 20854 22003 21479 21548
R-squared 0.264 0.176 0.185 0.218
Country & Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference: Active-Inactive -1.108 -0.436 -0.390 -0.275
F-test: Active-Inactive=0 106.580 89.246 104.826 43.968
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Difference: Completed-Inactive -0.506 -0.148 -0.308 -0.046
F-test: Completed-Inactive=0 15.310 7.150 42.774 0.911
p-value 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.340
Note: The excluded category in the regression is EAs with no active, inactive, or completed
projects within 25km. All models include Afrobarometer survey weights. Standard errors are
clustered on enumeration areas. Difference-in-differences tests are presented in bottom rows. The
p values of difference-in-difference estimates are based on F tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
impacts of active and completed projects is central to understanding the long term effect of the
aid projects on institutional trust. Based on Model 2 of Table 4.1, living near completed projects
is associated with a 0.15 decrease in trust in the President relative to living near inactive projects.
The Completed vs. Inactive difference-in-difference estimate for trust in the President corresponds
with a 9.5 percent decrease from the mean trust value, which is significantly lower than the 28
percent decrease in trust estimated for active projects. The estimate for trust in the Parliament
relates to a 0.30 point decrease, which is substantively similar to the estimate comparing active
and inactive projects. The Completed vs. Inactive difference-in-difference estimate for trust in
the Local Government Council relates to a 0.05 point decrease but is not statistically significant.
Overall, the comparison of the effects of completed and inactive projects on political trust suggests
that completed projects have a negative effect on trust in the President and Parliament and no
statistically significant effect on trust in the Local Government Council. Generally, the estimated
effects of completed projects on trust are statistically and substantively smaller than the effects
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estimated for active projects.
Why might the adverse effects of aid projects on political trust diminish after the completion
of aid projects? One potential explanation is that attribution errors are more common after the
projects are completed. Citizens are more likely to attribute public goods, particularly physical
infrastructure, provided by non-state actors to their local and national governments when donor
branding is no longer visible. A second potential explanation is that government rent-seeking be-
havior is lower after projects are implemented and all project funds have been disbursed. However,
citizens’ perceptions of corruption likely lag behind actual changes in behavior. Tests of theoreti-
cal mechanisms presented later in the empirical analysis suggest that improvements in trust after
project completion are primarily driven by higher evaluations of public good and service delivery.
Robustness Checks
A series of robustness checks are performed to confirm the validity of the baseline results. First, one
may be concerned about the sensitivity of the results to the selection of the 25km cutoff distance
from aid projects. To address this concern, I replicate Model 1 in Table 4.1, which utilizes the Trust
Index, for alternative cutoff distances between 5 and 50 km (Briggs 2018, 6). Recall that Trust Index
is an additive index of trust in the President, Parliament, and Local Government Council. The Trust
Index ranges from 0 to 9 and has a sample mean of 4.4. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 graphically display the
results comparing the difference-in-difference estimates across the alternative specifications. The
primary results for the effect of active projects on trust hold for all cutoff distances. Second, one
may be concerned that the empirical strategy is capturing variation in trust between individuals
that live in different parts of each country. To address this concern, I replicate Model 1 of Table 4.1
with region fixed effects, which cover 61 regions, and report the results in Appendix C. The primary
results are robust to the inclusion of region and round fixed effects.59 However, the estimated effect
size of active aid projects on trust is smaller in estimations employing region fixed effects. For the
baseline 25km cutoff distance, residing near an active project is associated with a 0.68 decrease in
the Trust Index relative to residing near an inactive project. This estimated effect size of active
projects on the Trust Index is 38.5 percent smaller than the effect size in the primary estimation
59The primary results are also robust to the inclusion of indicator variables for ethnicity in specifications with country
and round fixed effects.
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in Model 1 of Table 4.1, which utilizes country and round fixed effects. However, the estimated
effect is still substantively significant and constitutes a 15 percent decline from the mean value of
the additive index.
Figure 4.2: Difference in Active and Inactive coefficients with 95% CIs across cutoff distances
(a) Country & Round Fixed Effects + Controls (b) Region & Round Fixed Effects + Controls
Note: Cutoff distances in each subfigure range from 5km (top) to 50km (bottom).
Figure 4.3: Difference in Completed and Inactive coefficients with 95% CIs across cutoff distances
(a) Country & Round Fixed Effects + Controls (b) Region & Round Fixed Effects + Controls
Note: Cutoff distances in each subfigure range from 5km (top) to 50km (bottom).
Third, one may be concerned about variation in the relationship between aid projects and
trust between countries. In the appendix, I present the results for the countries individually. The
primary finding that active projects have a negative effect on trust is confirmed in the sample
subsets for Nigeria and Senegal. However, in Uganda, the difference between the estimated effects
of active and inactive projects on trust is negative but not statistically significant. Mechanism
tests for the country case of Uganda suggest that active aid projects negatively impact citizens’
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evaluations of government performance but have no significant effect on citizens’ perceptions of
leader corruption.60
Mechanism Tests
I test two mechanisms through which aid projects reduce citizens’ trust: evaluations of government
performance and perceptions of corruption. To test the effect of foreign aid projects on the evalua-
tions of government performance, I draw from two separate sets of Afrobarometer survey questions.
The first set of questions ask, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have
performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say:
President/Prime Minister, MP/National Assembly Representative, Local Government Councilor.”
Answers are coded as ordinal variables where 1=“strongly disapprove”, 2=“disapprove”, 3=“ap-
prove”, and 4=“strongly approve”. The second set of questions ask, “How well or badly would you
say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say:
managing the economy, addressing the income gap, addressing educational needs, improving basic
health services, and providing water and sanitation services”. Answers are coded as ordinal vari-
ables from 1 to 4 where 1=“very badly”, 2=“fairly badly”, 3=“fairly well”, and 4=“very well”. The
questions on economic performance were selected to gauge the impact of aid projects on citizens’
assessments of performance promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty. The questions
on performance providing education, health, and sanitation services were selected because these
sectors are the focus of donors’ development efforts in the sample countries.61
Table 4.2 presents the results testing the effect on aid projects on perceptions of government
performance. The results find evidence of the performance mechanism for citizens residing near
active projects. Models 1-3 show the results for assessments of leader performance. Proximity to
active aid projects is associated with decreased performance assessments of government officials, but
only temporarily. The difference-in-difference estimates comparing the effect of active and inactive
projects on trust in the President/Prime Minister, Member of Parliament, and Local Government
Councilor are negative and statistically significant. However, the difference-in-difference results
60This findings align with survey-experimental research by Milner et al. (2016), which finds that Ugandan citizens
view aid projects as less susceptible to corruption relative to government projects.
61Afrobarometer questions on government performance building roads are not available across rounds.
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Table 4.2: Foreign aid projects and government performance
Dependent variable: Government Performance Assessment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
President MP Local Council Economy Income Gap Education Health Water
Active 0.034 -0.005 0.050* 0.001 -0.005 -0.062* 0.022 0.058*
(0.039) (0.034) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033)
Inactive 0.411*** 0.240*** 0.248*** 0.297*** 0.274*** 0.187*** 0.220*** 0.151***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.036) (0.043) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.043)
Completed 0.406*** 0.178*** 0.276*** 0.360*** 0.120*** 0.284*** 0.304*** 0.176***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.046) (0.044) (0.047)
Mean dependent variable: 2.62 2.38 2.52 2.08 1.72 2.46 2.47 2.22
Observations 21928 20779 20977 22036 21831 22209 22288 22134
R-squared 0.101 0.063 0.152 0.113 0.064 0.096 0.056 0.058
Country & Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference: Active-Inactive -0.377 -0.245 -0.198 -0.296 -0.278 -0.249 -0.199 -0.092
F-test: Active-Inactive=0 67.824 39.576 34.224 50.457 54.661 46.875 35.120 4.913
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027
Difference: Completed-Inactive -0.005 -0.062 0.028 0.063 -0.154 0.097 0.084 0.026
F-test: Completed-Inactive=0 0.009 1.599 0.346 1.685 12.434 3.778 3.091 0.246
p-value 0.923 0.206 0.556 0.194 0.000 0.052 0.079 0.620
Note: The excluded category in the regression is EAs with no active, inactive, or completed projects within 25km. All models
include Afrobarometer survey weights. Standard errors are clustered on enumeration areas. Difference-in-differences tests are
presented in bottom rows. The p values of difference-in-difference estimates are based on F tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
comparing completed and inactive projects suggest that the negative effect is limited to active
projects. Citizens living near completed and inactive projects do not have statistically different
evaluations of leader performance. Models 4-7 of Table 4.2 present the results for assessments of
government performance for a host of development sectors. The results suggest that proximity
to active aid projects has a negative impact on citizens’ evaluations of government performance
managing the economy, narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor, addressing
educational needs, improving basic health services, and providing water and sanitation services.
Again, the findings change when comparing completed and inactive projects. Relative to inactive
projects, I find that completed projects are associated with higher performance evaluations of
the government’s performance delivering health care and education and no statistically different
evaluations of performance managing the economy and providing sanitation services. In sum,
the results find that active projects have an adverse effect on citizens’ evaluations of government
performance. In contrast, the results suggest that completed aid projects are more likely to be
attributed to recipient governments and positively factor into citizens’ evaluations of performance.
To test the effect of aid projects on corruption, I utilize Afrobarometer survey questions on
citizens’ perceptions of corruption in various institutions and assessment of government performance
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handling corruption. The primary set of questions on corruption ask, “How many of the following
people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say:
President/Prime Minister and Officials in his Office, Members of Parliament, and Local Government
Councilors”.62 The answers include “none”, “some of them”, “most of them” and “all of them”
and are coded on as ordinal variables from 0 to 3. I also utilize the following question, “How well
or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you
heard enough to say: handling corruption”. Like the performance questions utilized in Table 4.2,
this variable is measured from 1 to 4, with 1 corresponding with “very badly”.
Table 4.3: Foreign aid projects and corruption
Dependent variable: Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
President Parliament Local Council Fighting Corruption
Active 0.005 -0.008 0.052 -0.013
(0.031) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032)
Inactive -0.227*** -0.158*** -0.077** 0.292***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
Completed -0.109*** -0.034 0.064 0.035
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045)
Mean dependent variable: 1.48 1.51 1.54 1.99
Observations 19639 14656 15009 21187
R-squared 0.057 0.072 0.072 0.065
Country & Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference: Active-Inactive 0.232 0.150 0.129 -0.305
F-test: Active-Inactive=0 38.153 21.135 15.043 68.158
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Difference: Completed-Inactive 0.119 0.124 0.141 -0.257
F-test: Completed-Inactive=0 7.795 10.388 13.230 27.330
p-value 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000
Note: The excluded category in the regression is EAs with no active, inactive, or completed
projects within 25km. All models include Afrobarometer survey weights. Standard errors are
clustered on enumeration areas. Difference-in-differences tests are presented in bottom rows. The
p values of difference-in-difference estimates are based on F tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 4.3 presents the results testing the corruption mechanism. The results find that citizens
living near active aid projects are more likely to believe that their government officials are involved
in corruption relative to citizens living near inactive projects. In Model 1, the estimated effect of
active aid projects on perception of executive branch corruption relates to a 0.23 increase from the
mean value of 1.48. Similarly, in Models 2 and 3, the estimated effects of active aid projects on
perceptions of Members of Parliament and Local Government Councilor corruption correspond with
62Corruption questions for Parliament and Local Government Councilors are only available for survey rounds 3-5.
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a 0.15 and 0.13 increase from the mean values of 1.51 and 1.54. The difference-in-difference estimates
in Model 4 also suggest that being near an active aid project decreases citizens’ assessments of their
government’s performance fighting corruption. For all models in Table 4.3, the estimated causal
effect of completed projects on perceptions of corruption is similar to that of active projects. In
contrast to the government performance mechanism, this finding suggests that aid projects have a
long-lasting effect on citizens’ perceptions of corruption.
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of foreign aid projects on trust in political institutions. I theo-
rize that foreign aid projects harm institutional trust by lowering citizens’ evaluations of govern-
ment performance and increasing citizens’ perceptions of political corruption. Employing a spatial
difference-in-difference strategy, the empirical analysis finds that active aid projects are associated
with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and local government council. When testing the-
oretical mechanisms, I find evidence that active aid projects are negatively associated with citizens’
perceptions of government performance and positively associated with perceptions of corruption.
The analysis also examines the differential effects of active and completed projects on trust. The
findings suggest that completed aid projects have a negative effect on citizens’ trust in political
institutions. However, the effect of completed projects constitutes a statistically and substantially
smaller change in trust compared to active projects. The main contribution of the study is to
provide evidence of the long-theorized harmful effect of active aid projects on citizens’ perceptions
of their government. The central finding of the study differs from previous studies that find limited
evidence that aid projects negatively affect government legitimacy and confidence in government
institutions (Dietrich and Winters 2015; Dietrich et al. 2018; Sacks 2012).
Although the generalizability of the findings to greater Sub-Saharan Africa or other regions
should be cautioned, the findings have potentially meaningful implications for state development
and governance in recipient countries. The findings suggest that donors should reconsider the
scale of branding in low-income countries with fragile democratic institutions, where widespread
branding may have harmful effects on trust in political institutions, governance, and democratic
consolidation (Moore 2018). Additionally, the findings support calls for increased collaboration
between NGOs and recipient governments in service delivery (Batley and McLoughlin 2010; Brass
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2016). NGO-government collaboration can mitigate declines in citizens’ perceptions of performance
and support the development of state capacity. Future research on aid and institutional trust could
further examine the effect of completed aid projects on trust. Accurately discerning the differential
impacts of active and completed projects is central to understanding the long term effect of aid
on institutional trust. Future research might also explore how regime type mediates the effect of




This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of how foreign aid impacts political
and economic governance in recipient countries. Good governance is essential to ensure that foreign
aid supports long-term capacity development and poverty alleviation in recipient countries. Gover-
nance has a range of different components including accountability, political stability, government
capacity, control of corruption, sound economic policies, and rule of law. My research advances
knowledge about the impact of Chinese aid on compliance with aid conditionality in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the effect of aid on political budget cycles in developing democracies, and the impact of
aid projects on citizens’ trust in political institutions in developing countries. The essays highlight
how Chinese foreign aid deters compliance with policy reform attached to the disbursement DAC
foreign aid, foreign aid contributes to the incidence of political expenditures cycles and increased
incumbent support, and aid projects decrease citizens’ perceptions of government performance and
trust in political institutions.
Chapter 2 examines how the rise of China as a significant donor impacts recipient country
compliance with Western aid conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter contributes to
the emerging literature on the effects of Chinese aid on governance in recipient countries and the
literature on aid effectiveness. I argue that the presence of a significant non-traditional donor, which
does not utilize conditionality, weakens the material incentives of recipient countries to comply with
conditions attached to foreign aid from traditional donors. The theoretical predictions are tested
using project-level data on government compliance with World Bank project agreements for a
sample of 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000-2014. The empirical analysis finds strong
support for the hypothesis that Chinese development assistance decreases the likelihood of recipient
country compliance with the conditions specified in World Bank project agreements.
The chapter also examines the conditions under which Chinese aid undermines compliance with
World Bank conditionality. The study finds that the negative effect of Chinese aid on compliance
is most pronounced in environments with autocratic regimes and access to natural resource rents.
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These findings suggest that competition from Chinese aid may deter recipient policy reform in
the areas of governance and natural resource transparency aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of
DAC aid. Future research might investigate if the findings of the essay translate to conditionality
attached to IMF lending and aid from prominent DAC donors. Future research might also extend
the analysis to examine whether aid from other non-DAC donors also undermines compliance with
DAC conditionality.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of foreign aid on the incidence of political budget cycles in
expenditures and taxation in developing countries. This chapter aims to understand how foreign
aid impacts economic governance in election years. I theorize that aid increases the likelihood
of political budget cycles by increasing the value of holding office, obscuring voters’ information
about the government’s total budget and quality of incumbent politicians, and creating a soft budget
constraint that discourages fiscal discipline. Using panel data for over 70 developing democracies
from 1990-2012, the empirical analysis demonstrates that political budget cycles in expenditures
are statistically and substantively larger as foreign aid within a country increases. Contrary to
my hypothesis, the analysis reveals no significant relationship between aid and tax revenue prior
to elections. The findings of the paper suggest that the structure of public finance in developing
countries may impact incumbents’ choice of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation strategy. Developing
democracies that receive significant amounts of foreign aid are more likely to manipulate government
spending than tax revenue for electoral purposes.
The central contribution of this chapter is to provide an additional explanation for the oc-
currence of political budget cycles in developing democracies. The chapter also demonstrates an
additional mechanism, enabling political cycles in expenditures, through which foreign aid can help
incumbents gain electoral support. Increased spending prior to elections may be used to provide
public goods and services, temporary civil service employment, subsidies to targeted voters, or
clientelist transfers. The findings have negative implications for political turnover and democratic
consolidation. This chapter produces several avenues for future research on aid and government
spending prior to elections. One avenue is to further explore the effect of aid fungibility on the
incidence and size of political budget cycles in expenditures using disaggregated aid data. A second
avenue is to examine the impact of aid on the composition of political expenditure cycles to examine
if public spending shifts towards current or capital expenditures.
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Chapter 4 investigates the effect of foreign aid projects on citizens’ trust in political institutions
using geolocated data on aid projects and Afrobarometer survey results from Nigeria, Senegal,
and Uganda. In this chapter, I theorize that foreign aid projects harm institutional trust by
lowering citizens’ evaluations of government performance and administrative competence. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence that aid projects lower trust in
political institutions. Using a spatial difference-in-difference strategy, the empirical results find
that active aid projects are associated with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and local
government council. The results also indicate that completed aid projects are associated with
declines in institutional trust, although the effect size constitutes a statistically and substantively
smaller change compared to active projects. Testing causal mechanisms, the analysis finds that
active projects decrease citizens’ perceptions of government performance and increases citizens’
perceptions of leader involvement in corruption.
The findings provide a mechanism through which the non-state provision of public goods and
services can negatively impact governance, political participation, and democratic consolidation
in low-income countries. The study contributes to the practical question of how to best deliver
assistance to the world’s poorest countries and has implications for the use of branding and cooper-
ation between non-state actors and recipient governments. Future research on aid and institutional
trust might further examine the effect of completed aid projects on trust. Accurately discerning
the differential impacts of active and completed projects is central to understanding the long term
effect of aid on institutional trust. Future research might also explore how regime type mediates the
effect of aid on trust and if the effect of aid projects on trust varies across project sectors. Lastly,
the extension of the empirical analysis to a larger sample of countries is necessary to evaluate the
generalizability of the findings to other Sub-Saharan African and low-income countries.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
Incorporating Chinese Aid into the Aid-for-Policy Model Framework
Model Framework
First, consider the following simultaneous stage game between a traditional DAC donor, D, and
recipient government, X.63 The traditional donor decides between the actions of disbursing aid,
DA, to the recipient country and withholding aid, WA. The recipient decides between the actions
of implementing policy reform, R, and no reform, NR. The donor’s strategy set is defined as: sd=
{DA, WA}= {1,0}. The recipient’s strategy set is defined as: sx= {R, NR}= {1,0}.
When deciding to offer aid to a recipient country, the donor will compare its utility without
an aid-for-policy deal to its utility under an aid-for-policy deal. The donor’s utility is defined as:
Ud = Sd(Rd − sdA) + sxω (1)
where Sd is the donor’s utility as function of Rd. Rd is the total amount of resources available to
the donor. Sd is assumed to be an increasing and concave function. Rd is assumed to be exogenous
and constant. A is the amount of aid disbursed by the traditional donor to the recipient country.
ω is the utility the donor receives from policy reform. A and ω are assumed to be exogenous and
constant. s1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the donor allocates aid. sx is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the recipient implements policy reform. If the donor offers aid to the recipient country
(sd = 1), the resources and utility of the donor are reduced. If recipient country implements policy
reform (sx = 1), the donor receives additional utility from reform.
For the donor to offer an aid deal, the increased utility from reform in the recipient country
must at minimum offset the decreased utility resulting from the loss of resources. Thus, the following
inequality is assumed:
Sd(Rd −A) + ω ≥ Sd(Rd) (2)
If this assumption does not hold, lending would never occur. The assumption states that the donor
prefers to give aid if the recipient implements reforms but prefers to give no aid if the recipient
63The formal model adopts a similar framework to that found in Bermeo (2016).
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does not reform. As Sd is strictly increasing, this assumption holds if sx = 1. Under a cooperative
equilibrium, the exchange of aid for policy reform is the best outcome for the donor.
Turning to the recipient country, the recipient will compare its utility without an aid-for-policy
deal to its utility under an aid-for-policy deal. The recipient country’s utility is defined as:
Ux = Sx(Rx + C + sdA)− sxρ (3)
where Sx is the recipient country’s utility function of resources and Rx is the total amount of
domestic resources available to the recipient country. Sx is assumed to be an increasing and
concave function. Rx is assumed to be exogenous and constant. C is the amount of Chinese aid
the recipient country receives. ρ is the cost of policy reform. C and ρ are assumed to be exogenous
and constant. Again, sd is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the donor allocates aid, and sx is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the recipient implements policy reform. The central assumption of
the model is that Chinese aid is unconditional and does not impose a policy reform cost on the
recipient country. In practice, Chinese aid reflects its guiding principle of non-interference and does
not explicitly condition its aid on policy reform.
For recipient country compliance, the increased utility from aid from the traditional donor
must at minimum offset the decreased utility from the cost of policy reform. The recipient country
will accept and comply with an aid deal if :
Sx(Rx + C +A)− ρ ≥ Sx(Rx + C) (4)
The single stage game matrix is presented in Figure 5. In a single stage game, the unique Nash
equilibrium is no cooperation. The recipient will elect to implement no reform because no reform
strictly dominates reform. Therefore, the unique best response for the donor is no aid. Chinese aid
does not factor into the outcome of the single shot game.
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Figure A.1: Single shot game matrix
Infinitely Repeated Simultaneous Aid Game
Now consider an infinitely repeated version of the stage game from the previous section. Future
payoffs are discounted by δd for the donor and δx for the recipient. As is the case in many infinitely
repeated games, this game supports multiple equilibria. This study examines the effect of Chinese
aid on a cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium under a grim trigger strategy.64 The grim trigger
strategy for each player is to cooperate initially and continue to cooperate if no player has ever
defected. Cooperation translates into action DA (Disburse Aid) for D and action R (Reform) for
X. Defection translates into action WA (Withhold Aid) for D and action NR (No Reform) for X.




1 if aj = (1, 1)∀j < t or if t = 1
0 otherwise.
64A limited punishment strategy that punishes for k periods may be a more appropriate strategy to model the real-
world behavior of donors and recipients. However, the grim trigger strategy is simply an extreme version of a
limited punishment strategy. The predictions drawn from the comparative statics of the cooperative equilibrium
under a grim-trigger strategy in this analysis also hold under a limited punishment strategy.
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The donor’s present-discounted payoff under the cooperative strategy is equal to:
Sd(Rd −A) + ω
1− δd
(5)
For the cooperative strategy to be sustainable, the donor’s expected payoff from cooperation
must be greater than or equal to the expected future payoffs from a deviation to withholding aid
(WA). The donor’s best deviation is to defect to WA and continue to play WA in the future. Under
this deviation, the donor will receive utility from reform without providing aid to the recipient
country. In any deviation from cooperation for either player, the future path of the game will be
(WA,NR). For a cooperative strategy to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, the following equality
must hold:
Sd(Rd −A) + ω
1− δd
≥ ω + Sd(Rd)
1− δd
(6)





Turning to the recipient, the recipient’s expected payoffs under cooperation is equal to:
Sx(Rx + C +A)− ρ
1− δx
(8)
For cooperation to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, the recipient’s expected payoffs must be
greater than or equal to the expected future payoffs from a deviation to no reform. For cooperation
to be best response, the following equality must hold:
Sx(Rx + C +A)− ρ
1− δx




Solving for δx yields:
δx ≥
ρ
Sx(Rx + C +A)− Sx(Rx + C)
(10)
For cooperation under a grim trigger strategy to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, no profitable
deviation can exist for either player off path. Consider the previous history of at−1 = (NA,NR). A
deviation by the donor to action DA decreases the donor’s expected payoff by Sd(Rd)−Sd(Rd−A).
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A deviation by the recipient to action R decreases the recipient’s expected payoff by ρ. After either
deviation, the game continues on the path of (WA,NR). Therefore, once the game is off path of the
cooperative strategy, neither player has a profitable deviation.
The comparative statics of equation (10) can provide insight into how Chinese aid affects
recipient country compliance with conditionality. By assumption, S is concave S(x), and, therefore,
∂S
∂x > 0 and
∂2S
∂2x





Sx(Rx + C +A)− Sx(Rx + C)
=
−ρ(S′x(Rx + C +A)− S′x(Rx + C))
(Sx(Rx + C +A)− Sx(Rx + C))2
(11)
The numerator and denominator of the first order condition are both strictly positive.65 There-
fore, ∂∂C > 0. As the amount of Chinese aid the recipient country receives increases, δx increases.
As δx increases, sustainable cooperation becomes less likely. As Chinese aid increases, the range of
δ for which the recipient does not have a profitable deviation decreases. As a result, the number of
scenarios under which cooperation is sustainable decreases.
The model can also provide usual insight on the effect of Chinese aid on the maximum cost
of reform the recipient country is willing to pay in exchange for aid from the traditional donor.
Solving equation (9) for ρ yields:
ρ ≤ δx(Sx(Rx + C +A)− Sx(Rx + C)) (12)
∂
∂C
: δx(Sx(Rx + C +A)− Sx(Rx + C) = δx(S′x(Rx + C +A)− S′x(Rx + C)) (13)
Therefore, ∂∂C < 0. As the amount of Chinese aid the recipient receives increases, the maximum
cost the recipient is willing to pay for aid from the traditional donor deceases. This finding can
also be observed from equation (10). Consider the numerator as the cost of traditional donor aid
and the denominator as the benefit from traditional donor aid. As the amount of Chinese aid
increases, the benefit from aid from the traditional donor shown in the denominator decreases. In
order to hold δx constant, ρ must decrease. Therefore, as the amount of Chinese aid increases, the
65−ρ is strictly negative.
S′x(Rx + C +A)− S′x(Rx + C) < 0.
S′x(Rx + C +A) < S
′
x(Rx + C)∀A > 0.
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cost of reform that the recipient is willing to accept decreases, holding the recipient’s discount rate
constant.
The model predicts that Chinese aid decreases the range of δx in which a cooperative equi-
librium strategy under a grim trigger strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Additionally,
Chinese aid decreases the maximum level of reform cost that a recipient country is willing to accept
in exchange for aid from the traditional donor. The presence of Chinese aid limits the conditions
under which the recipient country is expected to comply with the policy reform requested by the
traditional donor.
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Data sources and Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Compliance 922 0.662 0.473 0.00 1.00
Chinese Official Finance/GDP 805 0.914 1.100 0.00 5.95
Chinese ODA/GDP 805 0.516 0.677 0.00 3.56
Chinese OOF/GDP 805 0.154 0.357 0.00 1.88
Chinese OF per capita (log) 807 1.181 0.857 0.00 3.99
Chinese Share of Total OF 802 10.366 12.575 0.00 82.86
DAC ODA/GDP 802 10.498 8.567 0.21 82.78
NR Rents/GDP 801 12.829 10.384 0.00 51.36
FDI Stock/GDP 792 28.820 45.872 0.20 566.71
Debt/GNI 780 51.094 50.855 4.39 857.04
GDPPC (log) 802 6.610 0.751 5.31 9.31
Executive Corruption 795 0.608 0.211 0.10 0.97
Conflict 787 0.232 0.351 0.00 1.00
Project Duration 921 5.258 3.074 0.01 14.26
Project Amount (log) 922 17.445 1.288 1.79 21.94
Evaluation Count 922 3.460 2.425 1.00 16.00
Population (log) 807 16.382 1.293 11.37 18.94
GDP growth 798 5.425 2.710 -5.41 17.17
Trade/GDP 731 66.016 28.949 30.90 294.20
Polity2 787 2.670 4.525 -9.00 10.00
Political Constraints 728 0.271 0.154 0.00 0.67
UN voting alignment (US) 786 0.118 0.032 0.04 0.31
UNSC 795 0.070 0.147 0.00 0.60
DPF 922 0.213 0.409 0.00 1.00
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Table A.2: Data sources
Indicator Name Definition Source
Government Compliance Binary variable based on Government Performance. Variable is
equal to 1 if Government Performance for a project is rated mod-
erately satisfactory, satisfactory, or highly satisfactory.
IEG WB Project Perfor-
mance Ratings
CHOF/GDP Chinese Official Finance as a percent of GDP. Chinese OF is mea-
sured by commitment amount. Commitment amount excludes
canceled, suspended, or Pipeline-Pledged projects.
AidData China Global Of-
ficial Finance Dataset
CHODA/GDP Chinese ODA-like flows divided by GDP. AidData China Global Of-
ficial Finance Dataset
CHOOF/GDP Sum of Chinese OOF-like flows divided by GDP. AidData China Global Of-
ficial Finance Dataset
Chinese OF per capita Chinese official finance divided by population (log). AidData China Global Of-
ficial Finance Dataset
Chinese Share of Total OF Chinese OF divided sum of Chinese OF and DAC OF. AidData, OECD
DAC ODA/GDP DAC ODA as a percent of GDP. DAC ODA is defined as Net
Disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from




FDI Stock/GDP FDI stock as a percent of GDP. UNCTAD
NR Rents/GDP Total natural resources rent as a percent of GDP. Total natural
resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal
rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.
World Bank WDI
Debt stock/GNI Debt stock as a percent of gross national income. World Bank WDI
GDPPC GDP per capita in constant 2010USD (log). World Bank WDI
Polity2 Polity2 score. Sum of institutionalized democracy and institution-
alized autocracy.
Polity IV Dataset
Executive Corruption Executive corruption index (v2x execcorr). Varieties of Democracy
Conflict Incidence and intensity of conflict. Coded as 1 for minor conflict
(battle deaths<25). Coded as 2 for war (battle deaths>1000).
Harbom & Wallensteen
(2012)
Population Total population (log). World Bank WDI
Trade/GDP Sum of imports and exports as a percent of GDP. World Bank WDI
GDP growth Real growth rate of GDP. World Bank WDI
Chinese Exports Bilateral Chinese exports to recipient country (log). WITS
Chinese FDI inflows Bilateral Chinese FDI inflows into recipient country (log). UNCTAD Bilateral FDI
Statistics 2014
Political Constraints Political constraints index (polcon3). The index measures the
number of veto players and their alignment across the different
branches of government.
Henisz (2000)
UN Voting Alignment (US) Ideal affinity score of UN voting alignment with United States. Voeten et al. (2009)
UNSC Binary variable equal to 1 if country is a temporary member of
UNSC.
Dreher et al. (2009)
Evaluation count Number of World Bank projects evaluated in current year. IEG WB Project Perfor-
mance Ratings
Project Duration World Bank project duration in years. IEG WB Project Perfor-
mance Ratings
Project Cost World Bank project amount (log). IEG WB Project Perfor-
mance Ratings
DPF Binary variable equal to 1 if project is a Development Policy Loan. IEG WB Project Perfor-
mance Ratings
WB Project Sectors Sectors include: 1) Agriculture, 2) Education, 3) Energy and Ex-
tractive, 4) Environment and Natural Resources, 5) Finance and
Markets, 6) Governance, 7) Health, Nutrition, and Population,
8) Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management, 9) Social Protection
and Labor, 10) Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience 11) Transport
and ICT, 12) Water.
IEG WB Project Perfor-
mance Ratings
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Table A.3: Government compliance summary
Country # Projects % Projects with Government Performance
rated moderately satisfactory or above
Angola 14 71%
Benin 34 74%
Burkina Faso 39 77%
Burundi 22 73%
Cabo Verde 20 90%
Cameroon 23 48%
Central African 11 27%
Chad 23 52%
Comoros 9 44%
Democratic Republic of Congo 13 54%
Republic of Congo 9 44%
Cote d’Ivoire 21 57%
Djibouti 11 64%





















Sao Tome and Principe 7 86%
Senegal 47 70%
Seychelles 3 100%
Sierra Leone 29 83%
Somalia 1 100%
South Africa 7 100%








Total Sub-Saharan Africa 1075 68%
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Table A.4: Top 10 recipients of Chinese development assistance
(a) Average Chinese Official Finance/GDP












(b) Chinese Share of Total Official Finance













Figure A.2: Chinese Official Finance to Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure A.3: Government Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa
(% projects rated moderately satisfactory and above)
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Robustness Checks
Table A.5: Conditional logit estimation results (change in log odds coefficients)
Dependent variable:
Government Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Chinese Official Finance per capita (log) -0.528***
(0.189)
Chinese Share of Total OF -0.057***
(0.012)
DAC ODA/GDP 0.035 0.053 0.051
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070)
NR Rents/GDP 0.027 0.030 0.039* 0.028
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021)
FDI Stock/GDP -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.017**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Debt/GNI 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDPPC (log) 1.913 1.284 1.489 1.084
(1.881) (1.711) (1.672) (1.507)
Executive Corruption -7.576*** -7.419*** -6.665*** -7.493***
(2.931) (2.762) (2.584) (2.740)
Conflict -0.521 -0.587 -0.324 -0.406
(0.801) (0.815) (0.814) (0.835)
Project Duration -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.149***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Project Amount (log) -0.021 -0.026 -0.028 -0.033
(0.096) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
Evaluation Count -0.179** -0.178** -0.192** -0.185**
(0.076) (0.078) (0.080) (0.077)
Governance Sector -1.113*** -1.118*** -1.077*** -1.126***
(0.381) (0.389) (0.383) (0.381)
Energy & Natural Resources Sector -0.913** -0.972** -0.930** -0.958***
(0.364) (0.380) (0.364) (0.364)
Economic Policy Sector -0.512* -0.495 -0.504* -0.554*
(0.302) (0.303) (0.301) (0.307)
Agriculture Sector -0.493 -0.489 -0.492 -0.520
(0.345) (0.344) (0.354) (0.352)
Observations 736 736 736 736
Countries 35 35 35 35
Note: All specifications include year fixed effects. Country controls are 5-year lagged averages. Project controls
are measured at exit year. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A.6: Conditional logit specifications with additional economic controls
Dependent variable:
Government Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chinese Official Finance/GDP -0.372*** -0.462*** -0.429*** -0.408*** -0.440*** -0.464*
(0.134) (0.117) (0.119) (0.112) (0.119) (0.259)
DAC ODA/GDP 0.005 0.019 0.028 0.046 0.041 -0.180
(0.085) (0.072) (0.070) (0.066) (0.068) (0.171)
NR Rents/GDP 0.030 0.026 0.031 0.022 0.031 0.043
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.107)
FDI Stock/GDP -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Debt/GNI 0.002 0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.004
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017)
GDPPC (log) 1.538 1.427 1.823 0.870 0.746 -2.944
(1.875) (2.057) (1.941) (2.449) (2.512) (4.242)
Executive Corruption -6.479** -7.011** -7.677*** -7.115*** -8.267*** -21.646**
(2.679) (3.090) (2.936) (2.717) (3.102) (8.449)
Conflict -0.614 -0.282 -0.448 -0.431 -0.526 1.402
(0.768) (0.703) (0.709) (0.800) (0.808) (1.288)
Project Duration -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.137*** -0.145**
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.071)
Project Amount (log) -0.016 -0.022 -0.022 -0.046 -0.016 -0.113
(0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.121) (0.122) (0.162)
Evaluation Count -0.165** -0.173** -0.182** -0.164** -0.199** -0.285***









Chinese Bilateral Exports (log) 0.297
(0.434)
Chinese Bilateral FDI inflows (log) -0.540
(0.461)
Project sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 736 736 736 677 687 289
Countries 35 35 35 33 34 22
Note: All specifications include year fixed effects. Country controls are 5-year lagged averages. Project
controls are measured at exit year. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A.7: Conditional logit specifications with additional political and project controls
Dependent variable:
Government Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Chinese Official Finance/GDP -0.425*** -0.397*** -0.450*** -0.414*** -0.418***
(0.113) (0.123) (0.121) (0.115) (0.120)
DAC ODA/GDP 0.035 0.035 0.029 0.037 0.035
(0.071) (0.071) (0.077) (0.070) (0.070)
NR Rents/GDP 0.030 0.036 0.036 0.030 0.027
(0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023)
FDI Stock/GDP -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Debt/GNI 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
GDPPC (log) 1.963 1.395 2.235 1.806 1.917
(1.820) (2.072) (2.016) (1.867) (1.870)
Executive Corruption -7.825*** -7.977*** -8.364** -7.654** -7.575***
(3.001) (2.978) (3.550) (2.990) (2.927)
Conflict -0.537 -0.511 -0.654 -0.549 -0.522
(0.811) (0.851) (0.820) (0.819) (0.796)
Project Duration -0.144*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.146***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Project Amount (log) -0.022 -0.055 -0.026 -0.022 -0.020
(0.095) (0.099) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Evaluation Count -0.179** -0.166** -0.189** -0.178** -0.179**











Project sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 736 677 729 736 736
Countries 35 32 35 35 35
Note: All specifications include year fixed effects. Country controls are 5-year lagged averages.
Project controls are measured at exit year. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A.8: Instrumental variable analysis robustness checks
Dependent variable:
Compliance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chinese Official Finance/GDP -0.2616** -0.2472**
(0.110) (0.100)
Chinese Official Finance per capita (log) -0.2790** -0.2485**
(0.118) (0.101)
DAC ODA/GDP -0.0157 -0.0169 -0.0075 -0.0084
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
NR Rents/GDP -0.0024 -0.0048 -0.0009 -0.0029
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
FDI Stock/GDP -0.0022 -0.0043
(0.003) (0.003)
Debt/GNI 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDPPC (log) 0.3179 0.2882 0.2169 0.2208
(0.389) (0.369) (0.391) (0.357)
Executive Corruption -2.3419*** -2.3303*** -1.7993*** -1.8233***
(0.778) (0.729) (0.516) (0.495)
Conflict -0.2593* -0.2283 -0.0420 -0.0332
(0.153) (0.141) (0.136) (0.132)




Project Duration -0.0282*** -0.0280*** -0.0267*** -0.0266***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Project Amount (log) -0.0099 -0.0102 -0.0136 -0.0135
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Evaluation Count -0.0440*** -0.0412** -0.0521*** -0.0482***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
pi * FDI Stock/GDP -0.0031 -0.0050**
(0.003) (0.003)
pi *Trade/GDP 0.0082** 0.0094**
(0.004) (0.004)
pi * GDP growth 0.0433 0.0418
(0.028) (0.026)
Project sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 608 608 608 608
Countries 36 36 36 36
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 8.22*** 7.67*** 7.71*** 7.39***
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 30.09 47.42 32.01 56.50
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 8.98 13.03 8.68 14.25
Note: The table reports results from two-stage least squares estimation. pi corresponds with the
probability of the country receiving Chinese aid. All specifications include country fixed effects
and linear time trend. Project sector controls are included in all specifications but not reported.
Country controls are 5-year lagged averages. Project controls are measured at exit year. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Chinese Official Finance/GDP -0.443*** -0.106 -0.238
(0.110) (0.492) (0.193)




Chinese Official Finance/GDP × Polity2 0.028
(0.022)
Executive Corruption -7.907*** -7.370** -7.290**
(3.069) (2.886) (3.023)
Chinese Official Finance/GDP × Executive Corruption -0.497
(0.759)
NR Rents/GDP 0.026 0.031 0.043
(0.028) (0.023) (0.027)
Chinese Official Finance/GDP × NR Rents/GDP -0.012
(0.009)
Observations 736 736 736
Countries 35 35 35
Note: This table corresponds with the marginal effects plots on heterogeneous treatment
effects presented in Figure 2. All specifications include year fixed effects and the baseline
set of country, project, and sector controls. Country controls are 5-year lagged averages.
Project controls are measured at exit year. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expenditures/GDP 1114 24.88 8.63 2.15 58.27
Tax Revenue/GDP 1224 16.10 7.51 0.60 53.87
Election5 1353 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Competitive Election5 1353 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
ODA/GDP 1319 7.84 12.13 -0.63 151.96
Usable ODA/GDP 1319 5.47 9.09 -6.86 148.60
ODA/GDPnotech 1319 6.05 10.56 -0.73 150.34
GDPPC (log) 1306 7.51 1.06 4.75 9.60
GDP Growth Rate 1300 3.66 7.03 -51.03 106.28
Trade/GDP 1262 75.11 39.25 13.75 311.36
Natural Resource Rents/GDP 1312 7.24 9.92 0.00 82.59
Age Dependency Ratio 1353 72.94 17.28 36.36 110.77
Political Constraints 1342 0.33 0.18 0.00 0.69
Conflict 1353 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
New Democracy 1353 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Party Age 1260 24.74 22.64 0.00 183.00
HRV Transparency 1106 1.02 2.03 -7.05 5.90
Media Censorship 1353 0.87 0.93 -2.49 2.71
Debt Stock/GNI 1148 75.84 118.54 0.75 1380.77
ln(100+ Inflation) 1180 4.77 0.42 4.49 10.08
Left Government 821 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
UNSC 1342 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
UN Ideal Point 1326 -0.36 0.51 -1.73 1.71
IMF Arrangement 1353 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
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Fixed Effects Estimation Robustness Checks
Table B.3: Alternative measures of foreign aid
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.676*** 0.680***
(0.056) (0.057)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.695*** 0.694***
0.035) (0.035)
Election5 0.083 0.053 -0.229 -0.309**
(0.266) (0.259) (0.144) (0.149)
ODA/GDPnotech 0.081*** -0.029*
(0.009) (0.015)
Election5 × ODA/GDPnotech 0.097*** 0.047**
(0.036) (0.023)
Usable ODA/GDP 0.088*** -0.043*
(0.019) (0.022)
Election5 × Usable ODA/GDP 0.112*** 0.069**
(0.031) (0.028)
Estimator FE FE FE FE
Observations 1015 1015 1155 1155
Countries 73 73 71 71
Adj. R2 0.55 0.55 0.64 0.64
Note: ODA/GDPnotech excludes technical assistance from net ODA. Usable ODA/GDP
excludes technical assistance and debt relief from net ODA. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in each regres-
sion but are not reported. Control are included but not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.4: Additional controls for Expenditures/GDP model
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.647*** 0.660*** 0.613*** 0.658*** 0.659*** 0.660***
(0.057) (0.060) (0.051) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Election5 -0.073 0.027 -0.407 0.015 0.017 0.022
(0.296) (0.284) (0.353) (0.262) (0.261) (0.259)
ODA/GDP 0.082*** 0.096*** 0.014 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.089***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.043) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.153*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
GDPPC (log) -0.388 -1.286 -0.541 -0.586 -0.181 -0.245
(1.481) (1.676) (1.607) (1.411) (1.427) (1.459)
GDP Growth Rate -0.009 -0.006 -0.017 0.004 0.002 0.000
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Trade/GDP 0.005 0.001 0.023* 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP 0.039 0.011 -0.114 0.013 0.005 0.007
(0.047) (0.047) (0.069) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Age Dependency Ratio 0.035 0.022 0.068 0.043 0.051 0.048
(0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034)
Political Constraints 1.119* 1.034 0.571 1.206** 1.172* 1.086*
(0.648) (0.693) (1.089) (0.600) (0.656) (0.643)
Conflict 0.188 0.298 0.380 0.050 0.077 0.087















Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 904 931 629 1015 1009 1015
Countries 67 71 60 73 72 73
Adj. R2 0.57 0.57 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.56
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in
each regression but are not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.5: Additional controls for Tax/GDP model
Dependent variable:
Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.639*** 0.716*** 0.680*** 0.693*** 0.689*** 0.693***
(0.055) (0.041) (0.049) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
Election5 -0.233 -0.259* -0.355** -0.277* -0.265* -0.285*
(0.158) (0.154) (0.176) (0.148) (0.145) (0.148)
ODA/GDP -0.017* -0.019* -0.088** -0.025* -0.025* -0.025*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.034) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.045*** 0.042** 0.061*** 0.043** 0.043** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
GDPPC (log) 0.556 -0.228 0.013 -0.023 0.076 -0.008
(0.665) (0.564) (0.738) (0.570) (0.587) (0.582)
GDP Growth Rate 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.053** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Trade/GDP 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP 0.040 0.029 -0.001 0.033 0.034 0.034
(0.031) (0.028) (0.043) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Age Dependency Ratio 0.004 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.011
(0.028) (0.023) (0.034) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Political Constraints 0.807* 0.532 0.281 0.486 0.493 0.527
(0.417) (0.388) (0.563) (0.361) (0.379) (0.363)
Conflict 0.001 -0.030 -0.456* -0.110 -0.127 -0.116















Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 1033 1048 739 1155 1143 1155
Countries 65 69 61 71 70 7
Adj. R2 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in each
regression but are not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.6: Addressing outlier concerns
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excl. Outlier Countries Excl. Outlier Obs. Excl. Outlier Countries Excl. Outlier Obs.
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.627*** 0.651***
(0.035) (0.043)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.678*** 0.690***
(0.041) (0.037)
Election5 0.043 0.145 -0.245* -0.223
(0.280) (0.264) (0.146) (0.145)
ODA/GDP 0.101*** 0.118** -0.070** -0.039*
(0.030) (0.050) (0.027) (0.023)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.077** 0.056** 0.037** 0.034**
(0.030) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016)
GDPPC (log) 1.093 -0.082 -0.172 -0.314
(1.596) (1.558) (0.609) (0.524)
GDP Growth Rate -0.046* 0.002 0.042* 0.052***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.021) (0.019)
Trade/GDP 0.013 0.006 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP -0.009 -0.001 0.036 0.041
(0.031) (0.042) (0.027) (0.025)
Age Dependency Ratio 0.028 0.048 0.006 0.012
(0.035) (0.034) (0.023) (0.020)
Political Constraints 0.344 1.093* 0.350 0.398
(0.633) (0.645) (0.347) (0.361)
Conflict 0.085 0.106 -0.115 -0.086
(0.345) (0.343) (0.171) (0.186)
Estimator FE FE FE FE
Observations 931 1009 1080 1146
Countries 67 73 66 71
Adj. R2 0.49 0.55 0.63 0.64
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in each regression
but are not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.7: Alternative election year adjustments
Dependent variable:
Expenditure/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Election Election3 Election6 Election9 Election Election3 Election6 Election9
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.659*** 0.660*** 0.661*** 0.665***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.691*** 0.690*** 0.692*** 0.692***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Electionk -0.075 -0.033 -0.057 0.033 -0.148 -0.182 -0.398** -0.258*
(0.253) (0.262) (0.281) (0.283) (0.151) (0.153) (0.160) (0.147)
ODA/GDP 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.096*** -0.024* -0.025* -0.025* -0.022*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Electionk × ODA/GDP 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.063** 0.050* 0.032 0.036* 0.041** 0.020
(0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) ) (0.018) (0.014)
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 1015 1015 1015 1015 1155 1155 1155 1155
Countries 73 73 73 73 71 71 71 71
Adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63
Note: This table reports estimation results using alternative 3 , 6, and 9 month adjustments to the calendar election year.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in each regression but
are not reported. Control are included but not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.8: Alternative explanations
Dependent variable:
Expenditure/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.661*** 0.660*** 0.593*** 0.661***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.692*** 0.687*** 0.701*** 0.692***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035)
Election5 0.340 -0.118 -0.142 -0.159 -0.353** -0.412* -0.259 -0.499***
(0.249) (0.419) (0.543) (0.469) (0.135) (0.237) (0.266) (0.187)
ODA/GDP 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.072*** 0.090*** -0.025* -0.032** -0.027* -0.025*
(0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.079** 0.080*** 0.042** 0.056*** 0.040 0.045**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.018)
Election5 0.000
(.)
New Democracy 0.079 0.068
(0.306) (0.174)
Election5 × New Democracy -0.651 0.132
(0.456) (0.252)
Party Age -0.003 -0.002
(0.008) (0.004)
Election5 × Party Age 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.005)
HRV Transparency -0.036 -0.048
(0.208) (0.108)
Election5 × HRV Transparency 0.114 -0.005
(0.166) (0.070)
Media Censorship -0.098 -0.075
(0.242) (0.144)
Election5 × Media Censorship 0.161 0.193
(0.282) (0.120)
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 1015 1015 840 1015 1155 1155 972 1155
Countries 73 73 61 73 71 71 59 71
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.64
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country and year fixed effects were included in each regression
but are not reported. Control are included but not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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System-GMM Estimation Robustness Checks
Table B.9: System-GMM estimation results
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.739*** 0.747***
(0.090) (0.089)




ODA/GDP 0.081*** 0.080*** -0.005 -0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.008) (0.008)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.077*** 0.047***
(0.022) (0.015)
Competitive Election5 -0.545 -0.483***
(0.415) (0.175)
Competitive Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.131*** 0.046**
(0.042) (0.020)
GDPPC (log) 0.912** 0.842** 0.326* 0.331*
(0.405) (0.392) (0.191) (0.198)
GDP Growth Rate -0.008 -0.009 0.053** 0.054**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Trade/GDP 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP -0.022 -0.022 -0.009 -0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011)
Age Dependency Ratio -0.021 -0.024 -0.017 -0.018
(0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
Political Constraints 0.696 0.460 0.513* 0.464
(0.690) (0.647) (0.308) (0.315)
Conflict 0.000 -0.059 -0.271 -0.288
(0.416) (0.409) (0.189) (0.193)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 1015 1015 1155 1155
Countries 73 73 71 71
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.15 0.13 0.81 0.74
Hansen 0.44 0.39 0.70 0.71
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are based on
the two-step System-GMM procedure using orthogonal deviations. Instruments are restricted to 3
lags and collapsed to minimize the instrument count. Endogenous variable is the lagged dependent
variables. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are p-values for tests of first- and second-
order autocorrelation. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic test the null hypothesis that
instruments are valid. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.10: System-GMM robustness checks- Alternative specifications
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.778*** 0.682***
(0.105) (0.173)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.888*** 0.905***
(0.079) (0.075)
Election5 0.086 0.009 -0.201 -0.262
(0.328) (0.365) (0.168) (0.178)
ODA/GDP 0.082*** 0.071 -0.030 -0.038
(0.030) (0.058) (0.021) (0.028)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.079** 0.075* 0.035** 0.039**
(0.032) (0.043) (0.016) (0.019)
GDPPC (log) 0.706* -0.399 0.101 -2.707
(0.416) (3.547) (0.175) (1.764)
GDP Growth Rate -0.024 -0.035 0.034* 0.059**
(0.031) (0.043) (0.020) (0.025)
Trade/GDP 0.006 0.006 0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP -0.016 -0.022 -0.004 0.022
(0.031) (0.042) (0.013) (0.030)
Age Dependency Ratio -0.022 -0.088 -0.006 -0.139
(0.022) (0.168) (0.013) (0.090)
Political Constraints 0.349 0.561 0.037 0.516
(0.716) (0.886) (0.337) (0.859)
Conflict 0.172 -0.552 -0.291 -1.162*
(0.421) (1.404) (0.209) (0.688)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 1015 1015 1155 1155
Countries 73.00 73.00 71.00 71.00
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.83 0.76 0.98 0.81
Hansen p-value 0.22 0.56 0.67 0.69
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are
based on the two-step System-GMM procedure. Instruments are restricted to 3 lags and
collapsed to minimize the instrument count. In Columns (1) and (3), the endogenous
variables are the lagged dependent variable, Election5, and ODA/GDP. In Columns
(2) and (4), the endogenous variables are the lagged dependent variable, Election5,
ODA/GDP, GDPPC, and GDP Growth Rate. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2)
are p-values for tests of first-and second-order autocorrelation. The p-values reported
for the Hansen statistic test the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.11: System-GMM robustness Checks- Alternative measures of foreign aid
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.753*** 0.761***
(0.083) (0.090)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.822*** 0.824***
(0.064) (0.064)
Election5 -0.036 -0.050 -0.316** -0.382**
(0.278) (0.282) (0.144) (0.149)
ODA/GDP 0.069*** -0.012
(0.015) (0.010)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.098*** 0.054***
(0.031) (0.020)
Usable ODA/GDP 0.082*** -0.014
(0.030) (0.013)
Election5 × Usable ODA/GDP 0.107*** 0.074***
(0.028) (0.024)
GDPPC (log) 0.773** 0.776** 0.301 0.306
(0.356) (0.376) (0.192) (0.191)
GDP Growth Rate -0.005 -0.001 0.054** 0.053***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
Trade/GDP 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.025) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011)
Age Dependency Ratio -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016
(0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
Political Constraints 0.703 0.656 0.485 0.520*
(0.647) (0.629) (0.305) (0.302)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 1015 1015 1155 1155
Countries 73 73 71 71
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are
based on the two-step System-GMM procedure using orthogonal deviations. Instruments
are restricted to 3 lags and collapsed to minimize the instrument count. Endogenous
variable is the lagged dependent variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
-
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Table B.12: System-GMM robustness checks- Additional controls for Expenditures/GDP model
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.728*** 0.756*** 0.846*** 0.739*** 0.705*** 0.736***
(0.092) (0.101) (0.129) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090)
Election5 -0.246 -0.090 -0.328 -0.041 -0.157 -0.100
(0.336) (0.344) (0.425) (0.296) (0.286) (0.295)
ODA/GDP 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.009 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.081***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.041) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.091*** 0.081*** 0.137*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.077***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
GDPPC (log) 0.729* 0.766* 0.518 0.624* 1.025** 0.909**
(0.428) (0.429) (0.421) (0.367) (0.416) (0.406)
GDP Growth Rate -0.030 -0.019 -0.021 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008
(0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Trade/GDP 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP 0.016 -0.022 -0.052** -0.010 -0.015 -0.022
(0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Age Dependency Ratio -0.026 -0.027 -0.002 -0.020 -0.012 -0.022
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Political Constraints 0.614 0.532 -0.019 0.808 0.749 0.723
(0.702) (0.763) (1.014) (0.668) (0.704) (0.690)
Conflict 0.094 0.057 0.423 -0.100 0.144 -0.016
(0.413) (0.405) (0.543) (0.419) (0.395) (0.415)
Debt Stock/GNI -0.007***
(0.002)












Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 904 931 629 1015 1009 1015
Countries 67 71 60 73 72 73
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are based on the two-step
System-GMM procedure using orthogonal deviations. Instruments are restricted to 3 lags and collapsed to
minimize the instrument count. Endogenous variable is the lagged dependent variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.13: System-GMM robustness checks- additional controls for Tax/GDP model
Dependent variable:
Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.823*** 0.911*** 0.856*** 0.823*** 0.833*** 0.822***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.078) (0.062) (0.057) (0.064)
Election5 -0.330** -0.276* -0.446** -0.363** -0.387*** -0.364**
(0.164) (0.146) (0.186) (0.147) (0.141) (0.147)
ODA/GDP -0.007 -0.004 -0.041*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.046*** 0.041** 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
GDPPC (log) 0.350* 0.164 0.303 0.196 0.282* 0.327*
(0.201) (0.175) (0.262) (0.165) (0.161) (0.191)
GDP Growth Rate 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.076*** 0.053** 0.057*** 0.053**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Trade/GDP 0.008** 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP -0.009 -0.004 -0.016 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age Dependency Ratio -0.013 -0.005 -0.007 -0.017 -0.007 -0.017
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
Political Constraints 0.770* 0.250 0.439 0.509 0.341 0.504*
(0.398) (0.329) (0.469) (0.314) (0.287) (0.301)
Conflict -0.161 -0.104 -0.507* -0.299 -0.142 -0.271















Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 1033 1048 739 1155 1143 1155
Countries 65 69 61 71 70 71
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are based on the two-step
System-GMM procedure using orthogonal deviations. Instruments are restricted to 3 lags and collapsed to
minimize the instrument count. Endogenous variable is the lagged dependent variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.14: System-GMM robustness checks- Addressing outlier concerns
Dependent variable:
Expenditures/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excl. Outlier Countries Excl. Outlier Obs. Excl. Outlier Countries Excl. Outlier Obs.
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.787*** 0.732***
(0.106) (0.106)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.805*** 0.787***
(0.069) (0.080)
Election5 -0.049 0.002 -0.381** -0.301*
(0.346) (0.319) (0.161) (0.154)
ODA/GDP 0.089** 0.106** -0.019 0.009
(0.038) (0.042) (0.015) (0.011)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.084** 0.058** 0.051*** 0.036**
(0.038) (0.029) (0.018) (0.015)
GDPPC (log) 0.774* 0.997** 0.307 0.418*
(0.454) (0.483) (0.215) (0.229)
GDP Growth Rate -0.035 -0.011 0.046* 0.044**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.020)
Trade/GDP 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Natural Resource Rents/GDP -0.020 -0.024 -0.015 -0.013
(0.020) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012)
Age Dependency Ratio -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.023
(0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015)
Political Constraints 0.050 0.555 0.554* 0.544
(0.642) (0.697) (0.313) (0.342)
Conflict 0.083 0.093 -0.379* -0.290
(0.397) (0.442) (0.204) (0.211)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 931 1009 1080 1146
Countries 67 73 66 71
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM
procedure using orthogonal deviations. Instruments are restricted to 3 lags and collapsed to minimize the instrument count.
Endogenous variable is the lagged dependent variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.15: System-GMM robustness checks- Alternative election year adjustments
Dependent variable:
Expenditure/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Election Election3 Election6 Election9 Election Election3 Election6 Election9
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.735*** 0.734*** 0.732*** 0.724***
(0.092) (0.091) (0.088) (0.085)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.820*** 0.818*** 0.820*** 0.816***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Electionk -0.274 -0.252 -0.187 -0.153 -0.216 -0.247* -0.475*** -0.383***
(0.248) (0.258) (0.305) (0.327) (0.146) (0.148) (0.153) (0.146)
ODA/GDP 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.092*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Electionk × ODA/GDP 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.062** 0.066** 0.034** 0.037** 0.043*** 0.034***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 1015 1015 1015 1015 1155 1155 1155 1155
Countries 73 73 73 73 71 71 71 71
Note: This table reports estimation results using alternative 3 , 6, and 9 month adjustments to the calendar election year.
Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure
using orthogonal deviations. Instruments are restricted to 3 lags and collapsed to minimize the instrument count. Endogenous
variable is the lagged dependent variable. Controls variables included but not reported. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.16: System-GMM robustness checks- Alternative explanations
Dependent variable:
Expenditure/GDP Tax Revenue/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L.Expenditures/GDP 0.730*** 0.732*** 0.750*** 0.741***
(0.089) (0.093) (0.105) (0.090)
L.Tax Revenue/GDP 0.810*** 0.803*** 0.831*** 0.826***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.071) (0.062)
Election5 0.287 -0.296 0.062 -0.198 -0.389*** -0.523** -0.361 -0.574***
(0.258) (0.491) (0.635) (0.527) (0.135) (0.246) (0.238) (0.179)
ODA/GDP 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.067*** 0.081*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Election5 × ODA/GDP 0.088*** 0.096*** 0.063* 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.049** 0.048***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.037) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015)
New Democracy 0.769** 0.434**
(0.348) (0.218)
Election5 × New Democracy -0.784* 0.058
(0.462) (0.251)
Party Age -0.006 -0.008*
(0.006) (0.004)
Election5 × Party Age 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.006)
HRV Transparency -0.123 -0.053
(0.120) (0.087)
Election5 × HRV Transparency 0.022 0.021
(0.185) (0.070)
Media Censorship -0.095 0.132
(0.190) (0.089)
Election5 × Media Censorship 0.097 0.174
(0.313) (0.119)
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Observations 1015 1015 840 1015 1155 1155 972 1155
Countries 73 73 61 73 71 71 59 71
Note: Windmeijer-corrrected standard errors reported in parentheses. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM
procedure using orthogonal deviations. Instruments are restricted to 3 lags and collapsed to minimize the instrument count.
Endogenous variable is the lagged dependent variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4
Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Active Project 25km 22746 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Inactive Project 25km 22746 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Completed Project 25km 22746 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
No Project 25km 22746 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Trust President 22199 1.55 1.08 0.00 3.00
Trust Parliament 21661 1.38 1.01 0.00 3.00
Trust Local Council 21733 1.46 1.04 0.00 3.00
Trust Ruling Party 21917 1.35 1.07 0.00 3.00
Trust Courts 21716 1.60 1.00 0.00 3.00
Trust Police 22231 1.27 1.09 0.00 3.00
Trust Military 16347 1.57 1.09 0.00 3.00
Govt. Perf. President 22122 2.62 0.96 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. MP 20938 2.38 0.90 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. Local Council 21155 2.52 0.91 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. Managing Economy 22239 2.08 0.89 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf . Income Gap 22025 1.72 0.80 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. Education 22417 2.47 0.91 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. Health 22494 2.46 0.89 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. Water and Sanitation 22340 2.22 0.93 1.00 4.00
Govt. Perf. Fighting Corruption 21357 1.99 0.93 1.00 4.00
Corruption President 19786 1.48 0.86 0.00 3.00
Corruption Parliament 14759 1.51 0.80 0.00 3.00
Corruption Local Council 15113 1.54 0.82 0.00 3.00
Age 22575 33.70 13.02 18.00 130.00
Education 22687 3.45 2.12 0.00 9.00
Gender 22746 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Urban 22746 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
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Table C.2: Trust in political institutions by country
Measure Nigeria Senegal Uganda
Trust in President/Prime Minister 30% 68% 64%
Trust in Parliament/National Assembly 23% 55% 61%
Trust in Local Council 24% 58% 68%
Trust in Ruling Party 24% 54% 57%
Trust in Courts 36% 77% 62%
Trust in Police 17% 81% 49%
Trust in Military 31% 89% 63%
Note: Afrobarometer respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough to say? Percentages reported in table correspond with the proportion of respondents
who responded “somewhat” or “a lot”.
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Robustness Checks
Table C.3: Foreign aid projects and institutional trust (region-round fixed effects)
Dependent variable: Trust in Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust Index President/PM Parliament Local Council
Active 0.227** 0.058 -0.005 0.144***
(0.095) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033)
Inactive 0.909*** 0.378*** 0.250*** 0.249***
(0.107) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042)
Completed 0.341*** 0.192*** -0.066 0.177***
(0.115) (0.050) (0.042) (0.041)
Observations 20854 22003 21479 21548
R-squared 0.318 0.231 0.223 0.254
Region & Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference: Active-Inactive -0.681 -0.321 -0.255 -0.105
F-test: Active-Inactive=0 45.469 56.218 40.675 6.271
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
Difference: Completed- Inactive -0.568 -0.187 -0.316 -0.072
F-test: Completed-Inactive=0 21.780 12.888 47.995 2.425
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.120
Note: The excluded category in the regression is EAs with no active, inactive, or completed
projects within 25km. All models include Afrobarometer survey weights. Standard errors are
clustered on enumeration areas. Difference-in-differences tests are presented in bottom rows. The
p values of difference-in-difference estimates are based on F tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
118
Table C.4: Foreign aid projects and institutional trust by country
Dependent variable: Trust Index
(1) (2) (3)
Nigeria Senegal Uganda
Active -0.231** -0.557*** -0.023
(0.117) (0.201) (0.114)




Observations 8912 2788 9154
R-squared 0.075 0.185 0.094
Country & Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Difference: Active-Inactive -0.526 -0.425 -0.095
F-test: Active-Inactive=0 15.548 4.353 0.460
p-value 0.000 0.038 0.498
Difference: Completed-Inactive -0.355 0.411
F-test: Completed-Inactive=0 5.099 5.280
p-value 0.024 0.022
Note: The excluded category in the regression is EAs with no active, inactive, or
completed projects within 25km. Standard errors are clustered on enumeration areas.
Difference-in-differences tests are presented in bottom rows. The p values of difference-
in-difference estimates are based on F tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table C.5: Foreign aid projects and institutional trust (alternative empirical strategy)
Dependent variable: Trust in Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust Index President/PM Parliament Local Council
Active -1.065*** -0.331*** -0.379*** -0.360***
(0.214) (0.095) (0.101) (0.066)
Inactive -0.546** -0.110 -0.186* -0.253***
(0.219) (0.097) (0.103) (0.068)
Age 0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.102*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.041***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female 0.099** 0.030* 0.044*** 0.019
(0.041) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Urban -0.498*** -0.132*** -0.144*** -0.217***
(0.079) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
Observations 18330 19435 18925 18992
R-squared 0.257 0.176 0.178 0.208
Country & Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference: Active- Inactive -0.519 -0.221 -0.194 -0.107
F-test: Active-Inactive=0 54.459 56.584 56.548 16.273
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table presents an alternative empirical strategy utilized in Isaksson and Kotsadam
(2018). The strategy defines inactive as respondents living within 25km of an inactive project
that will start at any time after the Afrobarometer survey date. Closed projects and project with
geocoding precision greater than 2 are excluded. The excluded category in the regression is EAs
with no active or inactive projects within 25km. All models include Afrobarometer survey weights.
Standard errors are clustered on enumeration areas. Difference-in-differences tests are presented
in bottom rows. The p values of difference-in-difference estimates are based on F tests. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Location of Afrobarometer Respondents and Aid Projects
Figure C.1: Nigeria Afrobarometer clusters and aid project locations
Figure C.2: Senegal Afrobarometer clusters and aid project locations
Figure C.3: Uganda Afrobarometer clusters and aid project locations
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